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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Chinese corporate disclosure environment has changed dramatically during the past two 
decades as a result political, economic and social changes in China. The establishment of the 
regulatory framework for corporate disclosure and the emergence of new stakeholder groups 
have created a challenging disclosure environment for listed firms in China. The purpose of 
this study is to investigate the response of Chinese listed firms to the changed corporate 
reporting environment in respect to their disclosure behavior. The investigation is conducted 
by examining the voluntary disclosure of strategic, financial and non-financial information in 
297 listed firms’ annual reports in the 1995 to 2006 reporting periods. The empirical findings 
aim to explain 1) to what extent the level of voluntary disclosure of listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market has changed over the period 1995-2006, and 2) what factors have 
contributed to the changes in the level of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market. 
The established theoretical framework based on legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory 
predicts that listed firms would assess stakeholder attributes and identify powerful 
stakeholders in the Chinese stock market. Voluntary disclosure is one of the strategies 
adopted by firms to manage the firm-stakeholder relationship.  
 
The findings of this study show that voluntary disclosure made by listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market increased over the testing period, meaning firms have positively reacted to the 
changed corporate disclosure environment in China. Firms’ ownership structure, corporate 
governance-related factors and economic attributes are used to represent either stakeholder’s 
political or financial stake in listed firms. The findings show that state ownership has a 
significant negative impact on firms’ disclosure decisions, whereas foreign investment has a 
significant positive influence on firms’ voluntary disclosure. The corporate governance 
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régime in the Chinese stock market has exerted pressure on listed firms in respect of 
information disclosure and investor protection. International audit firms were found to play a 
positive and significant role in improving disclosure transparency among listed firms. 
 
This study extends the literature by using a legitimacy and stakeholder theoretical framework 
to explain corporate disclosure changes in the Chinese context. China has displayed 
significant political, economic and social changes in the past three decades. This thesis, 
therefore, contributes to the literature by using a system-oriented view to explore disclosure 
behavior changes in an emerging capital market. More specifically, this longitudinal study 
enriches the corporate disclosure literature by investigating the implications and impact of the 
changing disclosure environment on the level of voluntary corporate disclosure made by 
listed Chinese firms in the context of a rapidly developing Chinese stock market. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The Chinese corporate disclosure environment has changed dramatically during the past two 
decades. Chinese accounting standards have been harmonized with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the regulatory agencies of the Chinese government 
have gradually established a comprehensive regulatory framework for corporate information 
disclosures in the Chinese stock market. The economic reforms launched in China since the 
late 1970s have led to some significant changes to Chinese society. Increased international 
competition and direct foreign investment, rapid development of the Chinese stock market 
and stakeholders’ demands for transparent information have all created a challenging 
disclosure environment for publicly-listed firms in China. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate the impact of the changed disclosure environment on disclosure behavior of listed 
Chinese firms. The investigation is conducted by examining the voluntary disclosure of 
strategic, financial and non-financial information made by listed Chinese firms in their annual 
reports in the 1995-2006 reporting periods. The study investigates empirically whether listed 
Chinese firms have increased their voluntary disclosure due to pressure from public 
stakeholders over the years and whether their voluntary disclosure can be explained by 
16 
 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. Both theories and the theoretical framework based 
on them are elaborated on in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. 
 
Section 1.2 of this chapter describes the general context of this study. Factors that have 
motivated this study are discussed in Section 1.3, and Section 1.4 specifies the research 
issues. Two key terms used in this thesis, voluntary disclosure and corporate disclosure 
environment, are defined in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 overviews the theoretical framework 
established for this study and explains the research methods employed to address the research 
questions. Research findings of this study are summarized in Section 1.7. Section 1.8 
discusses the contributions this study makes to the financial accounting literature. Section 1.9 
outlines the structure of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Context 
 
The general context for this study is the fast-growing economy in China, the rapid 
development of the Chinese stock market and complexities associated with the Chinese stock 
market. In the late 1970s, the Chinese government implemented an economic reform program 
and an open-door policy to promote economic growth. The success of these strategic actions 
is evident with the growth in China’s GDP averaging 10% percent per annum over the 1990 – 
2004 period, driven mainly by huge state investment in infrastructure and heavy industry, and 
by rapid growth of the private sectors (Wikipedia, 2010). International trade has been a major 
component supporting China’s economic growth. With its global trade exceeding US$2.4 
trillion at the end of 2008, China has become an indispensable participant in the global 
economy. The Chinese government has also focused on attracting foreign investment as 
17 
 
another driving force for China’s economy. By 2006, China had received US$69.5 billion in 
foreign director investment (World Bank, 2007), making it the world’s top destination for 
capital inflows. To capture the competitive advantage, more than 400 of the top 500 largest 
companies worldwide have investments in China (People’s Daily, 2005c). A survey 
conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
China recommends that China represents one of the most sustained and rapid economic 
transformations seen in the world economy in the past fifty years, and the pace of economic 
change is likely to be sustained for some time (OECD, 2005). 
 
The establishment of the Chinese stock market is a direct outcome of the economic reform in 
China. The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were officially opened in 1990 and 
1991, respectively. The development of China’s stock market is pivotal to the privatization of 
the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since its establishment, the Chinese stock 
market has been transformed from a fledgling, emerging market to the largest emerging stock 
market in the world. It is now the biggest stock market in Asia outside Japan, with 1879 firms 
listed on two stock exchanges and a total market capitalization equivalent to US$2.6 trillion 
at the end of 2009. There are approximately 146 million individual investors in the Chinese 
stock market (CSRC, 2009). 
 
Corporations have emerged in China following the profound SOE reforms. From the 
beginning of the 1990s the Chinese government has transformed many SOEs into 
corporations with a formal legal status, business structure, expanded administration and 
decision-making powers to increase their operational efficiency and make them more 
competitive, . Since then, these corporations no longer have privileges in obtaining 
continuous fund injections from the Chinese government; these enterprises must seek capital 
18 
 
resources from financial institutions and the capital market. For over a decade, publicly-listed 
firms have benefited most from the fast expansion of the Chinese stock market, raising more 
than US$96.6 billion of capital funds from public investors (CSRC, 2009).  
 
Despite fast growth, the Chinese stock market maintains a low information environment for 
public investors (Lam and Du, 2004). A major problem lies in the lack of transparent 
corporate information available to assist investors and other market participants to effectively 
make informed decisions (Lin and Chen, 2005). Several high-profile corporate scandals 
between 1998 and 20021 further confirm the view that Chinese corporate disclosure generally 
lacks transparency. This problem derives from the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock 
market. The difference between tradable shares and non-tradable shares, and between 
domestic invested class A shares and foreigner invested class B shares prior to 2005, 
complicated the internal control and share trading of listed firms. The diversified and 
conflicting interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders have led to 
“one dominating state-owned share monopolization” and “insider control”2 in listed firms 
(Xu and Wang, 1999). To maintain the confidence of domestic and international investors, 
the Chinese government has demanded corporate governance and disclosure transparency 
from listed firms in recent years (CSRC, 2000).  
 
In October 1992, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin 
released the government report Speed up Reform, Achieving Victory in Building up Socialist 
Undertaking with Chinese Distinguishing Features at China’s 14th National People’s 
                                                      
1 Financial scandals occurring between the late 1990s and early 2000s included Hongguan Shiye (1997), Hainan 
Qiong min run (1999), Xingye Juzhi (2001) and Yinguanxia (2001). 
2 Both terms are elaborated on further in Chapter 4 under the institutional background discussion. 
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Congress3. The significance of this government report is to confirm that the Chinese economy 
is moving from a socialist economy towards a “socialist market economy” and one of the 
essential factors supporting the sustainable economic development in China is the 
development of its capital market. General Secretary Jiang stated explicitly in the government 
report that the standardization and prosperity of the capital market in China would serve to 
optimize the allocation of resources, thereby promoting the growth of the national economy.  
 
To ensure sustainable development of the Chinese stock market, a regulatory framework on 
securities has been gradually established since the opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges. The National People’s Congress issued Company Law in 1993 and Security 
Law in 1999. The stipulation of the Company Law is to meet the needs of establishing a 
modern enterprise system and to standardize the organization and activities of companies in 
the socialist market economy. The issuing of the Security Law represents a new stage of 
legislation and regulation of the Chinese capital market. Its implementation has become the 
cornerstone for regulating the Chinese capital market in subsequent years, with the purpose of 
protecting minority investors’ interests (Tomasic and Andrews, 2007). Between 1992 and 
2000, the State Council 4  promulgated a series of important regulations, particularly 
addressing the trading activities in the Chinese stock market and disclosure requirements for 
listed firms, and aimed at improving the efficiency of the Chinese stock market and attracting 
both domestic and international investors. The established regulatory framework of the 
                                                      
3 In China, the National People’s Congress is the essential political system. According to the Chinese 
constitution, people are the owners of the country and all the rights of PRC belong to the people. The National 
People’s Congress is the supreme agency in which people exercise the state’s right and the National People’s 
Congress has the authorities of making country’s policies and decisions, and also exercises the country’s 
legislative rights (Zhang, 2005). The reports given, the proposals passed and decisions made in the National 
People’s Congress set the mainstream “tune” of China’s political reform, economic development and social 
changes. The State Council is the highest administrative authority and decision making authority. 
4 The State Council of the People's Republic of China, namely the Central People's Government, is the highest 
executive organ of state power, as well as the highest organ of state administration. The State Council is 
responsible for carrying out the principles and policies of the Communist Party of China as well as the 
regulations and laws adopted by the National People’s Congress, and dealing with such affairs as China's 
internal politics, diplomacy, national defense, finance, economy, culture and education. 
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Chinese stock market sends a strong signal to Chinese society and global markets that the 
development of a capital market is essential to China’s long-term economic prosperity.  
 
 1.3 Motivation 
 
This investigation of voluntary disclosure made by listed Chinese firms from 1995 to 2006 is 
motivated by the significance of the Chinese stock market to the nation’s economy and social 
development. The dramatically changed disclosure environment in China during the past two 
decades and the impact of a changed disclosure environment on firms’ disclosure behavior in 
the Chinese stock market over the years is also examined.  
 
1.3.1 Significance of the Chinese stock market 
 
 
The significance of the Chinese stock market is its profound impact on China’s national 
economic development and social development. Since its establishment, the backbone of the 
Chinese stock market is constituted by large-scale and profitable enterprises such as Bao 
Steel, China Life, China PingAn Group and Daqin Railway. The stock markets have listed 
firms coming from a wide range of industries including manufacturing, telecommunications, 
electronics, electricity, power, petroleum, chemicals and financial sectors (CSRC, 2009). The 
stock market has enabled Chinese enterprises to access more financial resources. By the end 
of 2007, listed firms had raised a total of US$246 billion from share issues. These funds have 
facilitated the growth of the Chinese corporate sector, making them more competitive in 
terms of productivity and strengthening their corporate governance through diversified 
ownership structures.  
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In respect of its influence on China’s social development, the Chinese stock market has 
diversified Chinese people’s investment channels. Wealth management has become 
increasingly popular among Chinese investors. The number of individual investment 
accounts increased significantly from 8.4 million in 1992 to nearly 138 million by the end of 
2007, and a total of US$74 billion was distributed as dividends to investors during that 
period. The Chinese stock market has facilitated the improvement of the social security 
system, with more insurance and social security funds being invested in the Chinese stock 
market. The development of the Chinese stock market has also nurtured new industries and a 
large number of professionals are engaging in underwriting, brokerage, asset management, 
legal and accounting consultation, financial analysis and financial planning (CSRC, 2009). 
 
Evidence shows that the Chinese stock market has become a growing driving force of the 
Chinese economy. As one of the direct results of the Chinese economic reforms, the Chinese 
stock market has led the development of the corporate sector in China and demonstrated its 
strong influence over China’s social development.  
 
1.3.2 The dramatically changed disclosure environment in China 
 
A country’s disclosure environment comprises its political context, social environment and 
economic system (Frank, 1979; Perera, 1989; Salter, 1998). In China, during the past three 
decades, the economic reform has led to fundamental changes in almost every aspect of the 
social life of the Chinese people. Politically, Premier Deng Xiaoping (1977-1989) and 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin (1989-2002), two of the leaders of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in the post-Mao Zedong era (1949-1976), abandoned Mao’s political class 
struggles and fights as the main theme of Chinese society. They gave priority to economic 
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reform and development. As a result, the Chinese people have benefitted with reduced 
poverty, higher incomes and improved living standards under Deng and Jiang’s leadership. 
The “Open Door” policy not only brings China capital investment, advanced technology and 
global markets, but also exposes Chinese people to the social environment of other Asian and 
western countries. Some traditional social values and social norms have gradually been 
transformed by the interactions between the Chinese value and Western value systems. As 
Kunkel (1970) suggested, economic development would lead to the changing of those 
selected aspects of man’s social environment which were relevant to the learning of new 
behavior patterns. Chinese society has changed some of its value system, for example, from a 
collectivist and feminist society to one exhibiting characteristics of individualism and 
masculinity5 (Ralston et al., 1999). These value changes are reflected in Chinese people’s 
new material focus and their worship of wealth.  
 
Rapid development of the Chinese economy requires new accounting, reporting and 
disclosure systems to meet its needs. The financial accounting conceptual framework for 
Chinese enterprises was established by a comprehensive accounting system reform launched 
by the Chinese government in the early 1980s. The Chinese government’s “Open Door” 
policy and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 have 
motivated huge foreign investment inflows into the Chinese economy. These economic 
measures give the government more impetus to align Chinese financial accounting systems 
and standards with internationally accepted accounting standards and practices.  
 
The establishment of the Chinese stock market leads to the separation of ownership and 
management in listed firms. There has been fundamental change in financial reporting and 
                                                      
5 Hofstede (1984) identifies these four value dimensions as large versus small power distance, strong versus 
weak uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism and masculinity versus femininity. These value 
dimensions will be explained in detail in Chapter 3.  
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disclosure. The fundamental change is that the objective of corporate disclosure has changed 
from satisfying the information needs of internal management and relevant government 
departments, to satisfying the information needs of public investors. The Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are the two main 
government regulatory agencies managing and regulating the stock market. Since the mid-
1990s, they have issued a series of regulations to govern corporations’ information disclosure 
and corporate governance practices. The roles played by the MOF and the CSRC suggest that 
the Chinese government is willing to improve the information transparency of corporate 
disclosure and protect the interests of public investors in the stock market. In addition to the 
state government, new stakeholder groups for listed firms have emerged. Investors, creditors 
and accounting professional associations are interested in firms’ performance and external 
disclosure as they possess either economic or political stakes in those firms. The stakeholder 
groups exert different degrees of pressure on listed firms to disclose more transparent 
information.  
 
1.3.3 The impact of changed disclosure environment on firms’ disclosure 
behavior 
 
A firm’s information disclosure includes its disclosure mandatorily required by regulations 
and its voluntary disclosure. Compared to mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure can 
reflect firms’ disclosure behavior changes better, as voluntary disclosure is the excess 
information voluntarily disclosed by firms for economic or social consideration and benefit 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Healy and Palepu, 1995; Deegan, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002). 
Voluntary disclosure practices vary from country to country as they can be driven by the 
different information needs of stakeholders such as government, regulators, investors, 
environmentalists or other interested parties in society. The content of firms’ voluntary 
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disclosure has been investigated worldwide. The Steering Committee under the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) in the US reports that American firms voluntarily 
disclose business data (for example, operating data), management’s analysis of business data 
(for example, the identity and past effect of key trends), forward-looking information (for 
example, management plans), information about management and shareholders (for example, 
management compensation and major shareholders), background about the company (for 
example, broad objectives and strategies) and information about intangible assets (FASB, 
2001). Key recommendations given by the Steering Committee are that firms in the US 
should increase their voluntary disclosure of intangible assets, forward-looking information 
and disappointing news. Among European countries, Brennan (2001) reports low voluntary 
disclosure of intellectual capital in Irish firms’ annual reports. Bozzolan et al. (2003) find a 
high level of voluntary disclosure about firms’ customers, distribution channels and business 
collaborations. Vandemaele et al. (2005) compare voluntary disclosure made by firms from 
Sweden, UK and Holland and conclude that Swedish firms’ voluntary disclosure of 
intellectual capital is higher than in the other two countries.  
 
The development of the Chinese stock market during the past twenty years provides a good 
research opportunity to explore voluntary disclosure practices thoroughly in the Chinese 
context through a longitudinal study. The longitudinal approach enables researchers to 
ascertain the main information content listed firms prefer to voluntarily disclose, and the 
information which listed firms avoid disclosing. A long-term trend of voluntary disclosure 
since the early days of the Chinese stock market and any changes related to it can also be 
traced by repeating observation of the same sample firms.  
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Factors motivating corporate voluntary disclosure have been broadly studied in western 
countries (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1991; Skinner, 1994; Zarzeski, 1996; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Most of these studies have investigated the relationship between the level 
of voluntary disclosure and stock prices, and firms’ costs of raising capital. Firms’ specific 
characteristics such as firm size, industry classification, leverage and profitability have been 
identified as determinants of firms’ disclosure decisions. The Chinese stock market has 
attracted some research attention in recent years due to its rapid development and distinctive 
institutional setting. Two studies have particularly concentrated on voluntary disclosure made 
by Chinese listed firms. Researchers use some variables closely associated with the unique 
characteristics of the Chinese stock market. Xiao et al. (2004) investigate voluntary internet-
based disclosure made by the largest 300 listed firms in 2001 and find that factors including 
type of auditor, foreign listing, and legal-person ownership are positively related to firms’ 
voluntary disclosure, while state ownership is negatively related to voluntary disclosure. The 
findings of Xiao and Yuan (2007) show the positive association between foreign ownership 
and firms’ voluntary disclosure. Their study is based on a sample comprised of 559 firms 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2002. The single test periods in both empirical 
studies are not able to generate a trend of changes in voluntary disclosure among listed firms 
in the Chinese stock market. These studies also haven’t identified the key influential factors 
behind firms’ disclosure decisions over a sufficiently long period of time. 
 
Although it has frequently been discussed that factors such as firms’ efforts to gain reputation 
and pressures from corporate regulatory bodies may also be driving the voluntary disclosure 
practices, not enough empirical research has been done to provide evidence supporting these 
assertions in the literature (Boesso and Kumar, 2007). Given the dramatic changes in the 
corporate disclosure environment in China, this study intends to argue that environmental 
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factors have played a major role in improving disclosure transparency in the Chinese stock 
market. Empirical research on voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market over a long 
period of time would provide evidence to test Boesso and Kumar’s assertion.  
 
1.4 Basic research questions 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate and explain the response of listed firms to the changing 
corporate reporting environment in respect of their disclosure behavior in China. The 
improved disclosure behavior could be measured by the increased extent of corporate 
disclosure to the Chinese stock market. This thesis adopts this measurement method. 
Transparent information disclosure in corporate annual reports can be partly achieved by 
following mandatory disclosure requirements. Corporate disclosure promulgation is aimed at 
improving the relevance, reliability and comparability of corporate information. This goal 
could be achieved by standardizing accounting rules determining the recognition and 
measurement of figures presented in the financial statements, or by prescribing the nature, 
quality and quantity of both financial and non-financial information to be presented and 
disclosed in corporate annual reports (Chalmers, 2001). In the Chinese stock market, listed 
firms must follow mandatory disclosure requirements. Xiao (1999) reveals that there is a high 
level of compliance of mandatory disclosure requirements among listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market. 
 
The other way to improve disclosure transparency is through voluntary disclosure. The issue 
of voluntary disclosure is of significance to the global business community. Its importance 
can be evidenced by the voluntary disclosure frameworks developed by the Financial 
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Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 2001) in the US, the OECD (OECD, 2001), the 
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA, 1999) and the Institute for Social 
and Ethical Accounting (ISEA, 1999) in UK. Voluntary disclosures are aimed at reducing the 
information asymmetry between firms and investors and provide clarification about long-
term business sustainability that concerns various stakeholder groups. 
 
Why is voluntary disclosure chosen to represent disclosure behavior change in China rather 
than mandatory disclosure? In the annual reports released in the Chinese stock market, listed 
firms make mandatory information disclosures. The compulsory character of disclosure is 
governed at national level through regulatory agencies in China. External reporting emerged 
in China after the establishment of the Chinese stock market at the beginning of the 1990s. It 
has taken the Chinese government nearly two decades to establish and complete corporate 
reporting and disclosure regulatory frameworks in China. The implication of this 
development process is that, even in the presence of mandatory disclosure regulations, full 
information disclosure is not guaranteed. Initially, the mandatory disclosure requirements of 
the Chinese stock market, compared with the mandatory disclosure requirements in a 
developed stock market, could not typically ensure that investors had all the information they 
needed for making efficient investment decisions. The Chinese government and its agencies 
have learned how to embrace internationally-accepted accounting standards themselves over 
the years. This situation supports why regulatory agencies in China encourage listed firms to 
voluntarily disclose information which, in their view, is useful for investors’ decision-
making. 
 
Academic literature shows that voluntary disclosure behavior is influenced by social and 
economic factors that are specific to firms, aggregately and individually. Listed firms’ 
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voluntary disclosures could be the result of the changed social, economic and political 
environment, regulations put in place by government agencies, or the pressures of public 
investors and other stakeholder groups. Therefore, to investigate the disclosure behavior 
changes of listed firms since the establishment of the Chinese stock market, an examination 
of voluntary disclosure made by listed firms will achieve more effective results than 
examining firms’ mandatory disclosure.  
 
This study argues that the corporate disclosure environment has changed dramatically in 
China over the past twenty years and it is expected that these changes would have impacted 
on corporate disclosure behavior. To investigate how the changed disclosure environment has 
impacted on listed firms’ voluntary disclosure, this study addresses these two specific 
questions: 
RQ1: To what extent the level of voluntary disclosure of listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market has changed during the 1995-2006 period? 
RQ2: What factors have contributed to the changes in the level of voluntary 
disclosure in the Chinese stock market? 
 
1.5 Definitions 
 
Two important key terms are defined in this section: voluntary disclosure and corporate 
disclosure environment.  
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1.5.1 Voluntary disclosure 
 
Both regulatory bodies and academic researchers have defined voluntary disclosure. The 
FASB defines voluntary disclosure as the information primarily outside the financial 
statements that is not explicitly required by accounting rules or standards (FASB, 2001). 
Meek et al. (1995) define voluntary disclosures as the disclosures made in excess of 
requirements. They represent free choices on the part of company management to provide 
information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual reports. Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari (2004) divides annual corporate disclosure into three categories: (1) compliance 
with mandatory disclosure, (2) depth of disclosing mandatory disclosures6, and (3) the extent 
of other voluntary disclosures. Without the distinction between the voluntary disclosures that 
are closely related to mandatory disclosure requirements and other types of disclosures, it is 
difficult to differentiate the information mandatorily required, the information exceeding the 
mandatory requirement and the information that has no direct relationship to mandatory 
requirements.  
 
For the purpose of this study, voluntary disclosures are the additional disclosures made by 
listed firms in their annual reports in addition to the statutory required information. These 
disclosures include: 
 Information closely related to mandatory disclosure requirements where the depth of 
disclosing exceeds the minimum mandatory disclosure requirements.  
 Information that has no direct relationship to the mandatory disclosure requirements. 
 
                                                      
6 The depth of disclosing mandatory disclosures is explained by Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) as the extra 
information that exceeds the minimum requirement of mandatory disclosure regulations.  
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Voluntary disclosures are also classified by academic researchers into three types, namely, 
strategic, financial and non-financial information disclosure (Meek et al., 1995; Eng and 
Mak, 2003). Following prior academic studies, this thesis adopts the following perspectives 
on voluntary disclosure: 
 Strategic information includes general corporate information, corporate strategy, 
acquisition and disposals, research and development, and future prospects.  
 Financial information includes sections such as segmental information, financial 
review, foreign currency information and stock price information.  
 Non-financial information includes information about directors, employee 
information and social policy.  
 
1.5.2 Corporate disclosure environment 
 
A number of international accounting studies have documented variations in financial 
accounting, reporting and disclosure practices across different countries. Diverse 
environmental factors have been suggested to explain differences in disclosure levels 
between countries (Frank, 1979; Belkaoui, 1983; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Salter, 1998; 
Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Hope, 2003). Belkaoui (1983) examines international 
differences in reporting and disclosure adequacy and relates these differences to the economic 
and political environment of each country. In his study, political rights, civil liberties and the 
political system constitute a country’s political environment, while the economic system, 
growth rate of income, government expenditure, gross national product and exports are 
components of the economic environment. Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) and Salter (1998) 
focus on the impact of a country’s economic factors and equity market factors on its 
corporate financial disclosure practices. The type of economy, degree of economic 
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development, level of foreign investment, development and size of the stock market, and 
activities on the stock market are employed as the elements of the disclosure environment. 
Another branch of international accounting studies looks at the roles of a country’s social 
environment in explaining variations in annual report disclosures (Jaggi, 1975; Violet, 1983; 
Perera, 1989; Eddie, 1990; Gray and Vint, 1995; Salter and Niswander, 1995; Chanchani and 
Willett, 2004). These studies either develop their own theoretical frameworks to explore the 
relationship between a country’s social environment and its accounting practices or 
empirically test Gray’s (1988) accounting model, which links the social dimension of 
Hofstede (1980) and accounting values7. The empirical results of these studies indicate that it 
is impossible to dismiss culture as an explanatory variable for firms’ disclosure choices. 
 
A comprehensive multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure was conducted by 
Archambault and Archambault (2003). This study develops a model which combines 
political, economic and social factors that influence the financial disclosure of corporations. It 
extends the literature on disclosure by considering a larger number of variables that represent 
determinants of disclosure, and by empirically testing the model using a large number of 
countries. Political factors include the freedom people have in a society, the legal system and 
the role of the media. A country’s economic system includes the development of its economy 
and its capital market, and its corporate system includes the ownership structures, auditors, 
leverage, size, industries and foreign sales. Social factors include education and religion, in 
addition to Hofstede’s (1980) four social dimensions.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the corporate disclosure environment in China consists mainly 
of three environmental categories: the political environment in China, its economic system 
                                                      
7  The four accounting values are professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity versus flexibility, 
conservatism versus optimism, and secrecy versus transparency.  
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and the social environment in Chinese society. Each category includes components developed 
by prior studies and some specific variables related to the Chinese context. The components 
of each category are as follows8: 
Political environment 
The political environment in this study includes the political system of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) before the late 1970s, and the CCP’s political reform since the early 
1980s. 
Economic system 
The economic system includes the stage of economic development, the objectives of financial 
reporting, the source of, and authority for, accounting standards and disclosure regulations, 
the establishment of corporate governance, the education, professional training and licensing 
system, and the enforcement of standards and regulations. 
Social environment 
The social environment includes the traditional Chinese norms and values, and changes in 
those norms and values in modern Chinese society.  
 
1.6 Overview of the study 
 
The theoretical framework developed for this study is based on legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory. Findings of prior studies based on information perspective and 
contracting research paradigm suggest that a firm’s characteristics, including firm size, 
leverage, profitability and industry classification, are determinants of a firm’s voluntary 
disclosures (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; DeAngelo, 1988; Ng and Koh, 1994; Zarzeski, 
1996; Leventis and Weetman, 2004). These economics-based views, however, limit their 
                                                      
8 These three environmental categories are elaborated on in detail in Chapter 3 when the political, economic and 
social changes in China over the years are discussed.  
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investigation of firms’ voluntary disclosure to the relationship between investors and the 
firms’ management, without considering the broader social impact on corporations’ behavior. 
In recent years, academic studies have used legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to 
explain the voluntary disclosure of social and environmental performance made by 
corporations in western countries (Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al., 2002; O’Donovan, 2002). 
These two theories consider corporations operate in a society where various stakeholder 
groups exist. Corporations’ performance and achievements are affected by these stakeholder 
groups and, meanwhile, are affecting the quality of stakeholders’ lives. To legitimize their 
social status and improve their social image, corporations need to comply with the ‘social 
contract’ between society and corporations. Corporations need to satisfy powerful 
stakeholders’ demands in terms of information disclosure. Social and environmental 
disclosure is a means adopted by corporations to achieve those objectives. Although 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are more frequently used to explain corporate social 
responsibilities in western countries, it doesn’t prevent other studies from using them as 
‘lenses’ to look at voluntary disclosure behavior other than social and environmental 
disclosure. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) adopt legitimacy theory to explain that managers of 
Australian reporting entities voluntarily disclose financial derivative information prior to its 
standard implementation, in order to gain a good reputation in respect of information 
disclosure. 
 
The changes that have occurred in the political, social and economic environment in China 
during the past three decades have led to some specific changes to the corporate disclosure 
environment in the Chinese stock market. The establishment of the regulatory framework for 
corporate disclosure and the emergence of new stakeholder groups have created a challenging 
disclosure environment for listed firms. It is expected that these changes would have 
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impacted on the disclosure behavior of listed firms. This study investigates empirically the 
predictive ability of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory in the Chinese settings.  
 
Adopting legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory, this study identifies main stakeholder 
groups of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. They are regulatory agencies, investors, 
creditors and professional associations. Stakeholder attributes including power, legitimacy 
and urgency of these stakeholder groups are then assessed and the most powerful stakeholder 
group is identified. A set of hypotheses are developed based on the following five 
propositions:  
1. Listed firms in the Chinese stock market need to legitimate their social status to 
respond to a changed disclosure environment and voluntary disclosure is a result of 
stakeholder salience; 
2. Ownership structures reflect shareholders’ financial stakes in listed firms and 
influence firms’ disclosure behavior; 
3. Corporate governance variables reflect political stakes of regulatory agencies and they 
influence firms’ disclosure behavior; 
4. Firms’ economic attributes are closely related to creditors’ and shareholders’ financial 
stakes and are associated with firms’ disclosure behavior; 
5. Listed firms use auditing firms with a good reputation to legitimate their social status. 
 
In this study, voluntary disclosures made by listed firms in their annual reports are chosen as 
the area of interest. A longitudinal research approach is adopted to examine the voluntary 
disclosure made by 297 listed firms in their annual reports to the Chinese stock market during 
the 1995 to 2006 financial reporting periods. Listed firms are selected because they are more 
likely to attract the attention of investors who are interested and rely upon corporate 
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disclosure to make investment decisions in China (Liu, 2005). The annual report released by 
listed firms is a significant element in the disclosure process (Todd and Sherman, 1991). 
Furthermore, the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports is positively linked to the 
voluntary disclosure of quarterly and other published information (Gray et al., 1995). Also, 
companies would like to incorporate the information disclosed voluntarily beforehand 
through other sources into audited annual reports to increase the report’s credibility (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993). Therefore, to a certain degree, the level of voluntary disclosure made 
in annual reports mirrors a company’s overall attitude towards information disclosure to the 
public investors. 
 
A weighted voluntary disclosure checklist was developed for this study based on mandatory 
disclosure requirements stipulated by the Chinese regulatory agencies, a survey of prior 
voluntary disclosure studies and reference to FASB’s voluntary disclosure framework. The 
checklist captures firms’ voluntary disclosure for financial reporting periods from 1995 to 
20069. Items voluntarily disclosed by the listed sample firms in their annual report are 
assigned different scores according to the extent of information disclosed and based on the 
consideration given to the significance of an item to investors’ decision-making. A firm’s 
disclosure score is the sum of the scores assigned to each of the information items. The total 
disclosure score assigned to each sample firm is used as the dependent variable for testing the 
hypotheses. The independent variables are the corporate governance attributes including state 
ownership, legal-person ownership, foreign ownership, proportion of independent directors, 
the existence of an audit committee and the quality of the external auditor. An ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression model is employed to test hypotheses which establish the 
                                                      
9 With the increasing comprehensiveness of the Chinese accounting standards over the years, the voluntary 
disclosure items identified for 1995-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2006 are different. However, the author has 
verified that the differences are marginal. The development of the voluntary disclosure checklist used for this 
study is elaborated on in Chapter 6.  
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relationship between firms’ voluntary disclosure and their corporate governance attributes. 
The whole testing periods, 1995-2006, are further divided into three testing phases. They are 
Phase I, Developing phase (1995-1998); Phase II, Corporate governance regime phase (1999-
2002); and Phase III, Convergence phase (2003-2006). The three testing phases reflect 
different development stages of the Chinese stock market. It is expected that different factors 
will affect firms’ voluntary disclosure during the different testing phases. 
 
1.7 Research findings 
 
The results indicate that the levels of voluntary disclosure made by listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market gradually increased during the 1995-2006 reporting periods. The level of 
voluntary disclosure is represented by both the increased number of disclosing firms and the 
increased extent of voluntary disclosure over the years. Among three testing phases, 
significant increments are found during Phase II (1999-2002 reporting periods). This result 
suggests that when the most powerful stakeholder of listed firms, the regulatory agency 
group, strengthens its regulation and exerts pressure on listed firms to disclose more 
information to the stock market, firms act responsively to satisfy the stakeholders’ demands. 
The pressure from the investor group and creditor group also has motivated listed firms to 
increase their voluntary disclosure.  
 
Univariate statistical results show, however, that listed firms are selective when they 
voluntarily disclose information. Firms are found to be more likely to disclose information 
related to their business operations and strategic plans. More sensitive information such as 
CEO duality, CEO commercial experience, stock price performance and trends of market 
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capitalization, however, have low levels of voluntary disclosure. Listed firms are also found 
to be more likely to disclose forward-looking information. High voluntary disclosures are 
found in relation to earnings forecasts, planned sale targets and future growth opportunity. 
Excess forward-looking information disclosure in the Chinese stock market reflects firms’ 
responses to a regulatory agency’s call in terms of improving information disclosure 
transparency. Low litigation costs may also contribute to the high volume of forward-looking 
information disclosure.  
 
Multivariate statistical test results show different factors influencing firms’ decision-making 
in respect of voluntarily disclosing information during different stages of the development of 
the Chinese stock market. They support all five propositions established for this study. State 
ownership is negatively related to voluntary disclosure, while foreign ownership contributes 
positively to information disclosure transparency throughout the entire testing period. 
Corporate governance related factors, independent directors and the existence of an audit 
committee all play a positive role in improving firms’ voluntary disclosure since the 
corporate governance regime was established in the Chinese stock market. A quality external 
auditor is another factor contributing positively to voluntary disclosure.  
 
1.8 Contribution of the study 
 
As corporate disclosure takes on a more important role in investors’ decision-making in the 
Chinese stock market, researchers have highlighted the need for further investigation into the 
significant change process that has occurred in Chinese corporate disclosure practices. Some 
studies conducted during recent years have addressed different aspects of Chinese corporate 
disclosure, including the level of mandatory disclosure compliance among listed companies 
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(Xiao, 1999); the extent that listed companies would like to disclose sensitive information 
such as related-party transactions and new share subscriptions (Lu, 2002); the relations 
between reported earnings and return on investment (Lee and Cao, 2002); and value 
relevance of accounting information prepared under the Chinese Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Sami and Zhou, 2004). In addition, Xiao et al. (2004), Liu 
(2005) and Leung et al. (2005) try to use company characteristics such as size and the 
structure of ownership as determinants of the transparency of corporate disclosure. However, 
the impact of changed corporate disclosure during the past twenty years has not been well 
addressed, and the question of how listed Chinese firms have responded to the external 
disclosure environment still represents a significant gap in the Chinese corporate disclosure 
literature.  
 
This study extends the literature by using a legitimacy and stakeholder theoretical framework 
to explain corporate disclosure changes in the Chinese context. China has undergone 
significant social and economic changes in the past three decades. This thesis, therefore, 
contributes to the literature by using a system-oriented view to explore disclosure behavior 
changes in an emerging capital market. More specifically, this longitudinal study enriches the 
corporate disclosure literature by investigating the implications and impact of the changed 
disclosure environment on the level of voluntary corporate disclosure, as made by listed 
Chinese firms in the context of the rapidly developing Chinese stock market. Understanding 
why listed Chinese firms voluntarily disclose information is potentially useful for the 
information preparers, users of such information and policy-making bodies, both in China 
and western countries. As the information preparers, listed firms will gain knowledge of what 
extent, what type and the amount of information that should be disclosed in order to be 
successful in competing for funds on the stock market. Knowledge of the influences on 
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voluntary disclosure will also assist users, such as public investors and financial analysts, to 
form reasonable expectations about the type and amount of information being made 
available. Understanding why listed Chinese firms voluntarily disclose information will 
enable the policy-makers in China to gauge the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
regime, compare the harmonization between Chinese accounting standards with 
internationally accepted accounting standards, and assess the ownership reforms implemented 
during the past twenty years. A thorough understanding of the corporate disclosure 
environment in China is also particularly useful for the policy-makers in western countries 
and western corporations, in order to make the best use of opportunities to develop business 
in China. Furthermore, the impact of a changed corporate disclosure environment on 
disclosure behavior in China will provide insights into the ability of Chinese enterprises to 
harmonize their corporate reporting with international corporate governance principles and 
practices. 
 
1.9 Organization of the thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2 contains the literature review. Studies conducted on voluntary disclosure are 
critically reviewed, and a review of two main views used to explain why firms voluntarily 
disclose information to the capital market is included. The information perspective and 
contract perspective are discussed under the economics-based view. Legitimacy theory, 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory are reviewed under the system-oriented view. 
Disclosure studies focusing on the Chinese stock market are also considered, and the gap that 
exists in the literature is identified, particularly in this area.  
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Chapter 3 considers the changes in the disclosure environment in China during the past three 
decades. It examines the political system, economic situation and social values of Chinese 
society before and after the economic reforms launched by the Chinese government in the 
late 1970s. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the accounting reforms and the establishment of a regulatory framework 
for corporate reporting and disclosure during the past twenty years in China. The primary 
purposes of Chapters 3 and 4 are to set up the institutional background for Chapter 5, which 
applies legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory as theoretical foundations for the conceptual 
framework used in this study. 
 
Chapter 5 builds up a theoretical framework for this study. This chapter justifies why 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are more appropriate than economic-based theories 
in explaining the disclosure behavior changes of listed firms in the Chinese setting. The 
stakeholder attributes of various stakeholder groups are assessed in this chapter. Five 
propositions are formed and a set of hypotheses is derived from those propositions to 
establish the relationships between firms’ corporate governance attributes and their voluntary 
disclosures. The entire testing period is further divided into three distinct testing phases, 
Phase I (1995-1998), Phase II (1999-2002) and Phase III (2003-2006). 
 
Chapter 6 contains the research design. It includes the research methodology and the specific 
research methods adopted. The quantitative longitudinal approach employed in this study 
requires repeated observations of the same sample over a long period of time. The sample 
selection, development of a voluntary disclosure checklist, disclosure item weighting and 
data collection are detailed in this chapter. The last section of Chapter 6 discusses the 
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regression model used to explore the relationship between levels of voluntary disclosure and 
the independent variables identified in Chapter 5’s hypotheses, and how to construct 
independent variables.  
 
The results of this study are reported in Chapter 7. Univariate results are presented based on 
three information sections, namely, the strategic, financial and non-financial information 
disclosures during the different testing phases defined in Chapter 6. The trends of firms’ 
disclosure behavior changes, and the preference firms have when voluntarily disclosing 
information, are identified. Multivariate results are also presented in different testing phases. 
In this way, factors significantly influencing firms’ voluntary disclosure during the different 
development stages of the Chinese stock market can be exhibited clearly.  
 
Chapter 8 summarizes the arguments developed in this thesis, provides a discussion of the 
findings, discusses limitations of the study and describes future research implications 
emanating from this study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As defined in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to investigate and explain the response of 
listed firms to the changed corporate reporting environment in respect of their disclosure 
behavior in the Chinese stock market. The Chinese firms’ voluntary disclosure in their annual 
reports is chosen to represent firms’ disclosure behavior. This chapter reviews the theories 
used to explain voluntary disclosure behavior, factors motivating firms to voluntarily disclose 
information and firm-specific determinants of voluntary disclosures. The primary purpose of 
this literature review is to lay the foundation for the theoretical framework for this study. The 
literature review in this chapter demonstrates that voluntary disclosure has been extensively 
explained by two economic consequence theories, namely, information perspective and 
contract perspective (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Firms’ profitability, leverage, size, 
industry, quality of auditor and various elements of corporate governance including 
ownership structure, proportion of independent directors on the board and the internal audit 
committee, have been tested as influential determinants of voluntary disclosure. In addition to 
these two economics-based perspectives, some disclosure studies conducted in recent years 
have also invoked legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory to explain 
voluntary disclosure behavior. These system-oriented theories try to embrace the social 
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impact on corporations’ disclosure behavior. The variables used to measure a firm’s 
legitimacy concerns, stakeholder relationship management and institutional pressure are, 
however, more tailored to specific studies. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the information perspective by looking 
at information asymmetry, the role that information disclosure could play in the stock market, 
information signaling and the proprietary nature of information. Section 2.3 examines the 
contract perspective, exploring how agency theory and corporate governance attributes 
explain firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. Section 2.4 surveys the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure under two economics-based perspectives. Section 2.5 explores three 
system-oriented theories, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory and 
why researchers have adopted them to explain firms’ voluntary disclosure in recent years. 
Disclosure studies of listed firms in the Chinese stock market are reviewed in Section 2.6. 
Section 2.7 summarizes the chapter.  
 
2.2 Information perspective 
 
2.2.1 Information disclosure and the stock market 
 
This section examines the role of corporate disclosure played in capital markets. As Bushman 
and Smith (2004) point out, financial accounting information is the product of corporate 
accounting and external reporting systems that measure and routinely disclose audited, 
quantitative data concerning the financial position and performance of publicly held firms. 
Audited balance sheets, income statements and cash-flow statements, along with supporting 
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note disclosures, form the foundation of the firm-specific information set available to 
investors and regulators. The availability of information is believed to be a key determinant 
of the efficiency of resource-allocation decisions and growth in an economy. However, 
information asymmetry and agency problems impede the efficient allocation of resources in a 
capital market economy (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Information asymmetry occurs when 
management has access to information about a firm, while the information is not equally 
available to public investors. The consequence of information asymmetry is the breakdown of 
the functioning of the capital market. An efficient capital market is a market in which 
investors have access to transparent information on the value of business investment 
opportunities (Palepu et al., 2004). Agency problems arise when investors do not intend to 
play an active role in the firms’ management and delegate the responsibility to the 
management of the firm. The self-interested managers have an incentive to make decisions 
that expropriate investors’ interests by over-consuming perquisites, paying directors 
excessive compensation or making investment decisions that are harmful to the interests of 
outside investor (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market and, in turn, 
in the long run, an efficient capital market contributes positively to a country’s sustainable 
economic development. A growing body of literature in economics and finance has 
investigated the effects of domestic financial development on economic growth and 
efficiency (Levine, 1997). Bushman and Smith (2004) suggest that a country’s economic 
performance can be improved through three channels, which all involve using financial 
information: (1) to help managers or potential entrants to identify promising investment 
opportunities, acquisition candidates or strategic innovations on the basis of the profit 
margins reported by other firms, (2) to enhance firms’ governance role by disciplining 
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managers to direct resources toward projects which can benefit owners of capital, by 
encouraging managers to pursue value-maximizing investment policies, by facilitating 
shareholder monitoring and the effective exercise of shareholder rights, and (3) to reduce 
information asymmetries among investors. Financial accounting information can enhance 
economic performance by reducing adverse selection and liquidity risk. Firms’ timely 
disclosure of high-quality financial accounting information reduces investors’ risk of loss 
from trading with more informed investors, thereby attracting more funds into the capital 
markets and lowering investors’ liquidity risk. Well-developed and liquid capital markets are 
expected to enhance economic growth by facilitating corporate investments that are high-risk, 
high-return and long-term and high quality financial accounting regimes provide important 
support for this capital market function. The three channels illustrated by Bushman and Smith 
(2004) are presented in Figure 2.1.  
 
With the emergence of the Chinese stock market and the separation of ownership and 
management in the Chinese listed firms, the importance of information disclosure has 
become obvious in respect of investor protection, long-term prosperity of the Chinese stock 
market and the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. The significant role played 
by information disclosure in project identification, improving corporate governance and 
reducing information asymmetry has been highlighted by disclosure studies focusing on the 
Chinese market (Xiao, 1999; Xiao et al., 2004; Qu and Leung, 2006; Xiao and Yuan, 2007). 
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Figure 2.1 Three channels through which financial accounting information affects economic 
performance 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Bushman and Smith, 2004, p. 67) 
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2.2.2 Signaling theory 
 
Signaling theory was initially developed by Spence (1973) to explain the behavior in the 
labor markets. Morris (1987) suggests that signaling was a general phenomenon applicable in 
any market with information asymmetry. The theory shows information asymmetry can be 
reduced by the party with more information signaling to others. In stock markets, signaling 
theory predicts that higher quality firms will choose disclosure policies which allow their 
superior quality to be revealed, while lower quality firms will choose accounting methods 
which attempt to hide their poor quality. Managers of higher quality firms will wish to 
distinguish themselves from lower quality firms through voluntary disclosure (Watson et al., 
2002). Higher profitability, better investment opportunity and reputable external auditors are 
used by researchers to represent higher quality firms (Clarkson et al., 1994; Jog and 
McConomy, 2003). However, Skinner (1994) also looks at why firms voluntarily disclose 
bad news. He suggests that less-profitable firms might disclose more information to explain 
the reasons for negative performance, in order to prevent potential litigation costs and 
reputational costs, to reassure the market about future growth, and to avoid severe 
devaluation of share capital and loss of reputation in the stock market as the result of 
disclosing “bad news”. 
 
2.2.3 Cost and benefit considerations 
 
Firms voluntarily disclose information only when the perceived economic benefits out-weigh 
the proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983). Proprietary cost is defined as “the costs associated 
with strategic decision–making by a competitor using all available information” (Luo et al., 
2006, p. 506). Proprietary cost is incurred when the private information conveyed through 
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voluntary disclosure is utilized by a competitor to the detriment of the income-producing 
activities of the firm. Private information, such as future earnings forecasts, is valuable to 
both the capital market and the firm’s strategic opponents, potentially limiting the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Verrecchia (1983) analyses the significance of the existence of a 
proprietary cost. If a proprietary cost exists and information is withheld by firms, investors 
are unsure whether it is withheld because the information represents ‘bad news’, or the 
information represents ‘good news’, but not sufficiently good news to warrant incurring the 
proprietary cost. Empirical studies suggest that disclosure levels decrease in relation to 
proprietary cost; the proprietary cost associated with voluntary disclosure can affect 
disclosure policy and firms need to balance the desire to convey private information against 
their need to protect proprietary information from potential competitors (Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Luo et al., 2006). 
 
Agency theory predicts that voluntary disclosures are likely to be influenced by managerial 
expectations of positive share price effects (Gray and Roberts, 1989). Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) conclude that revealing public information to reduce information 
asymmetry can reduce a firm’s cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large 
investors due to increased liquidity of its securities. Increased security liquidity could drive 
current prices up and result in lower cost of equity capital. The association between lower 
cost of equity capital and greater voluntary disclosure is also supported by Botosan (1997; 
2000). The findings of Eng et al. (2001) suggest that the level of disclosure and the number 
of analysts work hand-in-hand to lower the cost of equity capital in the Singapore stock 
market. The explanation offered is that in a low mandatory disclosure market, the increased 
voluntary disclosure may not be credible to the extent of having an impact on the cost of 
equity capital. However, the presence of a larger number of analysts following a firm’s 
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performance adds credibility to the level of voluntary disclosure, thus resulting in a lower 
cost of equity capital.  
 
2.3 Contract perspective 
2.3.1 Agency theory 
 
Agency theory focuses on the relationship between shareholders (principals) and corporate 
managers (agents). Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define the agency relationship as “a 
contract under which one or more (principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to 
the agent”. This relationship assumes that the agent is driven by self-interest and undertakes 
self-serving activities that could be detrimental to the economic welfare of the principals 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Principals’ monitoring of agents’ behavior and bonding agents’ 
interests with principals’ interests, constitute agency costs. Agency theory suggests that 
voluntary disclosures enable principals to monitor managers’ behavior while reducing agency 
costs that managers would otherwise bear. The reduction in agency costs is a product of 
narrowing the information gap and reducing uncertainty (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
Management’s incentive to engage in such activity is varied with a firm’s characteristics such 
as profitability, leverage, firm size and industry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). 
 
2.3.2 Corporate governance 
Agency perspective suggests that the separation of corporate managers from outside investors 
involves an inherent conflict. This classic perspective has been widely adopted by studies that 
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have investigated the association between firms’ corporate governance and information 
disclosure since the beginning of the 1990s. Corporate governance is the system by which 
companies are directed and managed. Sloan (2001) suggests that financial accounting 
provides financiers with the primary source of independently-verified information about the 
performance of managers. Thus, corporate governance and financial accounting are closely 
linked. Corporate control mechanisms, as defined by Bushman and Smith (2001, p. 1), are 
“the means by which managers are disciplined to act in the investors’ interest”.  
 
The practice of corporate governance has evolved significantly during the last several 
decades as a result of the rapid growth of the capitalist system, the investment in public 
companies and the development of the global economy (OECD, 2004). Because of its 
importance for the economic health of corporations and the welfare of society in general, 
corporate governance has attracted a great deal of public attention. During the 1980s, a series 
of high-profile business failures in the US and UK shook investors’ and banks’ confidence in 
large corporations. Several committees 10  were established to address the corporate 
governance problems. The Cadbury Report (1992), the Greenbury Report (1995) and the 
Hampel Report (1998)11 established baselines for legislation on corporate governance that 
was subsequently enacted in the US, Australia and elsewhere (O’Callaghan, 2003). 
 
                                                      
10 The Treadway Commission was formed in 1987 in the United States. Its primary role was to identify the main 
causes of misrepresentation in financial reports and to recommend ways of reducing the incidence. Financial 
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the UK accountancy profession set up the Cadbury 
Committee in 1991 to inquire into financial aspects of corporate governance. The committee was given the task 
of investigating how large public companies adopt corporate governance guidelines, with a focus on the 
procedures of financial report production and the role of the accounting profession. Later on, the Greenbury 
Committee and the Hampel Committee were formed in the UK. 
11  The Cadbury Report (1992) discusses issues including the role of the board of directors, standards of 
financial reporting, accountability of auditors and directors’ remuneration. The Greenbury Report (1995) 
particularly addresses directors’ remuneration and disclosure. The Hampel Report (1998) reviews the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports. 
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Acknowledging the significant transformation in the role of private corporations in economic 
development, job creation and the welfare of individuals, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), in conjunction with national governments and the 
private sector, developed the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance between 1998 and 
1999. More specifically, experts of the OECD have defined corporate governance as: “… one 
key element in improving economic efficiency and growth as well as enhancing investor 
confidence. Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management and also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are 
set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management 
to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should 
facilitate effective monitoring” (OECD, 2004, p.11). 
 
Consistent with the above definition, the OECD Principles include the rights of shareholders, 
the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency 
and the responsibilities of the board as the essential components of a corporate governance 
framework. The OECD Principles represent the first initiative by an inter-governmental 
organization to develop the core elements of a good corporate governance regime. It can be 
used as a benchmark by governments when they evaluate and improve their laws and 
regulations; meanwhile, it can be referred to by corporations when they develop their 
corporate governance systems and best practices (OECD, 1999). 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, investor confidence and public trust in accounting and 
reporting practices were shattered by a series of very high-profile scandals, such as Enron and 
WorldCom. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 in the US, and introduced highly 
significant legislative changes to financial practice and corporate governance regulation. It 
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introduced stringent new rules with the stated objective: "to protect investors by improving 
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws". 
This Act established enhanced governance and management standards for all US publicly-
listed companies and public accounting firms. The Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, under the Stock Exchange Commission, was formed to oversee public accounting 
firms and issue accounting standards. In general, the efforts made in the UK, the US and the 
OECD addressed the notion that decisions made by the directors and executives of a public 
company should be consistent with the interests of investors. Adequate and accurate 
information concerning the operations and the value of the firm needs to be disclosed in a 
timely and reliable manner. 
 
Disclosure is part of the corporate governance framework and, meanwhile, plays an important 
role in improving corporate governance practices. As noted previously, the separation of 
management and ownership in modern corporations creates opportunities for self-interest 
driven managers to increase their own wealth at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it is common to find that disclosure and transparency are 
emphatically addressed by all corporate governance principles, codes and best practice 
recommendations promoted by numerous organizations and countries worldwide. According 
to the OECD principles, corporate disclosure, as one way of corporations communicating 
their performance with public investors, can be a powerful tool for monitoring and 
influencing the behavior of companies and for protecting investors. Accessing regular, 
reliable and comparable information in sufficient detail enables shareholders and potential 
investors to assess the stewardship of management and make informed decisions about their 
investment. 
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Corporate disclosure comprises both the content of disclosure and the means of disclosure, 
which include the timeliness of disclosure, disclosure intensity and media releases (Bushman 
et al., 2004). The transparency of disclosure is measured by the quantity and quality of the 
publicly available information on the governance structure and financial position. The 
desirable practices of corporate governance should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure 
is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership and governance of the company. Disclosure should include, but not 
be limited to, material information on: the financial and operating results of the company; 
company objectives; major share ownership and voting rights; members of the board and key 
executives, and their remuneration; material foreseeable risk factors; material issues 
regarding employees and other stakeholders; and governance structures and policies (OECD, 
2004). 
 
On one hand, good corporate governance should exist prior to establishing transparent 
disclosure. On the other hand, transparent information will enable investors to participate 
more actively in the construction of good corporate governance mechanisms. As one of the 
external control mechanisms, the critical role of corporate disclosure played in capital 
markets is to reduce the information asymmetry and to solve the agency problem (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Transparency and disclosure give investors opportunities to exercise their 
rights by assessing how and in what manner the corporation is being managed. They should 
go hand-in-hand with a social norm of corporate governance, namely, accountability. The 
question formulated under the notion of accountability is “to whom are corporate managers 
accountable?” Licht (2002) argues that corporations, in the position of “accountables” owe 
shareholders, who are in the position of “accountees”, the accountability duties of promoting 
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the accountees’ interests, transparent reporting and liability to make amends. Without 
transparency and disclosure, accountability will not exist in any meaningful way.  
 
A high level of disclosure transparency contributes to the establishment of confidence in 
capital markets and encourages a better flow of foreign direct investment into a country 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001). Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), states, “If a country does not have a reputation for strong 
corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident 
with the level of disclosure, capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting 
and reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere. All enterprises in that country – 
regardless of how steadfast a particular company’s practices may be, suffer the 
consequences” (cited by Chris, 2002). 
 
2.4 Voluntary disclosure and economic determinants 
2.4.1 Information perspective and agency theory 
 
There are several determinants of voluntary disclosure jointly used by signaling theory and 
agency theory. After examining the logical relationship between signaling and agency 
theories, Morris (1987) concluded that these two theories are consistent theories rather than 
competing theories. Considerable overlap exists between the two theories: rational behavior 
is common to both; information asymmetry in signaling theory is implied by monitoring costs 
in agency theory; ‘quality’ in signaling theory can be defined in terms of agency theory 
variables; and signaling costs are implicit in some bonding devices of agency theory. This 
section reviews the determinants used by signaling theory and agency theory in explaining 
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firms’ voluntary information disclosure. The determinants include firms’ profitability, auditor 
quality, leverage, firm size and industry classification. 
 
Agency theory predicts a positive association between a firm’s profitability and its 
information disclosure. Profitable firms are subject to greater public scrutiny and will, 
therefore, apply self-regulation mechanisms, including voluntary disclosures to avoid any 
external regulation (Ng and Koh, 1994) and to support the continuance of profitable firms’ 
positions and compensation arrangements (Inchausti, 1997). Signaling theory predicts that 
profitable firms will disclose more in order to signal their strong financial position to 
investors (Watson et al., 2002). 
 
Both signaling theory and agency theory suggest a good quality auditing firm is positively 
associated with a firm’s greater information disclosure. Wallace et al. (1994) suggested 
quality auditing firms try to improve the perceived quality of disclosure by having clients 
disclose more information. The effectiveness of auditing and the auditor’s ability to influence 
disclosures is expected to vary with auditor quality. Auditor reputation is used to differentiate 
audit quality (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). As a result, quality audit firms have a stronger 
incentive to maintain their independence and to impose more stringent and extensive 
disclosure standards (DeAngelo, 1988). Therefore, agency theory holds a view that quality 
auditing firms assist in alleviating the conflicts of interest between management and 
investors. Signaling theory predicts that managers are cognizant of quality auditors’ 
incentives to demand higher quality disclosure. Engaging with quality auditors is a signal of 
their acceptance of such demands (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
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Leverage describes a firm’s financial structure and measures the long-term risk implied by 
that structure. It reveals the balance between two sources of long-term finance: funds invested 
by shareholders and funds invested by debt-holders (Watson et al., 2002). Debt increases 
financial risk, as the presence of interest payments causes the shareholders’ earnings stream 
to become more volatile as potential wealth transfers from debt-holders to shareholders and 
managers. Debt contracts are employed to align the interest of firms with those of debt 
claimants. Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and disclosure 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When a firm borrows, the divergence in the interest between 
creditors and management behavior increases the agency cost in the form of increased 
monitoring costs. Reducing monitoring cost may motivate firms to disclose more information 
voluntarily, which enables both shareholders and debt-holders to evaluate whether firms have 
managed the financial resources in the interests of external owners (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Signaling theory also predicts a possible association between disclosure and leverage; 
however, the direction of the relationship is not clear (Watson et al., 2002). While Ross 
(1977) suggests that managers who had confidence in a firm’s future would use an increase in 
financial leverage as a positive signal to the market, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
increased leverage would only send negative signals to shareholders. The empirical research 
also shows inconclusive results. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Leventis and Weetman 
(2004) find that leverage offered no explanation of voluntary disclosure for their sample of 
Mexican firms and firms listed in the Athens stock exchange, respectively. Hossain et al. 
(1995) and Archambault and Archambault (2003) confirm the prediction of agency theory, 
finding that there is a positive relationship between leverage and disclosure.  
 
Firm size has been identified as a significant explanatory factor among disclosure studies 
(Wallace et al., 1994; Zarzeski, 1996; Watson et al., 2002; Archambault and Archambault, 
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2003). The positive association between voluntary disclosure and firm size has been 
explained by large firms’ international resource dependence (Zarzeski, 1996), motivation to 
reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Confronted with greater information demands from the public, large firms are more 
likely to disclose more information to the market. 
 
Industry classification is another significant explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure 
(Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Higher political costs in regulated industries are likely to 
result in higher voluntary disclosure, while highly competitive industries may hinder 
disclosure to avoid proprietary costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In addition, Cooke 
(1991) reports the “follow the leader effect”, meaning that the existence of a dominant 
company in an industry with high levels of voluntary disclosure may have bandwagon effects 
for all firms within the same industry. 
 
2.4.2 Voluntary disclosure and corporate governance attributes 
 
Control mechanisms include both internal mechanisms, such as managerial incentive plans, 
director monitoring and the internal labor market, and external mechanisms. These include 
outside shareholder or debt-holder monitoring, the market for corporate control, competition 
in the product market, the external managerial labor market, and securities laws that protect 
outside investor against expropriation by corporate insiders. This section reviews the 
literature on the association between the level of voluntary disclosure and firms’ corporate 
governance attributes, which include ownership structure (managerial ownership, block-
holder ownership, institutional investors and government ownership), board composition 
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(proportion of independent directors, CEO duality and the existence of an internal audit 
committee) and management compensation. 
 
Managerial ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares held by the CEO and executive 
directors. When managerial ownership is low, there is a greater agency cost as the manager 
has greater incentives to consume perks and reduced incentives to maximize firm value. 
Hence, outside shareholders will increase monitoring of the manager’s behavior to reduce the 
agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring costs increase the costs of the firm. 
However, monitoring by outside shareholders may be reduced if managers can provide 
voluntary disclosure. Thus, voluntary disclosure becomes a substitute for monitoring (Eng 
and Mak, 2003). Empirical evidence provided by Ruland et al. (1990) and Eng and Mak 
(2003) shows that managerial ownership is negatively related to firms’ information 
disclosure. Luo et al. (2006) further confirm that the level of voluntary disclosure of the 
information about future performance of firms is weakened by a higher proportion of 
managerial share ownership, while Warfield et al. (1995) find that the extent of shareholding 
by management is positively associated with the amount of information disclosed about 
earnings. 
 
Block-holder ownership is the percentage of ordinary shares held by substantial shareholders. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that substantial shareholders are expected to have both 
greater power and incentives to monitor management, as their wealth is tied to the firm’s 
financial performance. When share ownership is diffused, the potential conflicts between the 
principal and the agent are raised (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, agency costs are increased 
by involving substantial shareholders in monitoring or controlling activities that potentially 
cause agency problems and more monitoring is required (Noe, 2002). Empirical evidence 
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shows a negative relationship between block-holder ownership and disclosure (McKinnon 
and Dalimunthe, 1993; Hossain et al. 1995; Mitchell et al., 1995; Schadewitz and Blevins, 
1998; Chau and Gray, 2002; Luo et al., 2006). 
 
Institutional investors have strong incentives to search for private pre-disclosure information 
about companies in their portfolios because of their fiduciary responsibilities and large 
resource bases. In addition, large institutional ownership induces a high level of voluntary 
disclosure prior to earnings announcements (El-Gazzar, 1998). However, Schadewitz and 
Blevins (1998) report an inverse relationship between institutional ownership concentration 
and disclosure, based on a study of interim disclosures by Finnish firms. 
 
The relationship between government ownership and voluntary disclosure is examined by 
Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore. Eng and Mak (2003) indicate that government ownership 
may have to look beyond pure profit goals and consider goals related to the interests of the 
whole nation, which may conflict with the commercial objectives of the enterprise. 
Enhancing investor value may not be the primary objective of government ownership. 
Government-linked firms in Singapore receive government funding and are also likely to 
have easier access to different sources of finance compared to non-government-linked firms. 
Managers of government-linked firms are also likely to face less discipline from the market 
for corporate control, because the government is expected to be a long-term investor in the 
firms and is unlikely to support unsolicited takeover offers for government-linked firms. 
Because of the government’s vested interest in the government-linked firms and the 
conflicting objectives faced by these firms, there may be a greater need for communication 
with other investors in the firms. Eng and Mak’s (2003) empirical results show that 
significant government ownership is associated with increased voluntary disclosure. Focused 
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on the same capital market, Luo et al. (2006), however, showed that the existence of 
government ownership has weakened the positive relationship between higher voluntary 
disclosure levels and information disclosure related to firms’ future performance.  
 
The corporate governance of firms, represented by board composition, has also been 
examined by prior studies. Independent directors are measured by the proportion of outside 
directors to the number of directors on the board. The larger the proportion of independent 
directors who are less aligned to management on the board, the more effective it will be in 
monitoring managerial opportunism, and firms can be expected to have more voluntary 
disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Meanwhile, independent directors benefit from establishing 
a reputation as monitoring experts; thus, they have incentives to increase the quantity and 
quality of disclosure (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Forker (1992) finds that a higher percentage 
of independent directors on boards enhances the monitoring of the financial disclosure quality 
and reduces the benefits of withholding information. Findings by Leftwich et al. (1981), 
Chen and Jaggi (2000), Ho and Wang (2001) also confirm a positive relationship between the 
proportion of independent directors and disclosure.  
 
CEO duality has been used as the proxy for the existence of dominant personalities in firms 
(Forker, 1992; Hong and Wang, 2001). Firms that have one individual who serves as 
chairman and chief executive officer/managing director are considered to be more 
managerially dominated (Molz, 1988) and CEO duality signals the absence of separation of 
decision control and decision management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni (1994) and Gul and Leung (2004) suggest that the concentration of decision-making 
power could constrain board independence and reduce its ability to execute its oversight and 
governance roles. In respect of information disclosure, the person who occupies both roles 
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would tend to withhold unfavorable information to outsiders (Molz, 1988). Although Fama 
and Jensen (1983) suggest that any adverse consequence caused by CEO duality could be 
eliminated by market discipline, Forker (1992) and Hong and Wong (2001) assert that a 
dominant personality is detrimental to the quality of disclosure and level of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
The existence of a voluntary internal audit committee is regarded as an important component 
of internal control mechanisms. One of the functions of an internal audit committee is to 
ensure the quality of financial accounting (Collier, 1993). Since an audit committee is 
supposed to consist mainly of non-executive directors, it is influential in reducing the amount 
of information withheld (Hong and Wong, 2001). Agency theory predicts that the 
establishment of audit committees is a means of accentuating agency costs. Forker (1992) 
argues that the existence of audit committees may improve internal control and, thus, regards 
them as an effective monitoring device for improving disclosure quality. His research 
findings show a positive, although weak association between the disclosure of share-options 
and the audit committee among UK firms, while Hong and Wong (2001) find the existence of 
an audit committee is significantly and positively related to the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
 
Several studies have considered the relation between corporate disclosure level and stock 
price-based incentives (Verrecchia, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Nagar et al., 2003). Healy 
and Palepu (2001) suggest that management compensation schemes provide incentives for 
managers to engage in voluntary disclosure to meet restrictions imposed by insider-trading 
rules and to reduce the risk of misevaluation. Nagar et al. (2003) provide evidence that stock 
price-based incentives elicit both good news and bad news disclosures from managers. 
Managers have incentives to release good news because it boosts the stock price, whereas, 
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investors’ potentially negative interpretations of silence (Verrecchia, 1983) and litigation 
costs (Skinner, 1994) are incentives to release bad news. 
 
2.5 A system-oriented view 
 
Information perspective and contract perspective have provided us with valuable insights into 
the determinants of firms’ disclosure choices. However, those perspectives fail to consider a 
more embracing social impact (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). In recent years, a number of 
researchers have adopted ‘system-oriented theories’ to explain voluntary corporate disclosure 
(Deegan 2002; O’Donovan, 2002). A system-oriented view sees the organizations as being 
part of a broader social system. An entity is assumed to be influenced by, and in turn to have 
influence upon, the society in which it operates. A system-oriented view of the organization 
and of society permits us to focus on the role of disclosure in the relationships between 
organizations, the State, individual and group stakeholders (Gray et al., 1996). 
 
Legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory are the three theories under the 
system-oriented view that explain why firms voluntarily make particular disclosures, as 
indicated below. Three theories are all well-linked to political economy theory. Gray et al. 
(1996, p. 47) define the ‘political economy’ as ‘the social, political and economic framework 
within which human life takes place’. Deegan’s (2006) interpretation of this perspective is 
that society, politics and economics are inseparable, therefore, economic issues cannot be 
investigated meaningfully in the absence of considerations about the political, social and 
institutional framework in which the economic activity takes place. Researchers are able to 
consider broader social issues that impact on how an organization operates and what 
information it elects to disclose by considering the political economy. Guthrie and Parker 
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(1990, quoted in Deegan, 2006, p. 252) state “the political economy perspective perceives 
accounting reports as social, political and economic documents. They serve as a tool for 
constructing, sustaining and legitimizing economic and political arrangements, institutions, 
and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation’s private interests. Disclosures 
have the capacity to transmit social, political and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of 
report recipients”. 
 
2.5.1 Legitimacy theory 
 
Legitimacy theory asserts that organizations continually seek to ensure that they operate 
within the bounds and norms of their respective societies (Deegan, 2006). Legitimacy is a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within a socially-constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions 
(Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy theory relies upon the notion of a ‘social contract’ between 
organizations and the society in which they operate. Deegan (2006) suggests that the 
requirements imposed by the law reflect the explicit terms of the social contract, while un-
codified community expectations (which will be perceived to be different by different people) 
constitute the implicit terms of the social contract. The ‘social contract’ represents the 
multitude of implicit and explicit expectations that society has about how the organization 
should conduct its operations. It is assumed that society allows the organization to continue 
operations to the extent that it generally meets their expectations. Failure to comply with 
social expectations may lead to sanctions being imposed by society in the form of legal 
restrictions imposed on its operations, limited resources being provided and reduced demand 
for its products. 
 
64 
 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122) claim that “organizations will take various actions to 
ensure that their operations are perceived to be legitimate”. To be designated as legitimate, a 
firm needs to determine community expectations, identify important stakeholders and 
manage the potential legitimacy gap (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). When a disparity, actual 
or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy 
(O’Donovan, 2002). Legitimacy-threatening issues can be created by the media, regulatory or 
institutional pressures, evolving social awareness and/or corporate/industry crises. 
Management must be cognizant of legitimacy-threatening issues and manage legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995). 
 
Corporate disclosures are considered to represent one way in which an entity can legitimate 
its ongoing operations. The studies by Deegan (2002), Deegan et al. (2002), O’Donovan 
(2002) and O’Dwyer (2003) show that voluntary disclosure of social and environmental 
performance and contribution is one of the means utilized by corporations to gain, maintain 
and repair legitimacy, and legitimate their ongoing existence. The research setting of these 
studies is that community expectations change from time to time. In the 1960s, an 
organization’s sole responsibility was to maximize profits for investors in order to be viewed 
as legitimated (Friedman, 1962). Since the mid-1980s, social expectations have embraced 
economic, environmental and social factor-relationships (Elkington, 1997). Organizations 
must adapt and change accordingly to meet changed social expectations. Failure to do so may 
lead to a revocation of the ‘social contract’ (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). 
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2.5.2 Stakeholder theory 
 
While legitimacy theory discusses society’s expectations in general, stakeholder theory 
considers the different stakeholder groups within society and how they should be managed if 
the entity is to survive and be successful in the long run (Deegan, 2006). Gray et al. (1995) 
suggest that stakeholder and legitimacy theory are two overlapping perspectives as both of 
them are set within a framework of assumptions about political economy. Their suggestion 
implies that the differences are in the levels of resolution of perception rather than arguments 
for and against competing theories.  
 
Freeman and Reed (1983) propose two definitions of a stakeholder. The wider sense of a 
stakeholder is any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
objectives. Public interest groups, protest groups, government agencies, trade associations, 
competitors, unions as well as employees, customer segments and investors are included in 
this definition. The narrow sense of a stakeholder is any identifiable group or individual on 
which the organization is dependent for its continued survival. This definition includes 
employees, customer segments, certain suppliers, key government agencies, shareholders and 
certain financial institutions. The narrow definition indicates that stakeholders are the groups 
of constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm. Each group supplies the firm with 
critical resources or makes a contribution to the firm. In exchange, each expects its interests 
to be satisfied by inducements (March and Simon, 1958). As Hill and Jones (1992) described, 
investors provide the firm with financial capital. In exchange, they expect the firm to 
maximize the risk-adjusted return on their investment. Creditors provide the firm with 
finance and, in exchange, expect their loans to be repaid on schedule. Management and 
employees provide firms with time, skills and human capital commitments. In exchange, they 
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expect fair income and fair and adequate working conditions. Customers supply the firm with 
revenues and expect value for money in exchange. Suppliers provide the firm with inputs and 
seek fair prices and dependable buyers in exchange. Local communities provide the firm with 
locations, a local infrastructure and perhaps favorable tax treatment. In exchange, they expect 
corporate citizens who enhance and/or do not damage their quality of life. The general public, 
as tax payers, provide the firm with a national infrastructure. In exchange, they expect 
corporate citizens who enhance and/or do not damage their quality of life and do not violate 
the rules of the game established by the public through their legislative agents. 
 
Despite the existence of different stakeholder groups, Scott and Lane (2000) believe that 
managers give their attention to certain stakeholders more than others because of time and 
cognitive constraints. Good stakeholder-firm relationship management has clear instrumental 
value for firms, as the ultimate goal of corporation decisions is market place success (Pfeifer 
and Salancik, 1978). Firms view their stakeholders as part of an environment that must be 
managed in order to assure revenues, profits and, ultimately, returns to shareholders (Berman 
et al., 1999). Bailey et al. (2000) and Nasi et al. (1997) suggest that entities respond to those 
stakeholders that are deemed to be “powerful”. A stakeholder’s power to influence corporate 
management is viewed as a function of the stakeholder’s degree of control over resources 
required by the organization, especially financial resources (Ullmann, 1985). For example, 
Neu, Warsame and Pedwell (1998) found that companies were more responsive to the 
demands or concerns of financial stakeholders including shareholders, creditors and 
government regulators than the concerns of environmentalists, because financial stakeholders 
possess power over a firm’s financial resources. Thus, Roberts (1992) suggests that one of the 
major roles of corporate management is to assess the importance of meeting stakeholder 
demands in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the firm. As the level of stakeholder 
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power increases, the importance of meeting stakeholders’ demands increases accordingly. 
Friedman and Miles (2002) believe the expectation and power relativities of the various 
stakeholder groups change over time. Unerman and Bennett (2004) support this argument, 
suggesting that organizations must continually adapt their operating and reporting behaviors 
accordingly as the expectations and power relativities of stakeholder groups’ change. 
 
Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that firms should assess the power of their stakeholders by 
applying sorting criteria and propose that classes of stakeholders should be identified by their 
possession of one, two or all three relationships attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. 
The power attribute refers to a stakeholder’s power to influence the firm, and power is 
defined by Pfeifer (1981, p.3) as “a relationship among social actors in which one social 
actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have 
done”. The legitimacy attribute refers to the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with 
the firm and, legitimacy in this context, is defined as a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially-
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. Legitimacy of a claim on a firm 
is based on contract, exchange, legal title, moral right, at-risk status or moral interest in the 
harms and benefits generated by company actions (Agle et al., 1999). Power and legitimacy 
are defined as core stakeholder attributes. The urgency attribute refers to the urgency of the 
stakeholder’s claim on the firm, and urgency is defined as the degree to which stakeholder 
claims call for immediate attention. Agle et al. (1999) further explain that stakeholder agency 
is a multidimensional notion that includes both criticality and temporality, with a stakeholder 
claim considered to be urgent both when it is important and when delay in paying attention to 
it is unacceptable.  
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Mitchell et al. (1997) classify stakeholders into latent stakeholders, expectant stakeholders 
and definitive stakeholders (Figure 2.2). Latent stakeholders are those possessing only one of 
the three attributes and include dominant (power), discretionary (legitimacy) and demanding 
(urgency) stakeholders. Expectant stakeholders are those possessing two attributes, and 
include dominant (power and legitimacy), dependent (legitimacy and urgency) and dangerous 
(power and urgency) stakeholders. Definitive stakeholders are those possessing all three 
attributes. Individuals or entities possessing none of the attributes are non-stakeholders or 
potential stakeholders.  
 
The theory of stakeholder salience predicts that firms do not respond to all stakeholders 
equally, rather, managers prioritize stakeholder relationships. Mitchell et al. (1997) define 
stakeholder salience as the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder 
claims. For example, shareholders and creditors place emphasis on firms’ profitability and 
wealth creation, while public interest groups, including environmentalists, focus on the 
impact of firms’ operations on the environment. Stakeholder salience is positively associated 
with the cumulative number of the three stakeholder attributes (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Stakeholder salience will be high where all three of the stakeholder attributes - power, 
legitimacy and urgency - are perceived by managers to be present. Stakeholder salience will 
be low where only one of the stakeholder attributes is perceived by managers to be present. 
The Mitchell et al. (1997) theoretical model of stakeholder salience is tested and confirmed 
by Agle et al. (1999). The empirical results of Agle et al. (1999) confirm that, in the minds of 
CEOs, the stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency are individually and 
cumulatively related to stakeholder salience. Their findings suggest that these stakeholder 
attributes affect the degree to which top managers give priority to competing stakeholders. 
Under stakeholder theory, corporate information disclosure is seen as a major element that 
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can be employed by an entity to manage or to manipulate the stakeholder, in order to gain 
their support and approval, or to distract their opposition and disapproval (Gray et al., 1996). 
 
Figure 2.2 Stakeholder typology: one, two or three attributes present 
 
 
 
(Source: Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997, p. 874) 
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2.5.3 Institutional theory 
 
In recent years, some studies have adopted institutional theory to explain voluntary corporate 
disclosure (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992; Deephouse, 1996; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
According to institutional theory, interacting organizations are linked by symbiotic 
relationships that can create institutional pressures limiting the set of rational choices 
organizations can use in demonstrating legitimacy to the public (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). 
Institutional theory implies that the interests, objectives and actions of those external to any 
given organization may also be critically important in understanding an entity’s accounting 
and disclosure choices. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) propose three classifications that relate to the motivation to 
adopt institutional practices – coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative 
isomorphism. Isomorphism refers to the adoption of an institutional practice by an 
organization. Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted 
on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent, and by social 
expectations in the society within which they operate. Deegan (2006) relates this form of 
isomorphism to stakeholder theory and observes that an entity will use voluntary corporate 
reporting disclosures to address the economic, social, environmental and ethical values and 
concerns of those stakeholders who have the most power over the entity. The entity is, 
therefore, coerced by its influential or powerful stakeholders into adopting particular 
voluntary disclosure practices. Mimetic isomorphism is a process that takes place when an 
organization attempts to imitate a more successful referent organization, a process that is 
often due to the uncertainty and lack of guidance in its own environment. Normative 
isomorphism stems from professionalization, that is, the collective struggle of members of an 
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occupation to define their conditions and methods of work. Applying normative isomorphism 
in the context of corporate disclosure, Deegan (2006) suggests that the professional 
expectation that accountants will comply with accounting standards acts as a form of 
normative isomorphism for the organizations in which accountants work to produce 
accounting reports (an institutional practice), which are shaped by accounting standards. In 
terms of voluntary disclosure, normative isomorphic pressures could arise through less formal 
group influences from a range of both formal and informal groups to which managers belong 
– such as the culture and working practices developed within their workplace. 
 
The above discussion shows that rather than being a competing theory to legitimacy theory 
and stakeholder theory, institutional theory provides a complementary perspective in 
explaining corporations’ disclosure behavior and in understanding how corporations respond 
to changing social and institutional pressures and expectations. Carpenter and Feroz (1992) 
draw on institutional theory to explain the state of New York’s decision to adopt GAAP. The 
evidence indicates that the role of professional élites was an important factor in accelerating 
the mimetic and coercive isomorphic processes that were creating institutional pressures for 
New York to adopt GAAP. Various elements of the institutional environment (the 
nation/state, the professions, resource providers and the public) used powerful representatives 
to create institutional pressure for adopting GAAP. In conclusion, they suggest that the state’s 
decision to adopt GAAP was an attempt to regain legitimacy for the state’s financial 
management practices. Deephouse (1996) operationalizes institutional theory by empirically 
investigating the relationship between organizational isomorphism and organizational 
legitimacy in the context of commercial banks. This study suggests that the key step of 
organizational legitimacy is to identify social actors. A legitimate organization is one whose 
values and actions are congruent with those social actors’ values and expectations of action. 
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The social actor accepts or endorses the organization’s means and ends as valid, reasonable 
and rational. Deephouse (1996) identifies government regulators and public opinion as two 
key social actors for commercial banks. He classifies two types of legitimacy, namely, 
regulatory endorsement which is the acceptance of an organization by the state agencies that 
formally regulate it, and public endorsement which is the acceptance of an organization by 
the general public. Regulatory endorsement is measured by a bank’s financial capital, and 
public endorsement is measured by public media exposure. Firms’ age, size and performance 
are also employed as explanatory variables.  
 
The Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) study empirically investigated managers’ responses to 
derivative financial instrument disclosure requirements proposed by the Australian 
accounting standard setting bodies and the Australian Society of Corporate Treasurers 
(ASCT). Confronted with social pressures to make derivative activities more transparent, 
managers responded in a manner that can be explained by both legitimacy theory, 
institutional theory and the maintenance of the managers’ and their firms’ financial reporting 
reputations. While the desire for legitimacy was unobservable, financial reporting reputation 
was proxied by attributes such as ASCT, the auditor and Group of 100 (G100) affiliations. 
ASCT members are expected to exercise personal influence to try and ensure the derivative 
financial instrument disclosures in their employers’ financial statements conform to the ‘best 
practice benchmark’ initiated by their professional body (normative isomorphism). Relative 
to lower reputation audit firms, high reputation audit firms are more likely to suffer 
reputation damage associated with auditing non-disclosing firms. To maintain or enhance 
their reputation status and avoid reputation costs, high reputation audit firms are more likely 
than low reputation audit firms to persuade (or demand) their clients to adhere to the 
recommended disclosure régime. G100 affiliated firms are large firms and their reporting 
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practices are more closely monitored than those of smaller firms. The visibility (both 
politically and communally) of G100 firms creates a necessity for such firms to respond and 
conform to institutional and community demands for derivative financial instrument 
disclosures, more so than firms less-publicly scrutinized. With the exception of auditor 
affiliation, results from the analysis were consistent with expectations. Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2004) suggest that the consistency and significance of the results implies that legitimacy and 
institutional theories provide a plausible explanation as to what impulses prompted managers’ 
responses. 
 
2.6 Disclosure studies in the Chinese stock market 
 
The extant literature of voluntary disclosure worldwide has been surveyed in the preceding 
section, as applicable to this thesis. This section focuses on the literature examining 
disclosure of listed firms in the Chinese stock market and identifies the literature gap in the 
Chinese stock market research. 
 
In respect of corporate disclosure research, the Chinese stock market attracted little attention 
until the mid-1980s owing to political, socio-economic, social and linguistic reasons (Zhou, 
1988). The Chinese economy had experienced a long period of stagnation from the 1960s 
until the early 1980s due to political and social turbulence; Chinese society had isolated itself 
from the world, hence, its economy was not integrated into the global economy. Prior to 
1978, there was no market–oriented competition among enterprises in China. Under the 
centrally-planned economy, the price of commodities and the volume of production were all 
under the tight control of the Chinese government. Financial accounting, reporting and 
disclosure were internally focused, undertaking the function of serving the administrative 
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purpose of the Chinese government and its regulatory agencies such as the Ministry of 
Finance. External disclosure has emerged in China since the early 1990s, when stock 
exchanges were opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
 
Following the economic reforms and consequent economic development in China, a growing 
body of literature on listed firms’ disclosure in China examines the characteristics of 
corporate disclosure and investigates the role played by disclosure in the Chinese stock 
market. Applying the Chinese social dimensions defined by Hofstede and Bond (1988), and 
the Gray (1988) accounting sub-culture model, Chow et al. (1995) explored the social 
constraints on the implementation and development of accounting reforms in China. Chinese 
society, according to the survey conducted by Hofstede and Bond (1988), features large 
power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, collectivism and 
femininity. Based upon the examination of several important phases of China’s accounting 
regulation development, some conventions, doctrines adopted by enterprises and the role 
played by accountants, Chow et al. (1995) suggest that China’s accounting practices and 
disclosure can be classified as statutory control, uniform practices, a conservative 
measurement approach and secrecy in disclosure. Disclosure requirement was reliant on the 
government’s prescription; accessing accounting information, particularly in the public 
ownership sector, was almost impossible. The implication is that transparency of corporate 
disclosure is difficult to achieve under the traditional Chinese social and economic 
environments. The Chow et al. (1995) viewpoint was further supported by the studies by 
Graham and Li (1997) and Bloom and Solotko (2003). 
 
As external disclosure began to play a more significant role in Chinese investors’ decision-
making and in the development of corporate governance in Chinese corporations, researchers 
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have highlighted the need for further investigation into the significant change process that has 
occurred in Chinese corporate disclosure practices. Studies conducted in recent years have 
addressed different aspects of Chinese corporate disclosure. Xiao (1999) indicated that there 
is a high level of mandatory disclosure requirement compliance among listed firms. However, 
firms are reluctant to disclose sensitive information such as related-party transactions and 
new share subscriptions (Liu, 2005). In respect of voluntary disclosure, Xiao et al. (2004), 
Liu and Eddie (2007) and Xiao and Yuan (2007) used firms’ characteristics such as size, the 
structure of ownership, the board composition and auditors as determinants of voluntary 
disclosure made by listed firms on the Chinese stock market. The Chinese government-
owned enterprises listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) voluntarily disclose 
more strategic and financial information than other companies listed there (Ferguson et al., 
2002). 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
This chapter highlights the importance of information disclosure to the development of a 
stock market. The chapter captures the significance of agency theory, signaling theory, 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory. The theoretical framework and 
empirical research of each theory contribute to the understanding of firms’ voluntary 
information disclosure. The discussion in Chapter 2 forms the basis for Chapter 5, in which 
the theoretical framework applicable to China is developed. 
 
In summary, voluntary disclosure has been widely explained and tested by agency theory and 
signaling theory. Empirical results show that voluntary disclosure is related to firms’ 
profitability, size, industry classification and auditors. Investigating the relationship between 
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firms’ corporate governance attributes and information disclosure has been an important 
component of the economics-based perspectives research. A firm’s ownership structure, 
board composition, internal audit committee and management compensation are the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. In recent years, researchers have embraced legitimacy 
theory, stakeholder theory and institutional theory to explain firms’ voluntary disclosure, 
aiming to explore the impact of social influence on firms’ disclosure behavior. Their findings 
suggest that factors such as firms’ social image and reputation in society, and stakeholder 
pressure, have an impact on firms’ disclosure decisions. 
 
The survey of disclosure literature focusing on the Chinese stock market highlights the fact 
that there is a significant gap in the extant literature that needs to be addressed. The impact of 
the changed corporate disclosure environment during the past twenty years on the level of 
corporate voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market has not previously been 
systematically examined. The next two chapters, Chapters 3 and 4, illustrate the political, 
economic and social changes in China over the past three decades, the establishment of the 
regulatory framework, and the growing group of stakeholders of listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market. These two chapters will identify the main stakeholder groups for listed firms, 
so a theoretical framework for this study can be developed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES 
IN CHINA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As described in Chapter 1, this study examines voluntary disclosure made by publicly-listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market in the context of the changed corporate disclosure 
environment. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of firms’ voluntary disclosure 
behavior. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to a discussion of the changes to the corporate 
disclosure environment in China in the past thirty years. Chapter 3 focuses on the political, 
economical and social changes in China since the late 1970s. The extensive changes that 
occurred in these three areas facilitated the establishment of the Chinese stock market, the 
emergence of various stakeholder groups for listed firms, and the development of the 
regulatory framework of corporate accounting, reporting and disclosure in China. Chapter 4 
elaborates on several important aspects of the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure 
in China. The primary purpose of these two chapters is the identification of the main 
stakeholders of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
 
Over the past three decades, China has experienced many significant political, economic and 
social changes. These changes include political reforms, economic reforms and shifts in 
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social values in Chinese society. The political changes in China during the past thirty years 
have influenced and facilitated its economic growth. The Chinese government’s ambition to 
build “a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” was a new concept. China is 
the first communist régime to open up its economy to the world (Moutinola et al., 1995). The 
political changes have led to a remarkable upsurge in China’s economy. Since the inception 
of economic reforms in 1979, China has one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. The 
economic reforms have allowed market prices and private investors to play a significant role 
in production and trade, and enabled the Chinese economy to become substantially integrated 
into the world economy (OECD, 2005). 
 
The above changes have contributed to a diminishing level of poverty and to higher personal 
incomes for the Chinese people. Along with the increase in wealth has been the increased 
exposure of Chinese society to innovative ideas, and a more interactive social environment 
between China and other societies. The traditional Chinese society has undergone significant 
changes as a result of the relatively more relaxed political environment and rapid economic 
development. The corporate disclosure environment, which has evolved in the context of the 
above changes in China during the past twenty years, reflects some of the characteristics of 
those changes. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the political system prior to 1978 and 
political reform post-1978. The economic reforms and current corporate structure and 
operating environment are addressed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 illustrates some of the social 
changes in China during the past three decades. Section 3.5 summarizes the chapter. 
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3.2 Political changes in China 
3.2.1 The political system prior to 1978 
 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949, taking socialism as its basic political system and applying Marxism-Leninism in China. 
During the Mao Zedong era (1949-1976), the major political developments were the 
centralization of party and government administration. The CCP undertook the leading role in 
China’s political, economic and social life. It set policies and controlled their execution 
through government officials and, effectively, made the government an element of the party. 
The CCP’s political leadership permeated in various levels of the government and institutions 
including the National People’s Congress (NPC), State Council and related Ministries and 
Bureaux. Important government policies were required to be submitted to the central party 
committee first for examination and approval before implementation (Zhang, 2005). During 
the early stages of the communist administration, the highly-disciplined new leadership 
gained the cooperation of all classes of people including the workers, peasants, petite 
bourgeoisie and the national capitalists in Chinese society. Social stability was achieved by 
implementing moderate social and economic policies with skill and effectiveness. However, 
several major political campaigns initiated by Mao, including “The Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (1966–1976)”12, put the nation in a state of serious political uncertainty. The 
                                                      
12 Mao initiated several political campaigns against the “enemies of the state”, actual and potential, during his 
era. In the early 1950s, these enemies consisted of "war criminals, traitors, bureaucratic capitalists, and 
counterrevolutionaries". The major targets in this drive were foreigners and Christian missionaries who were 
branded as United States’ agents at mass trials. The 1951-52 drive against political enemies was accompanied 
by land reform. The redistribution of land was accelerated, and a class struggle between landlords and wealthy 
peasants was launched. An ideological reform campaign requiring self-criticisms and public confessions by 
university faculty members, scientists, and other professional workers was given wide publicity. Artists and 
writers were soon the objects of similar treatment for failing to heed Mao's dictum that culture and literature 
must reflect the class interest of the working people, led by the CCP. These campaigns were accompanied in 
1951 and 1952 by the "three anti" and "five anti" movements. The former was directed ostensibly against the 
evils of "corruption, waste, and bureaucratism"; its real aim was to eliminate incompetent and politically 
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disorder in Chinese society caused the stagnation of the national economy during the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
 
3.2.2 Political reform 
 
The year 1978 proved a crucial one for the reformers in China. The new leader of the CCP, 
Deng Xiaoping, who sought genuine party reform, took the initiative to reorganize the 
bureaucracy and re-direct policy. The CCP then underwent a series of political reforms under 
Deng’s guidance after 1979 (Zhang, 2005). 
 
The political reform in China focused on democratization which consists of three factors. 
First was the separation between the CCP and the state government. The Thirteenth Plenum 
of the Party’s Congress in 1987 clearly pointed out that the CCP’s function was to exercise 
leadership on political principles and directions, while the state government had more control 
over specific economic policies and strategies (Goldman, 2006). Local governments gained 
more power to formulate public policy, which took the needs of the local private economy 
into account (Fewsmith, 2006). Second, research establishes that a major shift in ideology 
underpinned the reforms, with the CCP moving from a dogmatic emphasis on the Maoist 
version of Marxism-Leninism to a pragmatic, market-oriented approach. Although the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
unreliable public officials and to bring about an efficient, disciplined, and responsive bureaucratic system. The 
later movement was aimed at eliminating recalcitrant and corrupt businessmen and industrialists, who were, in 
effect, the targets of the CCP's condemnation of "tax evasion, bribery, cheating in government contracts, theft of 
economic intelligence, and stealing of state assets". In the course of this campaign, the Party claimed to have 
uncovered a well-organized attempt by businessmen and industrialists to corrupt party and government officials. 
This charge was enlarged into an assault on the bourgeoisie as a whole. The number of people affected by the 
various punitive or reform campaigns was estimated to be in the millions. In mid-1966 Mao's campaign against 
a wide variety of public figures, including State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and other Party and state leaders, had 
erupted into what came to be known as the Great Proletarian Social Revolution, the first mass action to have 
emerged against the CCP apparatus itself. 
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rhetoric of socialism has been retained (the so called ‘socialist market economy’), the staunch 
anti-market, anti-private gain focus has been removed (Moutinola et al., 1995). Third, China 
has, for the first time under the communists, opened up its economy. In 1979, China 
established four special economic zones to facilitate foreign investment projects. In 1984, the 
central government declared fourteen coastal cities as “coastal open cities” and, in early 
1990, several “development zones” were established among inland cities along the Yangtze 
River and cities bordering Russia, in order to further develop international trade and attract 
foreign investment (Moutinola et al., 1995). 
 
Although there has been no significant improvement in respect of giving people individual 
rights of free speech and political participation, or establishing a viable system of competition 
for political office, or a set of constitutional limits on the state, during the past three decades, 
the political reforms in China have gradually introduced at least some limited democratic 
principles and some controlled political participation (Goldman, 2006). The system of the 
People’s Congress was resumed and direct election of the People’s representatives has been 
expanded to the country level. It has become a system where people from all levels can listen 
to reports from the government, the Court of Justice and Court of Procuratorate (Zhang, 
2005). In addition, there has been a promotion of “public recommendation and public 
election”. From the late 1980s, villagers began holding multi-candidate elections for village 
heads and councils. During the early years of the 21st century, public elections had spread to 
90 percent of China’s villages in rural areas, and to local government and neighborhood 
committees in the cities (Fewsmith, 2006). Meanwhile, the political reforms also led to the 
decentralization of decision-making and to an empowering of the lower-level officials in 
much of China. The system’s decentralization has made the central level less relevant. “It 
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used to be that when the CCP centre spoke, the people all listened and obeyed. That day is 
gone.” (Lewis and Litai, 2003) 
 
3.3 Economic reforms in China 
3.3.1 China’s economy prior to 1978 
 
China’s political system determines its economic system (Zhang, 2005). The economic 
system in China has undergone some dramatic changes during the past six decades since the 
CCP established the PRC in 1949. Chiapello and Ding (2005) divided the Chinese economy 
into three major periods: introduction and application of the communist economic system 
(1949-1978), economic reform and the open door policy (1978-1992), and the development 
of a “socialist market economy” since 1992. The legitimacy characteristic of a communist 
economy is community well-being rather than economic efficiency. The communist 
economic system emphasizes equal wealth distribution, public property responsibility, wages 
and price controls, currency and trade regulations (Dillard et al., 2004). 
 
Prior to 1978, the CCP maintained a centrally-planned communist economy and adopted a 
socialist heavy-industry-development strategy. As a result, household consumption was 
reduced while rapid industrialization was given high priority. By 1978, nearly three-quarters 
of industrial production was produced by centrally-controlled SOEs (Morrison, 2006). 
Perceived demand was converted into specific production targets for each enterprise. Capital, 
labor, equipment and materials were all allocated to enterprises on the basis of production 
targets set by state or local government through national ministries or departments (Li, W., 
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1997). The aim of the management in SOEs was to achieve the quantitative production 
quotas assigned by the government rather than good financial performance.  
 
Between the early 1950s and the late 1970s, the goal of the Chinese government was to make 
the Chinese economy relatively “self-reliant,” which resulted in foreign trade being limited 
accordingly. Private enterprise and foreign-invested firms were non-existent under the public-
property rights system advocated by the CCP (Morrison, 2006). The above policies kept the 
Chinese economy stagnant and inefficient, mainly due to the lack of profit incentives for 
enterprises and farmers. As prices and production were controlled by the central government, 
the lack of competition caused widespread distortions in the economy. The living standards 
of the Chinese people as a whole were significantly lower than those of many other 
developing countries. 
 
3.3.2 The economic reforms and achievements 
 
From the late 1970s, with the aim of increasing the productivity of SOEs and raising living 
standards, the Deng Xiaoping government began restructuring the economy from centrally-
planned to more market-oriented, while remaining within the political framework provided 
by the CCP. This so-called “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics System” is in contrast to 
the “big-bang” reform adopted by post-communist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. The economic reform in China is regarded as a reform with a “controlled but 
progressive manner” (Li, W., 1997). Although it still exerts strong control and influence over 
the business environment, the Chinese government has strengthened the function of macro-
management while reducing micro-management intervention. It has switched its role from 
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administrative examination and approval in the economic field, to economic regulation, 
market supervision and public service (Zhang, 2005). 
 
Under the socialist market economy, the dominant political and economic context faced by 
organizations has changed from communitarianism to market capitalism. The legitimacy 
characteristic within the socialist market economy is economic efficiency. Any institutional 
feature characterized as organizationally relevant is, ultimately, motivated and legitimated by 
the criteria of economic efficiency. Codified laws and regulations are to facilitate wealth 
accumulation, private property rights, free trade policies and commercial activities (Dillard et 
al., 2004). 
 
One of the most fundamental changes that have occurred in China is the transformation from 
a public ownership system. Guo (2003) suggests that the ownership structure of the Chinese 
economy has transformed from a system of complete public ownership to the mixed 
ownership structure, with predominant public ownership coexistent with other economic 
elements such as cooperative, individual, private, foreign and joint venture organizational 
structures. The change of ownership structure indicates that the Chinese economy has 
departed from the pure socialism which featured predominantly public ownership. 
 
The re-orientation of the economy involved a dramatic reduction in heavy industrial 
investment and a shift of resources toward the household sector by permitting a wide variety 
of small-scale private service enterprises and light manufacturing entities. As of 2005, the 
private sector contributed 70% of China’s GDP (Wikipedia, 2010). The industrial reform was 
characterized by decentralizing the economic control of SOEs from central government to 
provincial and local governments, increasing the authority of plant managers and liberalizing 
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commodity prices in order to create a competitive environment (Li, J., 1997). The 
productivity of SOEs between 1980 and 1989 significantly improved (Li, J., 1997). As a 
result of implementation of the ‘Open Door’ policy, foreign direct investment (FDI) became 
one of the major resources of China’s capital growth. Annual utilized FDI grew from US$636 
million in 1983 to US$58 billion in 2005 (Morrison, 2006). Along with the increase in FDI 
was a rapid growth in international trade. Chinese exports rose from US$14 billion in 1979 to 
$762 billion in 2005, while imports over this period grew from US$16 billion to US$660 
billion, producing a large trade surplus (Morrison, 2006). China’s demand for energy and raw 
material has become an increasingly important factor in determining world prices for such 
commodities (Morrison, 2006). In 2001, after nearly fifteen years’ negotiation, China joined 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, in doing so, became an indispensable participant 
in the global economy. 
 
3.3.3 New capital resources for SOEs 
 
Prior to 1978, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China were rigidly controlled by the 
Chinese government which attached great importance to heavy industry. The equipment and 
raw materials used by SOEs were all supplied by the government. The prices of material, 
products, the suppliers and customers of SOEs, were all determined by the government as 
part of the central planning system. The control of China’s enterprises rested primarily with 
the inside nominated managers who, in turn, were often controlled and supported in various 
forms by the Party and ministerial associates (Tam, 2002). The function of managers, who 
served as the Party’s agents, was solely to supervise the production process and ensure the 
actualization of government plans (Lin and Tan, 1999). In terms of capital resources of SOEs, 
state funds were collected through fiscal and other means of revenue collection and siphoned 
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off to SOEs. The government, therefore, placed little weight on commercial banking and the 
capital market as active players in financial intermediation (Suzuki et al., 2008). Due to the 
government being the sole stakeholder of the SOEs, the Chinese economy had stagnated for a 
long period of time. The government gained the profits but also bore the losses as the 
ultimate owner of the SOEs, and managers and employees had no incentives to maximize the 
profitability of the SOEs (Xu and Wang, 1999). The distinctive characteristic of SOEs was a 
culture of low productivity. 
 
As part of the economic reform in China, the SOE reforms were launched in 1978. The 
essence of SOE reforms was a gradual relaxation of state central planning, implementation of 
various kinds of profit sharing schemes and increased autonomy over decision-making 
conferred to SOEs, and especially to the managers of SOEs (Qiang, 2003; Ren et al., 2005). 
In respect of financing the SOEs’ operations, the Chinese government in 1983 transformed 
the state budget allocations into loans, which were funded by four state-owned commercial 
banks13. The state-owned bank loans, therefore, replaced the government budget allocation 
and the major stakeholder of SOEs was changed from the Chinese government to state-
owned banks. Although banks were the main financial resource provider of SOEs, banks did 
not have any power over SOEs in terms of whether to lend funds to them. In fact, the 
government prevented banks from operating on purely commercial terms with revenue 
generating activities, by forcing banks to provide subsidized lending to SOEs. Since the 
emergence of the capital market in China in the early 1990s, some SOEs have been 
transformed into shareholding companies, obtaining funds for further development and 
expansion from public investors. However, the majority of poorly-managed and inefficient 
                                                      
13 China Industrial and Commercial Bank, China Agrisocial Bank, Bank of China, and China Construction Bank 
are the four state-owned commercial banks. In China, they are well known as “The Big Four”. The main 
functions of these four banks are to attract inexpensive, long-term capital to ensure credit for SOE and large 
state projects mainly in the areas of trade, agriculture, heavy industry and construction-related companies. 
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SOEs in China still relied upon bank loans. To avoid the potential social unrest caused by a 
high unemployment rate, the government felt obligated to support unprofitable SOEs by 
requesting state-owned commercial banks to extend loans or even provide the SOEs with 
more funds, with little consideration given to the borrowers’ repayment capacity (Xu, 2005). 
The formation of the Non-Performing Loan (NPL) problem was caused by the government’s 
intervention and the inefficiency of the SOEs. The China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) reported that there was the equivalent US$340 billion in NPLs in the financial 
system by the end of 2004. PricewaterhouseCooper’s China NPL Investor Survey 2004, 
however, reveals a figure as high as US$500 billion (Xu, 2005). 
 
The commitment to opening the banking and financial service market to foreign financial 
rivals under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement has pushed the banking and 
financial institution industry in China to be more independent, transparent and profit-driven. 
Public listing is one of the strategies to achieve these goals. Prior to public listing, the 
Chinese government assisted state-owned commercial banks to “unload” huge non-
performing loans from their books. In 1999, as a solution for tackling the NPL problem, the 
government established four financial asset management companies (AMCs) and transferred 
the equivalent of US$55 billion of non-performing loans to those companies (Xinhua Press, 
2005). The function of AMCs is to focus exclusively on debt collection. In addition, the four 
AMCs are allowed to negotiate with the borrowing state-owned enterprises and conduct a 
series of debt-to-equity swaps. In this way, the debts are transferred into equities and the 
AMCs have gained control over some enterprises (China Daily, 2005). The massive disposal 
of NPLs to AMCs has dramatically reduced the NPL ratio of banks and financial institutions. 
There were fourteen national and regional commercial banks listed in the Chinese stock 
market by the end of 2008. The two most publicized public listings are the China 
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Construction Bank and the Bank of China. The former was listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 2005 and the latter on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006. The other two 
state-owned commercial banks, China Industrial and Commercial Bank and China Agrisocial 
Bank, were listed in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
 
The listing of commercial banks and the further opening up of the banking market to foreign 
financial institutions has led to some positive changes in the Chinese banking industry. 
Petkova (2008) discusses several strategies adopted by the Chinese banking system in order 
to strengthen the banks’ balance sheets. First, the Chinese banks began to adopt international 
practices regarding balance sheet criteria in which the capital ratios are based on the risk 
involved. Secondly, banks started to apply commercial lending criteria. In their lending 
activities, banks have been disconnected from the government-based policy and have shifted 
to lending based on generally accepted commercial banking techniques. To reduce NPLs, 
banks have strengthened the finances and management of SOEs. In 2007, the National 
People’s Congress passed the new Bankruptcy Law, aiming to reduce the NPLs by ensuring 
better respect for creditors’ rights. In the same year, some steps were taken to build national 
standards and networks for credit assessment. The central bank of China, the People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC), has sought to develop a national credit information database and has urged 
banks to unify regulations. The CSRC has issued the Tentative Procedures for the 
Administration of Credit Ratings in the Securities Market (Petkova, 2008). 
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3.4 Social changes in China 
3.4.1 Traditional Chinese society 
 
China is a country with a history of more than five thousand years of civilization. The 
traditional moral standards, social norms and values of the Chinese people are heavily 
influenced by Confucianism. The essential components of Confucianism are the doctrine of 
the means, rite of harmony, the group or country’s interest over the individual’s and morality 
over utility (Creel, 1953). Achieving harmonization is in the best interest of each member to 
enable them to live in a good society. Consequently, it emphasizes individual duties to family 
and society. Individuals must be ready to compromise and willing to sacrifice their rights and 
freedom for the sake of the harmonious order of the family or society. Moral cultivation is 
much more important than material wealth. 
 
It is argued that Confucianism has played a positive role in maintaining peace and stability in 
ancient Chinese society, despite China being a country with a large geographical area and 
vast population, and the government being a huge, complex and layered bureaucratic 
structure (Ding, 1997). Influenced by the doctrine of means and the importance of harmony, 
people tended to avoid confrontation and extremes. Forbearance was considered a good 
virtue. In respect of people’s attitude to government and authority, forbearance means people 
only need to obey whatever orders are given, without understanding and questioning them. 
The power of feudal China was further strengthened by blind loyalty and a lack of democratic 
ideals. 
 
There is a view that the traditions and customs in Chinese society, while assisting in 
maintaining social stability, gradually turned into conservative forces that slowed down and 
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even stifled the growth of innovative ideas and new systems. The enduring stability of 
China’s feudal society brought with it one serious effect – lasting stagnation. Social 
development was extremely slow. There was no revolutionary change in the social, economic 
or political system for two thousand years (Ames, 2003). 
 
In summary, Confucian values had a double influence over society. Positively, they ensured 
the nation’s independence and unity, produced harmonious human relations, and cultivated 
the responsibility of individuals to society. Negatively, despising scientific rationality, they 
denied individual interests and self-development, causing one to be conservative and to seek 
peace, stability and safety (Deng, 2000). Hofstede and Bond (1988) examined the social 
characteristics of Chinese people. They identified the value dimensions of Chinese as: large 
power distance; strong uncertainty avoidance; collectivism; femininity; and long-term 
orientation. In general, Hofstede’s identification of the value dimensions of the Chinese 
people is consistent with the traditional Chinese culture. 
 
3.4.2 Forces leading to social changes 
 
Hofstede (1980) defines “culture” as a collective programming process by a society, which 
distinguishes the belief systems of its members from other societies. Can the culture of a 
society be changed? The extant literature provides some explanations in relation to a 
country’s culture change. Hofstede (1980) observes that the stability of culture patterns over a 
long period of time is the product of the dominant value systems, which are reinforced by the 
institutions in the society. Meanwhile, he points out that the value system is in a self-
regulating quasi-equilibrium: it does change, but generally at a slow pace. The forces toward 
change come from the outside, in the form of forces of nature or forces of man including 
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trade, conquest, or scientific discovery (Hofstede, 1980). Other social scientists believe that 
there are four major factors that cause social changes in a nation. They are changes in the 
environment; contact with other cultures; invention; and the future development of the culture 
itself. Of these forces, Hofstede (1980) acknowledges that the economic factor which leads to 
the changes in the environment is the most important one.  
 
Historical experience shows that economic development leads to a transformation in 
ideology, modes of thinking and sense of values (Fu, 2003). Hofstede (1980) also suggests 
that a society’s degree of economic evolution or modernity is a major determinant of social 
norms. His research shows that among the four dimensions of national culture, established 
empirically and based on his survey data, it is the individualism-versus-collectivism 
dimension which relates most closely to a country’s level of economic development and the 
femininity-versus-masculinity dimension the second. The cases of Egypt and Russia have 
also demonstrated that the transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market-
based economy is a long process involving changes in the philosophy of a society (Samadian, 
1996; HassabElnaby and Mosebach, 2005). 
 
3.4.3 Social changes in China during the past two decades 
 
In traditional Chinese culture, “individualism” possesses the meaning of egoism and 
selfishness (Deng, 2000). The main stream of traditional Chinese culture upholds 
collectivism by educating people to ignore the existence of individuals or sacrifice the good 
of an individual if it is necessary, just in order to achieve the goal of the group or to protect 
the benefit of the family; organization or community the individual belongs to. The 
harmonization and stability of Chinese society and its political system are at the expense of 
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individual values and personal rights. This philosophy was inherited and further strengthened 
by Mao Zedong, the leader of the CCP and the President of PRC from 1949 (Shi, 2000). He 
extended collectivism to an extreme level, treating individualism as an evil threatening the 
development of the socialist society. Hofstede explains Mao’s idea as: “The selfish behavior 
which Mao condemns is not necessarily behavior at the expense of others. It is sufficient to 
place personal interests above those of the group or simply to devote too much attention to 
one’s own things. Collectivism does not mean a negation of the individual’s well-being or 
interest; it is implicitly assumed that maintaining the group’s well-being is the best guarantee 
for the individual” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 151). 
 
The opening up of Chinese society since the beginning of the 1980s has led to the re-
interpretation of the meaning of individualism. Individualism has been re-interpreted as 
people’s self-realization, self-determination and self-struggling. Human creativity, freedom 
and innovation have become the ingredients of individualism replacing selfishness (Deng, 
2000). Along with the revival of individualism has been the growth of awareness of rights 
consciousness, particularly of political rights, as various individuals and groups have 
attempted to assert their right to speak out on a variety of issues without the CCP’s 
permission (Goldman, 2006). The 1978 Democracy Wall Movement and 1989 Tiananmen 
Demonstrations represent intellectuals’ challenges to the party’s political policies. In the 
beginning of the 21st century, increasing consciousness and articulation of political rights was 
spreading to the population as a whole. 
 
The increase in individualism is also being reflected by the behavior observed in the 
workplace. The social background of employees is very evident in the work environment: 
workers do not abandon their social values and attitudes upon entering a working place 
(Hofstede, 1980). As part of Chinese society, the mindset of senior executives of Chinese 
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enterprises would be impacted by the social culture as well. Hofstede’s opinion on the role 
generations can play in the process of culture change is: “Generation effects occur for values 
that were absorbed by the young people of a certain period and accompanied their age 
cohort over its lifetime. If conditions of life have changed, subsequent generations may carry 
forward different values that they absorbed in their youth” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 35). 
 
Ralston et al. (1999) lend support to Hofstede’s statement. Ralston et al. (1999) compared 
values held by the old generation of managers in China who experienced the communist 
consolidation (1949-1965) and the current generation of managers, whose adolescence 
occurred during the Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), to the new generation of 
managers who grew up mostly during the era of economic reform (1977-present). The 
research findings suggest that the new generation of managers scored much higher on values 
that are consistent with individualism, while scoring lower on traditional Chinese values such 
as collectivism and Confucianism. One implication of the increased individualistic tendencies 
of these younger Chinese managers is that they are more likely to act independently and 
openly, and take risks in the pursuit of profit, even when those actions are in conflict with 
traditional ways. The values of the new generation managers appear to reflect the 
consequence of the government’s “open door” policy, the relative freedom the Chinese 
people can now have and the greater exposure to western culture. 
 
Closely related to the increase in individualism is the change from femininity to masculinity. 
Under the planned economy, there was lifelong employment which not only included salary 
payment to workers, but also accommodation, child care and medical benefits. In order to 
maintain social stability, excessive government intervention and subsidies have saved the 
inefficient state-owned enterprises from bankruptcy. People did not have a sense of risk and 
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competition; egalitarianism was predominant in society. Despite the losses made by the 
SOEs, workers and managers could still receive a low, but steady income to maintain their 
day-to-day life (Lewis and Litai, 2003). 
 
The transformation to a market economy has brought both benefits and pain to Chinese 
society. Security of employment, which is highly valued by feminine cultures, has not been 
predominant in China since the mid-1990s (Deng, 2000). The development of a competitive 
business environment has resulted in some workers losing their permanent jobs due to lack of 
educational background, professional qualifications or desired skills. University graduates 
nowadays have the freedom to choose the job they are interested in but, meanwhile, they 
need to compete with others rather than relying upon the government to provide them with a 
guaranteed workplace position. Social security and welfare have been transferred from 
business enterprises to society. The Chinese business community is now being driven by 
profitability and productivity. Rewards for loyalty and conformity as well as group 
performance have been replaced by performance-based rewards for personal contributions in 
many Chinese corporations. Chief executive officers in large corporations have to confront 
enormous pressures, coming from the board of directors, the employees, shareholders and 
competitors (Deng, 2000). Individually, worship of money, wealth, achievement and 
individual success has gradually become acceptable values among the Chinese people. 
 
3.4.4 Emergence of domestic investors in China 
 
Since the economic reforms launched at the beginning of the 1980s, the level of income of 
urban and rural residents in China has continuously improved; China’s middle-class has 
expanded rapidly. Rising personal income has stimulated household consumption on the one 
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hand and resulted in a high saving rate in China on the other. With a population exceeding 
one billion, China’s saving rate has been as high as an average 40% of national GDP. Since 
the mid 1990s, the high saving rate has been correlated to factors including traditional 
Chinese culture and family concepts. The social structure changes caused by the economic 
reforms also contribute to the high saving rates. Many people prefer to have a bank deposit to 
fund their future retirement pension, education fees for children and the expenses of medical 
services and housing (China News, 2006). 
Individual investors have emerged in Chinese society since the beginning of the 1990s, when 
stock exchanges were opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen. As part of the fiscal policy of the 
Chinese government, the interest rates in China have remained low. Some investors have 
started to seek higher rates outside of traditional savings accounts. The prosperity of the 
Chinese stock market has attracted increasingly more residents to invest their savings in 
relatively high-risk income stocks, funds and other investment devices. As a result, many 
have withdrawn money from banks and given it to security companies in the form of cash 
deposits (People’s Daily, 2005b). 
Investors are investing capital resources in listed firms and, in return, they expect firms to 
maximize the return on their investment. The CSRC (2000) reports the Chinese stock market 
is primarily made up of individual investors. These individual investors are segmented, 
segregated and shareholding ratios are relatively low14. As minority shareholders of listed 
firms, individual shareholders have, on average, no more than 0.3% of the seats on the board 
of directors or supervisory board, even though they are a group possessing approximately 
one-third of the shares (Xu and Wang, 1999). Various factors have restricted individual 
                                                      
14 Regulators typically required that Tradable A shares accounted for no more than 25% of total outstanding 
shares when a company went public. Until July 1999, individuals were prohibited from holding more than 0.5% 
of total shares outstanding for any listed company; subsequently, the legal maximum for individual shareholders 
was increased to 5.0% (Berkman, 2008). 
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shareholders’ participation in the management and significant decision-making of listed 
firms. These include low shareholdings by individual shareholders, geography and the time 
zone differences (CSRC, 2000). Thus, the absence of cumulative voting procedures has 
significantly enhanced the control rights of a firm’s largest shareholder. 
 
Chinese domestic investors have a reputation for seeking short-term trading profit rather than 
long-term dividend income and investment growth, which is evidenced by the short share 
holding periods of 1-2 months in 1995, and 5.8 months in 2002, compared to the average 18 
months share holding period in the US (Deng and Wang, 2006). Such short investment 
horizons indicate that small individual shareholders neither have the willingness nor the 
capacity to monitor the management of listed firms closely. After more than a decade of 
development in the Chinese stock market, the number of individual investor accounts has 
increased from 8.35 million in 1992 to nearly 138 million by the end of 2007. The individual 
Chinese investors are also increasingly interested in the performance of listed firms and 
macroeconomic development when investing in the Chinese stock market. The value-oriented 
investment ideology is becoming more acceptable; and traders have been reported as 
becoming more rational and mature. The increasing number of institutional investors has 
changed the structure of investors in the Chinese capital market (People’s Daily, 2004). 
 
The Chinese public investors have also progressively become aware that they can protect 
their interests through legal mechanisms. This change can be related to the social changes in 
Chinese society since the late 1970s. While the Confucius school dominated other 
philosophical schools, including the legalist school15, civil action did not develop as an 
                                                      
15 Another influential philosophy in Chinese history is Legalism. Legalism is a political philosophy that does not 
address higher questions pertaining to the nature and purposes of existence; instead, it is concerned with ways of 
governing society (Wong, 2003). The essential view taken by Legalists is that the most effective way to control 
human behavior and maintain social order is through ritual, custom or ethics. Han Feizi is the prominent 
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independent body of law in China; rather, it has been subservient to the administrative and 
criminal law for the overall purpose of the empire’s stability. In traditional Chinese society, 
administrative courts and judicial courts were the same body and the head of each 
administrative court functioned as executive, judge and legislator. Private lawsuits were 
frowned on by the public and discouraged by the government. The administrative court 
regarded parties to the lawsuit as people who did not follow socially-accepted norms and had 
a nerve challenging the authority above them (Shao, 2003). Improved living standards and a 
more open society have contributed to change in some social norms and values. As discussed 
in previous sections of this chapter, the revival of individualism in Chinese society has led to 
a growing sense of rights consciousness. People living in a more masculine society pursue 
material wealth and individual success. The combination of these two social changes 
contributes to investor concerns about market abuse. 
 
In 2001, nearly 900 compensation cases in relation to fraudulent financial statements, insider 
trading and market manipulation were lodged in the lower courts (People’s Daily, 2001). In 
early 2002, two reputable law firms filed plaints in the court on behalf of 363 investors and 
700 investors who suffered from financial losses caused by fraudulent financial information 
disclosed by two listed firms. In November 2002, eleven individual investors obtained 
compensation of RMB 224,096 Yuan (US$28,012) from Hongguan Shiye and a related 
security underwriting company after a lawsuit lasting nearly four years. This marks the 
success of the first civil compensation case in China over fraudulent financial information. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
advocator of Legalism. He used to be Xunzi’s student and accepted his opinion on human nature. As all human 
beings were born fundamentally depraved, selfish, greedy and lustful, Xunzi believed that humans could be 
made good through education, while Han Feizi suggested that humans could be made good only through laws. 
In his work, which was named after his name, Han Feizi contended that the laws should be written well enough 
and enforced aggressively; there was no need for individual leadership, for the laws alone were sufficient to 
govern a state. Whoever was ruler was powerful because the position held power, not because the person 
possessed any special qualities. Benevolence and humanity are not attitudes adopted by rulers because unless 
people are ruled by a strong, strict government, they grow lazy and disrespectful of authority (Deng, 2000). 
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The case reflects the attitude of government authorities and regulatory agencies towards 
further legal enforcement of various regulations in respect of listed companies (Shao, 2003). 
These high-profile civil compensation cases indicate that as major stakeholders of listed 
firms, shareholders’ actions can exert pressure on listed firms in the Chinese stock market in 
relation to corporate disclosure. The investment community, therefore, has created a demand 
for transparency in corporate disclosure. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
 
Since the late 1950s, the shift of political emphasis in the Chinese Communist Party has 
enabled Chinese society to focus on the economic development of the nation rather than 
political campaigns. A series of economic reform measures implemented by the Chinese 
government has abandoned the pure public property system, allowing the co-existence of 
both public and private ownership. A market-oriented economy has replaced a centrally-
planned economy in China. As a result, the operating environment of state-owned enterprises 
has fundamentally changed. In respect of capital resources, rather than relying solely upon 
funds budgeted by the Chinese government, enterprises now need to seek alternative capital 
resource providers. State-owned commercial banks and investors in the Chinese stock market 
have replaced the government’s role, providing enterprises with financial capital for their 
operations and for further expansion. Improved living standards and a more open society 
have led to changes in social norms and values. It can be observed that the Chinese people, 
especially the younger generation, worship power and desire wealth and individual success. 
Investors have emerged in Chinese society as a social group. The pressure they have exerted 
on listed firms to disclose transparent information reflects the changed social norms and 
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values. The changed social environment now enables Chinese investors to protect their 
interests through legal mechanisms, if necessary. 
 
The significance of Chapter 3 is that it defines the political, economic and social changes in 
Chinese society in the past three decades. These changes have created an environment for 
new stakeholders of listed firms, such as investors and creditors, to emerge in the Chinese 
stock market. Chapter 4 will consider the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market 
and the development of the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure.  
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CHAPTER 4 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE IN CHINA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 examined the political, economic and social changes that have occurred in China 
during the past three decades. This chapter explores another important component of the 
changed corporate disclosure environment, the accounting, reporting and disclosure system 
that has been established in China. The Chinese stock market has its own unique institutional 
setting. The overwhelming influence of state-owned shares creates two main problems for 
listed firms, namely, “one dominant state shareholder” and “insider control”. Poor corporate 
governance practices in the early stages of development of the Chinese stock market have 
become the main driving forces of the corporate disclosure regulatory framework. 
 
The Chinese government continues to maintain its important influence on the development of 
the Chinese stock market. Its two regulatory agencies, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) have been actively engaged in the 
regulation, administration and operation of listed firms in the stock market. The MOF has 
significantly reformed the accounting system in China and harmonized Chinese accounting 
standards with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The CSRC devotes 
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itself to minority investor protection through building up the regulatory framework of 
corporate disclosure in China and the corporate governance régime in the Chinese stock 
market.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses unique characteristics of the Chinese 
stock market, including its ownership structure, related agency problems and poor corporate 
governance practices in the early period of the Chinese stock market. The establishment of 
the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure is illustrated in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 
assesses the CSRC’s efforts in minority investor protection among listed firms. The 
development of a professional accountancy association is detailed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 
summarizes this chapter. 
 
4.2 Unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market 
 
Being part of China’s economic reforms, the SOE reforms, as previously discussed, have 
been launched since 1978. The essence of SOE reforms has been a gradual relaxation of state 
central planning, the implementation of various kinds of profit-sharing schemes and increased 
autonomy over decision-making conferred on the SOEs, and especially managers of SOEs 
(Xu and Wang, 1999). The establishment of the Chinese stock market is the consequence of 
continuous economic restructuring, including SOE reform, in China. Aiming to raise capital 
funds for the Chinese enterprises from the public and to facilitate the modernization of the 
operation and management of Chinese enterprises, from the early 1990s, some of the SOEs 
were transformed into listed companies via corporatization, raising capital funds from the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges through their initial public offerings (IPO) (Wang, 
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2005). Along with the development of the Chinese stock market, the problems associated 
with agency relationships and the conflicting interests between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders, emerged in the Chinese business structures. The main reasons 
contributing to these problems were the unique ownership structures of listed firms in China 
and the poor corporate governance practices among the listed firms. 
 
4.2.1 Ownership structure of listed firms 
 
To analyze the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms, consideration needs to be given to 
the classification of shares and the trading restrictions imposed on different classes of shares 
in China. Shares issued are classified as either A-shares, B shares, H shares or N shares. A-
shares could only be sold to Chinese investors, traded on Chinese stock exchanges in Chinese 
currency and financial reporting is under the Chinese GAAP. B shares could only be sold to 
foreign investors prior to April 200116. These types of shares are tradable on Chinese stock 
exchanges, but in US dollars, and financial reporting is subject to IFRS. Companies that issue 
H shares are listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and this type of share could only be 
traded in HK dollars. N shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange through an IPO. 
 
The A-shares could be further classified into state shares, legal-person shares and tradable A-
shares. State shares are owned by the central government and local government, but the 
ultimate owner, in fact, is the State Council of China. State shares are not tradable on stock 
exchanges, but are permitted to be transferred between domestic institutions, with the 
approval of the CSRC up until April 2005. Legal-person17 shares are held by domestic 
institutions including stock firms, state-private mixed enterprises and non-bank financial 
                                                      
16 Since April 2001, domestic Chinese investors can also subscribe to B shares if they have a US dollar account.  
17 A legal-person is defined in the PRC Company Law as a non-individual legal entity or institution. 
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institutions and SOEs that have at least one non-state owner. Non-financial institutions 
include securities firms, trust and investment companies, finance companies and mutual 
funds. Legal-person owned shares are not tradable on the stock exchange; they were only 
allowed to be transferred between institutions until April 2005. The rationale behind the 
trading restriction of state-owned shares and legal-person shares was to ensure the “control” 
of the company remains with the state-owned or state-controlled shareholders. Tradable A-
shares, representing only one-third of total shares issued, are owned by Chinese individual 
investors and they could be traded relatively freely among domestic investors. Figure 4.1 
describes the ownership structure of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
 
The status of share ownership could be described as concentrated share ownership during the 
early stage of the Chinese stock market. After more than a decade of operation, some changes 
have occurred to ownership structures. The official statistics published by the Chinese 
Securities Express show that although non-tradable shares still occupy a significant 
proportion of total shareholdings of listed firms, the average proportion of non-tradable 
shares has decreased from 72.58% in 1992 to 64.28% in 2000. The average proportion of 
state-owned shares has decreased from 51.3% to 38.90% (CSRC, 2009). In April 2005, the 
government initiated a program, aiming to eliminate various share ownership types and make 
all shares legally tradable A-shares. By mid-2006, this conversion process had been 
completed by 94% of listed firms (Jiang et al., 2008). 
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Figure 4.1 Ownership structure in the early stage of the Chinese stock market 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Agency problem in the Chinese stock market 
 
The concentration of ownership among listed firms in the Chinese stock market caused an 
agency problem. Xu and Wang (1999) suggest that the agency problem in the Chinese 
context is not in the diverged interests between management of firms and their shareholders. 
It is in the form of conflicting interests between majority shareholders (state-owned 
shareholding) and minority shareholders (public shareholding). The illustration of two 
interrelated issues below is helpful in understanding how majority shareholders exploit 
minority shareholders in listed firms. 
4.2.2.1 One dominating state-owned share monopolizes 
 
The first issue is the close relationship between listed firms and their parent entities. The 
closeness is the direct result of the “privatization procedure” of SOEs in China. Briefly 
mentioned before, the Chinese government’s original purpose of transforming state-owned 
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enterprises (SOEs) into listed firms was to raise funds for SOEs and improve their 
performance, hoping that their operation could be more efficient and responsive to market 
competition. However, while the government has tried to give corporatized SOEs more 
autonomy, it is also concerned about the loss of controlling ownership rights. As indicated by 
Firth et al. (2006), many listed firms are “carve-outs” from SOEs, in which some or all of the 
profitable operations of an SOE are transferred to a new firm, new shares are sold to the 
public, and these shares are listed on the stock exchange18. The SOE often, however, retains a 
controlling stake in the listed firm and becomes the parent entity. Since the establishment of 
the Chinese stock market, state ownership has been the largest shareholder stake in many 
listed firms.  
 
As majority shareholders of listed firms, state shareholders are the organizations with 
authority to invest on behalf of the Chinese government, such as the state asset management 
bureaux and local finance bureaux. The equity stake of state shareholders in listed firms is 
normally converted from the properties previously allocated to SOEs prior to the SOEs being 
transformed into listed firms. Although the Chinese government declared in the mid-1990s 
that the ultimate owner of state shares is the State Council of China, there is no true owner 
                                                      
18 The transformation from an SOE to a listed firm is a result of considerations given to the socio-political 
environment and involved a series of procedures. The CSRC set a quota for the number of listings each year and 
gave the listing priority to enterprises engaging in agriculture, resources, transportation, telecommunication and 
high-technology prior to 1998. Local government and state ministries are encouraged to recommend leading 
enterprises with a good record of profitability and greater prospects to be listed on stock exchanges (CSRC, 
1996). To become a listed firm, an SOE’s profitable operation is firstly registered as a new firm. The net assets 
of the SOE are re-valued and converted into state ownership. The shareholder of the state ownership is the 
original SOE, having controlling voting rights. This is called a “carve-outs” procedure by Firth et al. (2006). 
After this “carve-outs” procedure, the SOE becomes the parent entity of the new firm. Secondly, the firm needs 
to submit an application to the CSRC and obtain its approval. To be qualified for listing, a firm must pass the 
profitability requirements of the CSRC, having at least 3 consecutive years of profitable operations prior to the 
IPO process. Once the CSRC’s approval is obtained, the firm is examined by the Listing Committee of the stock 
exchange and is assigned with a numerical listing code. The IPO Prospectus can be released to the public after 
the above administrative procedures. This document must disclose the primary purpose of capital raising, the 
IPO offer price, number of different types of shares offered, the ownership structure prior and post IPO offering, 
composition of the Board of Directors, balance sheet and income statement for the past three years and earnings 
forecast (until March 2001). On average, six months after issuing the IPO Prospectus, the firm is officially listed 
on the stock exchange. 
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representing these properties in a practical sense, as the State Council of China represents all 
of the citizens of the PRC. Firth et al. (2006) found that the majority of the ownership of the 
listed SOEs belongs to the state, as people in the state are supposed to be the master of the 
country and owner of public properties in a socialist society. However, the public in general 
in China do not have direct control over public properties nor do they participate in the 
management of enterprises. Therefore, there is no true owner of state shares. Thus, this “lack 
of proper owner” of the state’s stake is commonly regarded as the most important reason that 
has led to corruption and poor corporate governance among listed firms (Xu and Wang, 1999; 
Shi and Weisert, 2002). 
 
Although holding a majority of shares in listed firms, state investors in China do not have 
cash flow rights from the shares they hold; dividends and other payouts by firms are remitted 
directly to the Ministry of Finance or local governments (Deng and Wang, 2006). They are 
also prohibited from direct involvement in running listed firms. As a result, state investors 
must appoint representatives to work in the senior management positions in listed firms. The 
selection and evaluation of senior management are often determined by the CCP 
organizations. The senior management personnel must be members of the CCP and do not 
necessarily has skills to manage a commercial business. The consequence of such a political 
process is that representatives of state investors cannot play a significant role in terms of 
performance improvement and profit maximization. Research findings of Xu and Wang 
(1999), Hovey et al. (2003) and Leung (2007) all show a negative relationship between state 
ownership and firms’ performance. 
 
The phenomenon of “one dominating state-owned share monopoly”’ is very common among 
listed firms in China. The consequence is the lack of restriction on “big” shareholders, who 
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can take opportunities to manipulate listed companies or invade minority shareholders’ 
interests by utilizing their priority position (DeFond et al., 1999). A typical example is the 
dominant shareholders’ control of the funds of listed firms. Dominant shareholders divert 
capital resources to purposes other than business operations, in contrast to listed firms which 
promise not to in their communications with public investors in their IPO prospectuses. 
Statistics compiled by the CSRC show that, by 2004, the dominant shareholders of 350 listed 
firms had improper control of funds and about US$7 billion of funds had been used for non-
operating purposes. Among the listed companies which retreated from the stock exchange19, 
the most important reason for their failure was the dominant shareholders’ control and the use 
of capital funds in listed firms (Tong, 2004). 
4.2.2.2 Insider control 
 
The second issue derives from the first issue, it is the “insider control problem”. State 
ownership (where there is no true owner) means there is a lack of effective external 
monitoring of the management of listed firms. The controlling power of listed SOEs is 
concentrated in the hands of the directors and senior management, who share no material 
interests or risks in the company, but exercise dominant power, free from the checks of 
market discipline. Rubber-stamped shareholders’ meetings and dual roles undertaken by 
managing directors constitute the problem of insider control, enabling the controlling insiders 
to serve their own interests to the potential detriment of minority shareholders and even the 
whole firm. Deng and Wang (2006) list five typical insider controlling behaviors: (1) 
pursuing private benefits, such as embezzling companies’ resources for perquisite 
consumption; (2) conducting market manipulation through misleading the public investors or 
being engaged in insider trading; (3) seeking and retaining relationship advantages for 
                                                      
19 A listed firm could be delisted from the Chinese stock market if the firm makes a loss for two consecutive 
years or has a negative return on equity (ROE) for three consecutive years. 
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themselves by using company resources, for example, state-owned companies may appoint 
persons who are helpful for them to keep good connections with the government officials; (4) 
appropriating company funds to develop their own political background; and (5) dealing with 
creative accounting and releasing fraudulent financial information and over-investing or 
excessively consuming the assets. 
 
4.2.3 Poor corporate governance practices in listed firms 
 
There was no notion of corporate governance in China until the mid-1990s. The enactment of 
the PRC Company Law in 1994 is regarded as a big step forward in improving corporate 
governance in China. According to the PRC Company Law, the basic corporate structure of a 
limited liability company consists of three tiers of control: the shareholders’ meeting, the 
board of directors, and the board of supervisors. 
 
The board of directors is responsible to the general meeting of the shareholders: to convene 
and report to the general meeting; to fulfill the resolutions of the general meeting; to 
determine the operating plan and investment plan of the company; to prepare the annual 
financial budget and financial statements; to determine how profits should be distributed; to 
determine increases or decreases in the registered capital of the company; to determine the 
combination, separation, change or liquidation of the company; to determine the design of the 
company’s internal management organization and its establishment; and to appoint or dismiss 
the management team and supervise their remuneration. 
 
The function of the board of supervisors is to supervise directors and senior officers, in order 
to ensure that they fulfill their responsibilities. The board of supervisors should consist of not 
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less than three supervisors and be comprised of representatives of shareholders and a 
reasonable proportion of representatives of employees (Articles 52 & 53, PRC Company 
Law). Directors, general managers and financial controllers should not hold a position 
concurrently as a supervisor. The duties of the supervisory board include supervising the 
directors and managers for any violation of laws, regulations or the articles of association of 
the company during their performance of company duties. They also have the right to 
examine the company’s financial affairs, instruct a director or manager to rectify his/her 
actions if such an act is harmful to the interests of the company, and propose the holding of 
special shareholders’ meetings. 
 
There are several studies investigating corporate governance practices among listed firms in 
the early stages of the Chinese stock market. Xu and Wang (1999) suggest that due to the 
“one dominating state-owned share monopoly and insider control”, the three tiers of control 
did not function very effectively and efficiently. By studying the PRC Company Law, 
shareholders in China appear to have more managerial power than their counterparts in many 
Anglo-American countries, as shareholders in China have the power to call for meetings, 
elect and replace directors and supervisors, and approve the reports provided. In addition, 
they also have the right to examine the corporate final accounts, decide whether to issue 
additional shares and make decisions regarding corporate mergers, dissolution and 
liquidation. However, research findings show that shareholders’ meetings are often merely 
“rubber stamped”. 
 
The dominance of state ownership enables the original state-owned enterprises to exert 
control over managerial appointments and incentives. A survey conducted in 2000 by the 
CSRC reveals that the majority of directors of boards were appointed via the state ownership. 
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Meanwhile, the independence of the board has been seriously weakened as the board is 
controlled by an “insider person” as a result of the duality of a board member also acting as 
chairman. The supervisory board is also incapable of identifying and addressing managerial 
corruption, due to its lack of real authority and power. It can be concluded that the “one 
dominating state-owned share monopoly under internal control” has been a major problem in 
blocking the way for Chinese listed firms to improve their corporate governance practices. 
 
4.3 Regulatory framework of corporate reporting and disclosure 
 
China’s economic development during the past twenty years has been facilitated by 
significant changes in the political attitudes and priorities of the CCP. However, a political 
tradition that originated in the era of central planning means the government still has a strong 
influence over the market-oriented economy in China (Xiao et al., 2004). In order to create a 
more attractive business environment and improve the efficiency of the Chinese stock 
market, the Chinese government has been heavily and actively involved in the establishment 
of a regulatory framework for listed firms. Since the mid-1980s, various governmental agents 
have released important regulations, including the Accounting Law, the Company Law, the 
Securities Law and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, to regulate the 
accounting practices, external financial reporting, the corporate affairs and the trading 
behavior of the listed firms in the Chinese stock market. As a result, a comprehensive 
regulatory framework of corporate accounting, reporting and disclosure has been gradually 
built up. This section looks at three main components of the regulatory framework: the 
accounting reform, corporate disclosure régime and development of corporate governance. 
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4.3.1 The accounting reform in China 
 
The transformation from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy 
demands a changed accounting system. The “fund accounting”20 adopted under the planned 
economy was unable to adequately serve and support economic reforms, as it lacked the 
capacity to handle diversified ownership and more complex business transactions (Tang and 
Lau, 2000). In response to the rapidly changing business environment, the MOF started to 
formulate a series of new accounting systems and standards based on western accounting 
concepts and practices. Without Deng Xiaoping’s bold call for rapid change towards a market 
economy in 1992, it would have been impossible for accounting standards containing 
principles previously perceived to be capitalist tools to be issued in China (Xiao et al., 2004). 
 
4.3.1.1 The accounting and reporting system between 1949 and 1978 
 
 
The objective of the accounting function in China between 1949 and 1978 was to serve the 
centrally-planned economy, as featured by the public-ownership model. Specifically, the 
accounting system in China was to reflect, analyze and assess the implementation of the state 
plan and to reflect the source of funds obtained by enterprises and the way funds are applied 
(Zhou, 1988). In the 1950s, isolated from western countries in areas of politics and 
economics, China allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The Soviet Union) 
because of the shared social system and belief in communism (Chiapello and Ding, 2005). 
Under the socialist system, enterprises were owned by the state government on behalf of the 
Chinese people and, therefore, played a dominant role in the Chinese economy (Zhou, 1988). 
                                                      
20 The “Fund Accounting System” includes two main accounts, “Fund applications” refers to employment and 
utilization of funds in the acquisition of property, goods and materials for production, while “Fund sources” 
represents the channel for obtaining and generating funds. 
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The accounting system in China followed the pattern used by the Soviet Union, namely “fund 
accounting”. The role of “fund accounting” was to service the information needs of the 
government, the central planner and to assist the government in planning and controlling 
economic activities. 
 
Prior to 1978, the managers of SOEs had little or no managerial autonomy. The state 
provided all the financing to factories and controlled virtually all the investment and 
operating decisions. Inputs were provided by the state and outputs were sold to the state at the 
price determined by the government. The government also specified the salaries and wages of 
the workers and managers of the SOEs. All profits were remitted to the state and all losses 
were covered by the government. The factories simply served the purpose of fulfilling the 
production quota stipulated by the government. Consequently, the managers of these factories 
had neither the incentive nor the managerial authority to reduce costs and generate profits 
(Xiang, 1998). 
 
4.3.1.2 The accounting reform between 1980 and 1990 
 
 
The period from 1980 to 1990 was a transition period when the Chinese economy was 
transformed from a centrally-planned economy to a socialist market economy. The 
accounting system reform during the transition period was driven by the forces of the 
economic and enterprise reform, and the “Open Door” policy. Since 1978, the economic role 
of the Chinese government has changed from the planner and manager of the economy at a 
macro and micro level, to the macro level only. The government significantly reduced its 
intervention in the affairs of individual SOEs and began to use indirect monetary and fiscal 
policy to achieve economic goals. SOEs were given autonomy in their operational and 
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financing activities: they were free to produce, set prices and compete with other suppliers for 
consumer market share in most areas of the economy. Meanwhile, the Open Door policy 
enabled foreign investment enterprises from Hong Kong, USA and Japan to operate and 
compete with SOEs in the Chinese domestic market. The emergence of private enterprises 
and foreign investment dramatically changed the capital structure of business enterprises in 
China. Foreign trading partners and investors required accounting reports that were based on 
accounting concepts and conventions with which they were familiar, and the reform to 
enterprise management also highlighted the need for reports suitable for decision-making at 
the enterprise level. Groom et al. (2005) suggest the reforms exposed the need for accounting 
standards on consolidation and equity accounting, as well as clarification of accounting 
treatments for paid-up capital, fixed assets and depreciation, intangible assets and goodwill, 
tax and profit appropriation. The “fund system” adopted from the former Soviet Union during 
the 1950s could not facilitate and support economic reform, as it lacked the capacity to 
handle diversified ownership and more complex business transactions, such as leasing of 
assets, real estate valuation, business mergers and foreign exchange transactions (Davidson et 
al., 1996; Tang and Lau, 2000). 
 
In response to the rapidly changing business environment and to create a more attractive 
business environment for foreign investments, the MOF began to reconstruct its accounting 
rules, theories, practices, education and the profession (Chiapello and Ding, 2005). Since 
1982, the main responsibility of the MOF has been to form and implement accounting laws 
and regulations at national level and also to examine the accounting systems and methods 
drafted by districts. The most remarkable achievement in terms of establishing accounting 
regulations was the issuing and enacting of the PRC Accounting Law in 1985. These 
regulations were widely regarded as a milestone in the legalization of accounting work 
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(Davidson et al., 1996). Zhou (1988) indicates that the purposes of the promulgation of the 
Accounting Law are, first of all, to prevent illegal financial activities such as corruption, 
embezzlement and speculation that had caused significant losses of state properties; and 
secondly, to improve the qualifications of practitioners, so they can possess the capacity to 
execute adequate accounting supervision and managerial control; and last, to protect 
accountants when they need to exercise their duties in fighting illegal and criminal activities. 
The main contents of the Accounting Law include the defining of the functions and sphere of 
responsibility of accounting officers and staff of enterprise units; identification of legal 
liability of accounting officers and staff; and specification of the legal liability and 
obligations of hierarchical administrative executives.  
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the MOF has issued several accounting systems applicable 
to different industries. The uniform accounting system remained, but it was revised and 
improved by simplifying the chart of accounts, introducing reference numbers and permitting 
the financial bureau and agencies of local government to formulate certain supplementary 
regulations, in order to ensure the stability and consistency of the accounting information 
(Zhou, 1988). In addition to the above industry-emphasized regulations, the MOF also issued 
the Accounting System for Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures in 1984. The formulation of this 
regulation was widely regarded as the first attempt made by the Chinese government to 
harmonize Chinese accounting practice with international practice (Chow et al., 1995; Zhang, 
2007). Giving consideration to the financial accounting and reporting needs of foreign 
invested enterprises, the new system, for the first time in China, adopted the accounting 
elements and financial statements widely used in western countries. Therefore, foreign 
investments were pivotal in pushing Chinese accounting practice towards IFRS during the 
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transition period. However, convergence of accounting standards was limited and application 
of accounting regulations was narrow in scope (Zhang, 2007). 
 
Despite the above changes occurring in the economic context and accounting area, prior to 
the emergence of the stock exchanges in China at the beginning of the 1990s, accounting 
information was still used in national planning and macro-economic control. The state 
government was the ultimate user of financial information. There was no sense of external 
reporting and disclosure. 
 
4.3.1.3 The capital market and accounting reform between 1990 and 2000 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Chinese government defined the destination of the 
economic reform as building up the socialist market economy system with Chinese 
characteristics. The accounting, reporting and disclosure system reform in China between 
1990 and 2000 was driven by the emergence and rapid development of the Chinese stock 
market. Compared to the accounting reforms between 1980 and 1990, the accounting 
regulations promulgated during the 1990s had considerable impact on the financial 
accounting practice of listed firms. A principal component of this phase of accounting system 
reform was the development of financial reporting standards to fairly present the financial 
position and performance of enterprises participating in the share system (Winkle et al., 
1994). 
 
In 1992, the MOF issued the first national regulation, the Accounting System for 
Experimental Shareholding Companies, to specifically address the financial accounting for 
listed firms. The system stipulated in detail the general principles of accounting as well as the 
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accounting of assets and liabilities, shareholders’ equities, costs and expenses, operating 
incomes, profits and profit distribution. Accounting items and accounting statements were 
standardized, as were procedures and tasks for the audit of accounts. In addition, it also 
stipulated the formats and contents of accounting statements that listed companies must 
disclose to the public. 
 
Effective from July 1993, the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) were 
seen as a landmark development in the Chinese accounting system, reflecting the socialist 
market economy. The ASBE was regarded as a conceptual framework for financial reporting 
in China, guiding the production of accounting information and formalization of accounting 
standards (Davidson et al., 1996). A big step forward made by the ASBE was the financial 
information user identification. In addition to the information needs of the main user, the state 
government, ASBE also acknowledged that the information needs of investors, creditors and 
other relevant parties must be satisfied. The ASBE represented a dramatic breakthrough and 
went a considerable way to bringing Chinese accounting systems into harmony with IFRS. 
Many features were incorporated which made the financial statements more understandable 
to foreign investors. Its theoretical underpinnings were congruent with that of accounting 
concepts adopted by the IASB, FASB and other national standard setters (Tang and Lau, 
2000). These included the basic accounting principles of the accounting entity, accounting 
period, going concern and monetary measurement. To ensure the effective application and 
compliance of the ASBE standards, thirteen industrial accounting regulations were 
implemented in 1993 as a transitional arrangement to provide technical guidelines. These 
thirteen regulations integrated the industrial characteristics and requirements of the ASBE 
standards and provided listed firms with detailed rules for the recording of transactions, a 
chart of accounts and the formats of financial statements. The empirical results show that the 
117 
 
application of ASBE, in conjunction with the thirteen industry-specific accounting 
regulations, substantially improved the understandability and comparability of accounting 
information provided by Chinese enterprises (Chen et al., 1999). 
 
The formulation and release of specific Chinese Accounting Standards started from mid 
1997. On 22nd May 1997, the MOF released the Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises: Related Party Relationships and Transactions, to tackle the lack of transparency 
of related party transactions and improve associated disclosure. Listed firms in China were 
reported to be using related-party transactions to “enhance” their performance and manipulate 
earnings (Ma, 2005). For example, a listed firm can purchase raw material from its related 
parties at a price far below the market price and, meanwhile, sell the products to other related 
parties at a price far above the market price, in order to artificially improve profitability 
(Groom et al., 2005). The deal was motivated by either attracting more capital from the stock 
market or avoiding delisting by the CRSC. Whether the standard has effectively improved the 
creditability of financial statements could be questioned. Despite the fact that majority-listed 
firms disclose related-party transactions according to the requirements of the standard, 
corporate financial scandals involving related-party transactions have never stopped (Ma, 
2005). 
 
Nevertheless, related-party standards were the first Chinese Accounting Standards and since 
their release, between 1998 and 2003, the Chinese Accounting Standards Committee 
(CASC), under the instruction of the MOF, has issued another fifteen accounting standards. 
These address the accounting and reporting requirements for the cash flow statement, events 
after the balance sheet date, debt restructuring, revenue, investment, construction contracts, 
changes of accounting policy, estimates and corrections of accounting errors, non-monetary 
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transactions, contingencies, intangible assets, borrowing costs, leases, interim reporting, 
inventories and fixed assets. These standards were all developed with reference to IFRS. 
 
Efforts were continuously made to shorten the distance between Chinese accounting practices 
and internationally accepted practices. In early 1998, the MOF promulgated the Accounting 
Regulation for Listed Companies, aiming to eliminate discrepancies between the ASBE and 
the IFRS. The new regulation made some significant changes in terms of bad debt 
allowances, inventory valuation, investment valuation, equity/cost method, organization 
costs, revenue recognition and consolidation. The Chinese government claimed that the 1998 
regulation was in harmony with IFRS in all major aspects and the accounting practices of 
listed firms in China (Chen et al., 2002). However, the empirical results cannot lend strong 
support to this claim. There was no evidence available showing that the 1998 regulation had 
significantly reduced the gap between Chinese GAAP earnings and IFRS earnings. 
 
4.3.1.4 Completion of the accounting framework between 2000 and 2007 
 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, WTO accession became the main impetus for the 
Chinese government to speed up its international accounting standard harmonization process. 
Simultaneous to the issue of Chinese accounting standards more closely aligned with IAS 
GAAP, was the promulgation of the Accounting System for Business Enterprises (System) in 
2001 by the MOF. The System functioned as a comprehensive financial reporting framework, 
emphasizing principles such as substance over form, consistency, timeliness, 
understandability, accrual basis, prudence, materiality and transparency. A significant 
development in terms of asset measurement was the requirement to recognise impairment 
losses on all assets. Listed firms were required to follow one unified financial accounting 
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system rather than industry-specific regulations. Supposedly, the increased comparability 
would enhance users’ decision-making. However, financial scandals that occurred between 
the late 1990s and early 2000s damaged the credibility of the Chinese stock market and 
weakened public investors’ confidence in the financial information being provided to the 
market. 
 
The need to attract foreign investment and further develop the Chinese stock market 
motivated the Chinese government to enhance the reputation of the Chinese stock market 
amongst the international investment community. The new System was viewed as the Chinese 
government’s response to the “accounting information crisis” caused by misleading financial 
reporting (Xiao et al., 2004). The harmonization process was ongoing, with the MOF 
directing that the CASC’s work program, including the development of new standards and 
reissue of existing standards, aligned with IFRS. During 2005, the CASC issued 21 Exposure 
Drafts and also reviewed its 16 existing standards. As a result, China’s Accounting Standards 
System for Business Enterprises was further developed with a view to achieving convergence 
of those standards with the equivalent IFRSs. 
 
On 16th February 2006, the MOF announced the new Accounting Standard for Business 
Enterprises (ASBE). The ASBE consists of the Basic ASBE and 38 specific ASBEs that are 
substantially in line with international standards. The Basic ASBE replaces the 2001 System 
and functions as a new conceptual framework; specific ASBEs replace existing standards and 
address nearly all areas covered by IFRSs. The new ASBE changes the primary basis of 
financial accounting in China as it moves toward emphasizing the new philosophy of 
providing decision-useful accounting information to investors and the public (MOF, 2006). It 
is not simply an expansion of the disclosure requirement, but is expected to have a significant 
120 
 
effect on how an entity’s financial position and performance are presented in the financial 
statements. Changes to some areas are notable, such as the share-based payment transactions 
for employee services, business combinations, accounting treatment for goodwill, discount on 
acquisition of a business, presentation of minority interest and development costs, derivatives 
recognition, measurement of finance leases and the recognition of the tax effect of temporary 
differences between the tax basis and the carrying amount of assets and liabilities (Deloitte, 
2006). The new ASBE, effective from 1st January 2007, is mandatory for all listed firms in 
the Chinese stock market. By the end of 2006, the MOF had issued implementation guidance 
on 32 of the 38 ASBEs, aiming to assist listed firms to cope with the new financial 
accounting standards. 
 
Concurrent with the IFRS convergence of financial accounting standards, is the movement 
toward adoption of International Standards on Auditing (ISA) issued by the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). The issuance of a series of exposure 
drafts by the China Auditing Standards Board (CASB) and the Chinese Institute of Certified 
Practicing Accountants (CICPA) resulted in the adoption of 48 new Chinese Auditing 
Standards based on ISAs in February 2006, effective for listed firms from 1 January 2007. 
 
The fundamental change, as a result of accounting reform and international accounting 
standard convergence, is the change of the objective of financial reporting in China. Under 
the centrally-planned economy, the Chinese government was the main and sole user of 
enterprise reporting. The only role of financial reporting was to provide information to the 
government for planning purposes, for resource allocation decisions and for monitoring of the 
plan. The SOEs prepared financial statements to report their production levels and cost data 
according to a uniform style; there was no real system of external financial reporting (Tang 
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and Lau, 2000). In contrast, the objective of financial reporting under the market-oriented 
economy is, according to the MOF, “to meet the needs of national macro-economic 
administration, the needs of all concerned parties to understand the financial position and 
operating results of an enterprise” and “to strengthen accounting work of share enterprise, 
to protect the legitimate interest of investors and creditors” (MOF, 1992). Users of financial 
reporting include non-government bodies such as non-state investors, creditors and other 
users of financial information (Tang and Lau, 2000). 
 
4.3.2 Establishment of a corporate disclosure regulatory framework 
 
The primary purpose of a corporate disclosure regulatory framework in China is to improve 
the efficiency of the Chinese stock market and protect investors’ interests (CSRC, 1996). The 
regulatory framework of corporate information disclosure in China is comprised of four tiers. 
The corporate disclosure régime is built of regulations stipulated by the National People’s 
Congress, the State Council, the CSRC and the stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen.  
 
On top are the basic laws released by the National People’s Congress, the PRC Company Law 
and the PRC Securities Law promulgated in 1993 and 1999, respectively. The Company Law 
imposes legal responsibilities on public issuing companies to disclose their financial reports 
to public shareholders, not to provide fraudulent financial information and that non-disclosure 
will lead to fines. The Security Law aims to regulate share issuing and trading of shares. The 
law requires listed firms’ continuous disclosure, forbids fraud, insider trading and market 
manipulation in issuing and trading securities. Article 69 states that if the share prospectus, 
measures for offer of corporate bonds, financial or accounting report, listing report document, 
annual report, interim report or ad hoc report announced by an issuer or a securities 
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underwriting firm contains any falsehood, misleading statement or major omission, thus 
causing losses to investors in the course of securities trading, the issuer or the firm shall be 
liable for the losses, and responsible director(s), supervisor(s) and/or the manager of the 
issuer or the firm shall be jointly and severally liable for such losses.  
 
The second layer is the administrative regulations released by the State Council. In April 
1993, after three years of stock exchange operation in China, the Temporary Regulation of 
Share Public Issuing and Trading became the first regulation to standardize the information 
disclosure of listed firms. However, for the listed firms, it is still a regulation at the principle 
level rather than a practical guide. This regulation determines the direction and emphasis for 
the stock market regulator – the CSRC21. It is the CSRC’s responsibility to produce detailed 
guidance to assist listed firms to implement the administrative regulations. 
 
The third layer is Detailed Rules for Implementation of Information Disclosure of Publicly 
Listed Firms released by the CSRC in June 1993. This regulation marks the beginning of a 
series of specific disclosure rules and requirements stipulated by the CSRC in order to 
strengthen the transparency of information disclosure made by listed firms. The regulations 
issued by the CSRC from 1993 to 2003 can be classified into four categories: Standards of 
Contents and Formats of Information Disclosure by Public Issuing Firms (14 documents); 
                                                      
21 To regulate trading activities and information disclosure of listed firms in the Chinese stock market, two 
government regulatory agencies, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) were established in October 1992. The SCSC was the state authority 
responsible for exercising centralized market regulation, while the CSRC operated as SCSC's executive branch, 
responsible for conducting supervision and regulation of the securities markets. In August 1997, The State 
Council decided to put the securities markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen under the supervision of the CSRC. 
Meanwhile, offices of the CSRC commissioners were set up in the two municipalities. In April 1998, pursuant 
to the State Council Reform Plan, the SCSC and the CSRC were merged to form one ministry directly under the 
State Council. Both the power and the functions of the CSRC have been strengthened after the reform. In 
December 1998, The Security Law clearly stipulates that the CSRC is the main supervisory organization of the 
Chinese securities markets. The two stock exchanges are under the ultimate authority of the CSRC and they are 
delegated powers to regulate firms under their jurisdiction. Thus, a centralized securities supervisory system was 
established. 
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Preparing Rules of Information Disclosure by Public Issuing Firms (17 documents); The 
Answers to the Queries of Information Disclosure Regulations of Public Issuing Firms (6 
documents); and Other Regulations (6 documents) (Ma, 2005). 
 
Of these standards, Number 2, Contents and Formats of Listed Firms’ Annual Reports was 
first released in January 1994. It is the first regulation for the content and format of annual 
reports in the Chinese stock market. In 1997, the CSRC established the formal draft and later 
amended it in 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002, respectively. A series of revisions have 
significantly increased the information that listed firms are mandatorily required to disclose 
to the market. In addition to financial information, listed firms are required to disclose 
information related to corporate governance, such as ownership structure and working 
experience and education background of directors and management personnel. Hu (2002) 
indicates that there have been several steps taken by the CSRC in improving the information 
usefulness of the annual report. First, this regulation explicitly requires firms to disclose the 
information related to earning distribution. When companies make a profit but decide not to 
distribute dividends to investors, listed firms are required to disclose reasons and a plan of 
how the retained profit will be used. This requirement reflects the CSRC’s concern for public 
investors’ interest protection. Second, listed firms are required to disclose whether there is a 
complete separation of management personnel, assets and the financial system between listed 
firms and their parent entities. Listed firms are supposed to be the pioneer of modern 
enterprises in China; it is the CSRC’s expectation that listed firms should undertake a 
leadership role in corporate governance. Third, this regulation addresses specifically the 
independent role of accounting and auditing firms. An annual report must be accompanied by 
an auditor’s report. 
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Since 1993, listed firms have been required to lodge their interim financial report, annual 
report, acquisition announcements and significant events announcements with the CSRC. In 
terms of the means of information disclosure, the full text of the annual report must be 
published on the CSRC’s official website within four months after the reporting date. A 
summary of these reports must be published in at least one of the national newspapers 
appointed by the CSRC. The CSRC also takes into account the fact that a large number of 
individual investors in China reside in diverse locations and requires listed companies to 
make information available not only at the firm’s premises, the stock exchange, the relevant 
licensed brokers and their branches, but also to publish their annual report using specified 
publication requirements and the internet concurrently (CSRC, 2000). 
 
The fourth layer is the listing rules and specific guidance released by the two stock 
exchanges. These rules and guidance are subject to the approval of the CSRC. In 1998, the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges released the Rules Governing the Listing of 
Securities, further defining the stock exchange’s forefront surveillance responsibility of 
information disclosure. 
 
4.3.3 Corporate governance régime 
 
As one of the important participants in the global economy, China has responded to the 
emphasis on corporate governance worldwide by establishing its own corporate governance 
principles for publicly-listed firms. The two most important regulations stipulated by the 
CSRC are the Guidelines for Establishing Independent Directors System for Listed 
Companies in 2001 and Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China in 2002. 
The former tries to overhaul the insider-controlled board structure problem by promulgating a 
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requirement that the board of each listed firm is to have at least one-third independent 
directors by June 2003. The latter addresses the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, the 
responsibilities the directors and management of listed firms should undertake, and the 
importance of information disclosure. 
4.3.3.1 China’s Code of Corporate Governance 
 
In January 2001, the CSRC issued its Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
in China, based on the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999. This code signals a 
new direction in the development of China’s corporate sector and has been used as an 
important tool for raising the standard of corporate governance in China (Tomasic and 
Andrews, 2007). The CSRC’s 2001 Code addresses several aspects of corporate governance, 
including shareholders and shareholders’ meetings; listed firms and their controlling 
shareholders; directors and boards of directors; the supervisors and the supervisory board; 
performance assessment and incentives; and disciplinary systems and stakeholders. Chapter 7 
of the Code gives special attention to information disclosure and transparency, by addressing 
detailed disclosure requirements for listed companies. In addition to financial information, 
companies must disclose information regarding corporate governance and controlling 
shareholders’ interests. It is recorded that it is the responsibility of listed companies to 
provide shareholders with truthful, accurate, complete and timely information, as required by 
laws and regulations. The code itself does not give a definition of transparency but listed 
firms are encouraged to voluntarily disclose all other information that may have a material 
effect on important decisions to ensure equal access to information for all investors. 
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4.3.3.2 Independent director system 
 
One way of seeking to improve Chinese corporate governance and to solve the problems 
caused by “insider” control among listed firms is to seek the appointment of independent 
directors (Tomasic and Andrews, 2007). A survey of listed firms in Shanghai, conducted by 
Tam (1995) in 1992, reveals the following board composition: independent directors, 30.6%; 
representatives of legal-person ownership, 10.6%; government department, 10.6%; and 
representatives of foreign investors, 5.7%. Compared to an average of 75% independent 
directors on the board of publicly-listed firms in the United States, the proportion of 
independent directors in firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is relatively low. 
Several high profile corporate scandals in 2000 and 2001 highlighted the poor corporate 
governance practices among listed firms in the Chinese stock market. The existence of both a 
board of directors and a supervisory board did not prevent the disclosure of false information. 
 
To protect public investors’ rights and interests, in August 2001, the CSRC released the 
Guide Opinion on Establishing Independent Director System by Listed Companies, hoping 
that independent directors taking on more of the monitoring responsibilities would result in 
greater transparency in listed firms. The independent directors system required the managing 
board to be comprised of at least one-third independent directors by 30th June 2003. The 
CSRC defines “independence” as being independent from controlling shareholder, 
management and major business relations. Candidates’ qualifications as independent 
directors must be checked and approved by the CSRC before they can be elected at a 
shareholders’ meeting. Candidates for independent directorships are required to make a 
public declaration on their independence qualifications and their information needs to be 
published in the newspapers. The CSRC reports that by June 30, 2002, more than 2,300 
independent directors had been elected and appointed at shareholder meetings of listed 
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companies. 80% of the 1,084 firms appointed 2 independent directors on their board of 
directors, and 70% of companies have at least one accounting professional as an independent 
director (Zhang, 2002). In the new regulations, the main responsibility of independent 
directors is to protect investors’ rights, especially public minority investors. Independent 
directors are authorized to submit proposals to call shareholders’ meetings, recruit or dismiss 
accounting firms, invite in independent auditors and offer independent financial reports, apart 
from their normal duties as board members. Major related-party transactions have to be 
approved by independent directors and independent directors can serve as chairs of the 
auditing, compensation, and nomination committees and they must be in the majority on 
those committees. The independent director system has contributed positively to the 
credibility of corporate information disclosure and increasing minority investors’ wealth 
(Tomasic and Andrews, 2007). 
 
The CSRC recognizes that rules and regulations will not necessarily bring about investor 
protection in the Chinese stock market unless proper training of the main participants of the 
Chinese stock exchange and strong enforcement are implemented. To promote corporate 
governance practice among listed firms, the CSRC conducts workshops and training courses. 
The requirement for independent directors has created a huge demand for qualified directors. 
By offering training courses on the roles and responsibilities of directors, CSRC is able to 
develop a pool of candidates from which the listed companies can choose independent 
directors (Zhang, 2001). Monthly training classes for independent director candidates were 
run in big cities including Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. There were five thousand 
candidates trained between 2001 and 2002. The CSRC believes strongly that the educational 
process will enhance understanding of the importance of corporate governance by both firms 
and investors. 
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4.4 Enforcement of investor protection 
 
One of the most important measures necessary to maintain the sustainable development of the 
Chinese stock market is minority investor protection, given the problem of “one dominating 
state-owned share monopoly under insider control”. Minority or public investors’ interest has 
been expropriated by majority shareholders since the establishment of the stock market in 
China (Xu and Wang, 1999). Over the years, investor protection has been acknowledged by 
the MOF, the CSRC and both stock exchanges as one of the most important measures to 
support the steady growth of the Chinese stock market. In the speech given at a Chinese 
Business Summit in 2001, Laura Cha, the Vice Chairman of the CSRC, pointed out that given 
the overwhelming proportion of state ownership and the inferior position of minority 
shareholders in listed firms, minority investors need to be given priority protection due to 
information asymmetry. Minority investors, if well-protected, will establish confidence in the 
Chinese stock market, leading to more funds being invested in the market and greater 
investor participation. Thus, the better protected the investors are, the better role the capital 
market will play in the allocation of resources, leading therefore to the sound and efficient 
development of the entire national economy. 
“Investor protection” is a relatively new concept in Chinese society and there are two 
ideological issues affecting the implementation of investor protection in the Chinese stock 
market (CSRC, 2007). First, prior to economic reform, China’s centrally-planned economy 
was based on material production. It was widely held that only tangible productions such as 
wheat, steel and automobiles could make contributions to society, the economy and wealth 
creation. Service industries, banking, finance, tourism and storage were thought of as not 
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creating or increasing real wealth for the nation because they did not manufacture or produce 
any material products. Secondly, the income distribution principle is derived from the 
material production concept. The income distribution principle under the planned economy 
stresses that only labor-producing material wealth is entitled to eventual distribution. This 
narrow understanding of the economy and wealth creation has cast doubts on whether 
securities investment can create value in the way that material production does. This doubt 
unavoidably gives rise to the question of why securities investors’ interests need to be 
protected. Therefore, the CSRC recommends that it is necessary to promote a deeper 
awareness and understanding of the concept of investor protection. Without a real 
understanding of the significance of developing the securities market, and a full affirmation 
of the role of stock investment, the protection of investor interests would not be able to be 
implemented in a real sense (CSRC, 2007). 
4.4.1 Justification of regulatory agencies’ role in investor protection 
 
La Porta et al. (2000) argue a legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate 
governance and to protect minority investors. In China, although the Chinese government has 
enacted the Company Law and the Security Law in recent years, the overall legal system is 
still relatively primitive by the standards of capitalist countries (Berkman, 2008). China’s first 
civil compensation suit regarding a securities case, illustrated in the previous section, reflects 
on one hand, the activism of the investment community in China. On the other hand, as Chen 
et al. (2005) suggest, one successful civil suit in the first 12 years of the Chinese stock market 
is a testament to the lack of legal redress in securities cases. Under the Security Law, a civil 
case against a listed firm can only be brought to the court after the CSRC has made an 
investigation. Class action lawsuits are not possible in China and so a lawsuit brought by an 
individual investor is very costly and has a low probability of success (Chen et al., 2005). 
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Given the weak legal mechanism in China in respect of investor protection, the question 
needs to be raised, who is in the best position to play this role in the Chinese stock market? 
Glaeser et al. (2001) suggest that in emerging markets with relatively weak legal systems, 
regulators can provide an effective substitute for ineffective judicial enforcement. This 
proposition is particularly relevant to the Chinese stock market. Research has shown that in 
China the government’s regulatory agency group including the MOF, the CSRC and stock 
exchanges, can jointly provide an investor protection role (Chen et al., 2005; Berkman, 
2008). 
 
4.4.2 CSRC enforcement 
 
Aiming to promote and protect investor interest, the CSRC introduces, on average, twenty 
major policies each year to address the stock issue system, trading and supervision of listed 
firms (People’s Daily, 2005d). Since the establishment of the CSRC in 1992, more than 300 
regulations, rules, standards and guidelines concerning the securities market have been 
stipulated by the MOF and the CSRC. In respect of its enforcement, the CSRC declares that 
its major responsibilities are supervising security markets and exercising vertical power of 
authority over the regional and provincial supervisory institutions of the market, and 
investigating and penalizing activities violating securities and futures laws and regulations. 
The CSRC acknowledges that investors are expecting stronger supervision of listed firms’ 
information. Firms that fail to provide the capital market with timely, adequate and 
transparent information will face severe penalties from the CSRC (People’s Daily, 2005a). In 
the early and mid-1990s, the CSRC enforcement actions were weak and punishment was lax. 
Thus, in the earlier days, the CSRC was viewed as being ineffective (Chen et al., 2005). 
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From 1998, the CSRC gained overall regulatory power and has over-riding control over the 
securities industry. 
 
The CSRC initiates investigations based on a number of leads. According to Chen et al. 
(2005), leads include complaints from investors, information from insiders or former 
employees of firms, newspaper articles, analyses of annual reports and other corporate 
disclosures, referrals from the stock exchanges, legal disputes and police investigations. In 
addition to formal investigations, the CSRC also conducts on-going surveillance of listed 
firms and has a practice of regular reviews and random investigations. The process is similar 
to that of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US. The results of the 
CSRC’s investigations are made public if wrong-doing is found. If an infraction is deemed to 
be very minor, the CSRC will give an internal warning to the firm and there will be no public 
disclosure of either the investigation or its outcome. Public admonishments take four main 
forms. They are public criticism, public condemnation, official warning and monetary fines. 
These four categories of admonishment are stipulated in the Security Law. For individuals, 
the sanctions can include criminal prosecution and carry severe penalties. An example of the 
possible severity of the penalties occurred in 1999, when the chairman and general manager 
of Dongfang Boile were sentenced to death for fabricating financial statements. Table 4.1 
summarizes the number and category of firms which received CSRC’s public condemnation 
for providing misleading information to the Chinese stock market between 1996 and 2006. 
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Table 4.1 Public condemnation of inappropriate behavior of listed firms 
Firm 1996 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Listed firms 1    13 24 37 22 33 
Future firms  2 1  1 4 4 3 4 
Security firms    16 2 10 3 19 1 
CPA firms     4 3 5 2  
                           (Source: the CSRC website http://www.csrc.gov.cn) 
 
To enforce the Chinese accounting standards, the MOF, jointly with the CSRC, supervise 
financial accounting information disclosures made by listed firms on the Chinese stock 
market. The CSRC has the power to punish listed firms and their auditors if non-compliance 
with accounting standards and audit criteria or false financial information is found. Penalties 
for the CPA firms that do not apply appropriate standards can include cancellation of 
licenses, temporarily or permanently. By the end of 2004, the CSRC had completed the 
investigation of 851 cases and 953 related persons had been punished, most for disobeying 
the accounting standards and showing false information in their reports (CSRC, 2005). 
 
The CSRC has also publicly pledged to improve the transparency of its own work to ensure 
the efficiency of capital market reforms and to curb corruption. In 2005, the CSRC further 
implemented the stock market reform plans mapped out by the State Council and steadily 
opened up the market. According to Shang Fulin, the former chairman of the CSRC, strong 
protection of the interests of public investors is the priority for the reforms, and an 
accountability culture needs to be developed (CSRC, 2000). The CSRC has also increased its 
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interaction with the media and the public investors, such as offering more detailed 
introductions of the new policies to investors and conducting more interviews with the media. 
 
The “transparency” principle of the CSRC can be reflected by the composition and work of 
its listing approval committee. The Committee, which reviews and approves the listing 
applications of domestic companies, was established by the CSRC in 2003. The members are 
made up of representatives from other government departments, securities businesses, 
lawyers, accountants, fund managers and academic scholars who can represent some interest 
groups and present professional opinion on listing. Since 2003, the names of the members 
that review each stock or bond issue application have been released on the CSRC’s website to 
ensure transparency. In fighting against corruption in the process of listing approval, the 
CSRC has also pledged to create legal access for normal communications between listing 
committee members and the listing applicants, such as giving the latter more opportunities to 
introduce their enterprises and respond to problems raised during the reviews (CSRC, 2005). 
4.4.3 The stock exchanges’ role in investor protection 
 
Under the close supervision of the CSRC, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
established their own listing rules in 1998 and strengthened their roles in supervising 
information disclosure. While endeavoring to provide facilities for the securities trading and 
monitoring thereof, the two stock exchanges also participated in championing the 
improvement of corporate governance, especially in respect of protecting investors’ interests 
and the transparency of information disclosure. In 2003, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued 
the Guidelines on Protection of Investor Rights and Interests for Small and Medium 
Enterprises Board. Article 12 of this guideline stresses that listed companies should 
“truthfully, accurately, completely and timely disclose the information that may significantly 
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impact the price of stocks and derivatives or the decision-making of investors, and such 
information must not contain falsehoods, misleading statements or material omissions. The 
person with disclosure obligation shall, based on the principle of good faith, voluntarily 
disclose other information that is not required by laws, administrative regulations and rules, 
as well as the rules of the Exchange. Listed firms shall ensure that investors have equal 
access to the information disclosed and shall not make selective disclosure”. Article 13 
emphasizes that “when making voluntary disclosure of forward-looking financial 
information, listed companies shall follow the internal audit procedures, issue risk warnings 
to investors stating the assumption basis for such forward-looking information and any 
uncertainty involved and, in accordance with actual conditions and in a timely manner, 
modify the information previously disclosed”. 
 
In addition to releasing and implementing rules to regulate information disclosure by listed 
firms and safeguard the interest of public shareholders, these two stock exchanges also take 
some action to maintain the sustained development of the stock market. They monitor the 
dominant shareholders’ illegal use of funds of listed companies; in conjunction with the 
assistance of local governments, they enforce state shareholders to return funds to listed 
companies to ensure the capital resources raised from the stock exchange are used for 
legitimized purposes. The regulatory department within the Shanghai Stock Exchange has 
also released reports to expose the bad behavior of some security investment companies in 
the stock market. It is complementary to Chinese accounting standards that disclosure is 
reasonable and systematically and efficiently enforced. It also helps to ensure that the 
Chinese accounting standards are properly implemented. Taking a similar attitude as the 
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CSRC in respect of investor protection, the two stock exchanges also undertake strong 
enforcement to promote transparent disclosure in the stock market22. 
 
4.4.4 Market reaction to regulatory agencies’ actions 
 
Market reactions to the CSRC’s actions are investigated by Chen et al. (2005) and Berkman 
(2008). Chen et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence on the impact of the regulatory 
agencies’ enforcement actions on the valuation of listed firms. In their study, the authors 
identify 169 enforcement actions carried out by the CSRC in the period 1999-2003. Using 
event study research methodology, Chen et al. (2005) find that enforcement actions 
implemented by the CSRC have a negative impact on stock prices, with most firms suffering 
wealth losses of around 1-2% in the 5 days surrounding the event. Moreover, they find that 
firms have a greater rate of auditor change; a much higher incidence of qualified audit 
opinions; increased CEO turnover; and wider bid-ask spreads. The negative stock returns and 
the costly economic consequences for listed firms suggest that the regulatory agencies in the 
Chinese stock market have credibility and their actions have “teeth”. 
 
                                                      
22 In his research report, Ruyin Hu (2002), Director of Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Centre, reports on 
the stronger enforcement and frontline regulations in 2002 and 2003 in Shanghai Stock Exchange – SSE 
publicly reprimanded listed companies for violations of their listing rules: in the year of 2002, SSE strengthened 
supervision on listing companies: made format guidelines for listing companies temporary bulletin, regulated 
disclosure, and further implemented the questioning supervision. SSE sent listing firms over 500 post-auditing 
advices and 105 supervision letters. Publicly reprimanded 19 companies, sent inside notice of criticism to 49 
companies or high-level managers, had CSRC specially audit or check 21 firms. Established inside information 
knower database. Checked the share-holding situation and illegal close-out among high-level managers. 
Advocated 37 companies to announce a proposal letter on perfecting corporate governance, actively advanced 
listed firms for regulating disclosure of governance structure, and strengthened the legal system training and 
trust education of directors and auditors. In 2003, SSE made further implementation of questioning supervision 
and strictly managed listing companies which have violation activities: 33 companies received a notice of 
criticism. 11 companies were publicly reprimanded, 10 listing companies were subjected to a CSRC special 
investigation. In the period after the periodical report, SSE issued 480 post-auditing advice reports and 142 
regulatory letters and urged listing companies to publish 169 Complementary to Periodical Reports or Correct 
Announcements.  
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Berkman (2008) adopts an event study methodology to examine the stock market reactions to 
three newly-released regulations by the CSRC aimed at reducing expropriation from public 
investors by controlling shareholders. The three regulations were all introduced in the second 
quarter of 2000 and were partly motivated by China’s successful attempt to gain entrance into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The first new regulation (released on May 18, 2000) 
substantially increased the rights of public investors at a firms’ annual shareholders’ meeting. 
The second regulation (released on June 6, 2000) prohibited the issuance of loan guarantees 
by a firm to its controlling shareholder, and the third regulation (released on June 26, 2000) 
improved the transparency and regulation of asset transfers to related parties. Berkman 
(2008) finds significant positive abnormal returns accrue to firms with weak governance, as 
proxied by the value of related-party transactions and a variety of less direct measures. These 
results are interpreted as evidence that securities market regulation can be effective in 
protecting public investors from expropriation in a country like China with weak judicial 
enforcement. 
 
4.5 Development of a professional association – CICPA 
 
The accounting profession had not been a strong, well-organized and well-paid professional 
group in China until the late 1970s. Traditional Chinese culture and its under-developed 
economy contributed to the low status of accountants. Traditional Chinese culture considers 
merchants and people related to industry as inferior to other professions. Confucian 
philosophy suggests that “the mind of the superior man is conversant with righteousness; the 
mind of the mean man is conversant with gain” (Gao and Handley-Schachler, 2003). In 
ancient China, in an economy which was dominated by small scale family businesses, the 
role of accountants in respect of strategic management and decision-making in Chinese 
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society was not well regarded. However, the function of accountants has changed since the 
economic and enterprise reforms in China. The rapid growth of accounting firms during the 
past fifteen years is the consequence of the introduction of massive new accounting 
regulations, standards and the trend of international accounting harmonization. The important 
role that accountants can play in improving business management and corporate governance 
has been recognized and this recognition has led to the development of a certification process 
for the accounting workforce (Groom and Sims, 2005). 
 
The establishment of the Chinese Institute of CPAs (CICPA) was a landmark event in the 
development of the CPA profession in China (Tang and Lau, 2000). The CICPA is a quasi-
government organization and reports to the MOF. The CICPA’s main responsibilities include 
registering CPAs and public accounting firms and conducting the entrance examination. In 
January 1994, the People’s Republic of China Registered Accountant Law (Certified Public 
Accountants Act) was promulgated by the MOF. The Act defines the scope of a CPA’s role, 
including external auditing as distinct from internal auditing and government auditing, and 
other accounting consultancy work such as the design of accounting systems, performing 
accounting projects for management and providing advice on taxation, business registration 
and staff training. 
 
A further step in the development of an independent profession has been the de-linking of 
CPA firms from sponsoring agents, usually government departments and institutions, since 
1998. With the growth of the market economy, the government’s tight control over CICPA 
has become impractical. It is necessary for accounting firms to be formed as independent 
partnerships or limited liability companies. The de-linking is a sign of the intention of the 
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government to abandon direct control over CPA practices. CPA professional services have 
been subject to professional, legal and market discipline since then. 
 
An important role has been played by the independent accounting and auditing firms in 
boosting investors’ confidence in the Chinese stock market. In 1998, a survey was conducted 
by the CICPA among 773 listed companies as part of an “accounting and auditing market 
cleaning campaign” implemented between 1997 and 1999 in China. The results show that 
there was a significant improvement in respect of the quality of accounting and auditing 
work. Of the 773 companies, there were 38 companies that received qualified auditor’s 
opinion, 55 companies were offered an auditing opinion with the attachment of an 
explanation. One auditing firm released a qualified auditor report to a listed firm and one 
auditing firm refused to issue an audit report to a listed firm. In total, 12.29% of auditing 
firms expressed their disagreement to the financial information provided by the listed firms. 
Prior to that, the issuing of a qualified auditor report to a listed firm by an auditing firm had 
never previously happened. The implication of these actions is that accountants in China have 
improved their professionalism and sense of responsibility to public investors. A survey 
conducted by Chinese media in June 1998 also showed that the public’s confidence in 
qualified accountants had improved from 45% in 1994 to 81%. The image and creditability of 
independent accounting and auditing firms have gradually improved. However, the quality of 
services provided by domestic accounting and auditing firms is still far from satisfactory, 
especially in respect of professional ethics. In order to make higher profits, some accounting 
firms assist their clients to produce fraudulent financial information. Due to a lack of any 
sense of risk, these accounting firms do not seem to realize that public investors rely upon an 
auditor’s opinion to make decisions regarding capital investment. The majority of corporate 
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scandals including Hongguan Shiye and Qiongminyuan can be related to the deceptive role 
played by external accounting and auditing firms. 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the complex nature of the Chinese stock market. The unique 
ownership structure among listed firms has consequently caused an agency problem with 
distinctive characteristics in the Chinese context. The conflicting interest between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders requires further transparency in terms of corporate 
disclosure. A regulatory environment has been gradually established by the Chinese 
government to facilitate a more attractive business environment. As government agencies, the 
MOF and the CSRC jointly oversee the administration of the Chinese stock market. Both of 
them promote transparency of disclosure and the protection of the interests of public 
investors. Established in 1992, the initial function of the CSRC was to perform administrative 
roles such as approving the listing and reviewing the share transfers of state shares and legal 
shares among institutional investors. Gradually, the CSRC has changed its function to 
regulate listed companies’ information disclosure and fraudulent behavior. The CSRC sees 
itself as a pro-active regulator in fostering corporate governance, in enforcing rules, in 
safeguarding the integrity of the Chinese stock market, and in championing the rights of 
public investors (Tomasic and Andrews, 2007). Research shows their actions are plausible as 
the market responds to them positively. 
 
Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have established the institutional background for Chapter 5, by 
illustrating the changed disclosure environment and identifying the main stakeholder groups 
of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. Chapter 5 will develop a theoretical framework 
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for this study and establish hypotheses to explain disclosure behavior changes among listed 
firms over the 1995 to 2006 testing period. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework for this study by 
analyzing the impact of the changed corporate disclosure environment on listed firms’ 
disclosure behavior over the period 1995 to 2006 in the Chinese stock market. The theoretical 
framework is based on the range of theories reviewed in Chapter 2. This chapter draws upon 
the two previous chapters in developing the hypotheses detailed later in this chapter. Chapter 
2 critically reviews the extant literature on corporations’ voluntary disclosure. Previously, 
firms chose to disclose information based either on economic concerns or through pressure 
from society and powerful stakeholder groups. Chapters 3 and 4 elaborate on the changes in 
the disclosure environment in China during the past three decades as influenced by the 
political, economic and social changes which have occurred since the late 1970s. Chapter 4 
explores the main roles undertaken by the MOF, the CSRC and the two stock exchanges in 
developing a comprehensive regulatory framework for corporate disclosure in China. 
 
The analysis in this chapter is based upon the assumption that a changed disclosure 
environment in China would have impacted on the disclosure behavior of listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market. It is believed that the changed disclosure environment has resulted in 
several social groups in Chinese society becoming important stakeholders of listed firms. 
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Theories under the system-oriented view discussed previously, suggest listed firms will 
assess the power possessed by each stakeholder group and determine their strategies 
according to stakeholders’ power. Listed firms are expected to adopt voluntary information 
disclosure as a means to strategically manage the relationship between firms and their 
powerful stakeholder/s. Links between stakeholder power and firm-specific characteristics 
including ownership structure, corporate governance-related factors and economics-based 
variables are also established in this chapter. Several hypotheses are then developed to predict 
the relationship between these firm-specific characteristics and firms’ voluntary disclosure 
changes over the period covered by this study. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 justifies why a system-oriented view is more 
appropriate in the Chinese context than an economic-based view in explaining voluntary 
disclosure of listed firms. The theoretical framework used in this study is developed in this 
section. Section 5.3 assesses stakeholder attributes by using the Mitchell et al. (1997) 
stakeholder sorting criteria and identifies the most powerful stakeholder group for listed 
firms. Hypotheses are established in Section 5.4, and Section 5.5 summarizes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Theoretical framework of this study 
 
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, disclosure studies use two main perspectives, an economics-based 
perspective and a system-oriented perspective to explain and predict factors that have 
contributed to firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. The former perspective primarily 
concerns the relationship between management of firms and their investors specifically, while 
the latter considers firms’ disclosure behavior in the much broader social structure and 
institutional environment within which firms operate (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). The 
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agency problem in the Chinese context, as illustrated in Chapter 4, is not caused by diverged 
interests of managers (agents) and investors (principals). The problem is in the form of 
conflicting interests between majority ownership and minority ownership, due to “one 
dominating state-owned share monopoly” and “insider control”. Therefore, commonly used 
economics-based variables cannot give a full account or description of disclosure behavior 
changes among listed firms in the Chinese stock market. Rather, they provide supplementary 
explanations of the disclosure behavior changes of listed firms in the Chinese institutional 
setting of corporate disclosure. 
 
Legitimacy theory asserts that firms need to consider the social environment in which firms 
operate. Firms legitimize their behavior in accordance with the “social contract” between the 
society and firms. The voluntary disclosure of corporate social and environmental 
responsibility in recent years in developed countries is regarded as corporations legitimizing 
themselves in society, due to increased demand from stakeholders (Roberts, 1992; Nasi et al., 
1997; Neu et al., 1998; Deegan, 2002; Deegan et al., 2002). The institutional environment 
surrounding increased voluntary disclosure of CSR can be regarded as a changed “social 
contract” in western societies. In the 1960s, the expectation that society had of corporations 
was profit maximization, meaning profit was the only criterion used by society to measure 
whether a firm’s behavior and performance was legitimated (Friedman, 1962). The public 
expectations, however, have significantly changed in recent years. Rather than focusing only 
on investors’ economic interests, society also expects corporations to address the interests of 
other stakeholders including employees, suppliers, customers and the community. The 
content of the “social contract” has changed primarily from profit maximization to 
environmental protection, pollution reduction, employee welfare and safety of products 
(Deegan, 2006). Voluntary disclosure of CSR is regarded as one of the means by which 
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corporations choose to respond to changed social expectations and operating environments. 
Voluntary disclosure of CSR can assist corporations to reduce the “legitimacy gap” between 
corporations and society. 
 
In China, given the political, economic and social changes which have occurred during the 
past thirty years, as discussed in Chapter 3, the changes of disclosure behavior among listed 
firms are considered and investigated using a changed corporate disclosure environment as a 
lens. The main elements of the changed disclosure environment, as discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4, include: 
 the transformation from a socialist, centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy in China; 
 the anxiety of the Chinese government about opening the economy further and 
attracting more direct foreign investment; 
 the development of the Chinese stock market; 
 the change in the objectives of reporting and disclosure from solely satisfying the 
government’s information needs, to satisfying external investors’ information needs; 
 the establishment of a regulatory framework for corporate reporting and disclosure; 
 the increased pressure and demand for transparent information from the investment 
community; 
 the growth of professional accounting associations. 
 
These changes have formed a new “social contract” between Chinese listed firms and 
Chinese society. Prior to the economic reform launched in the late 1970s, the social 
expectation of state-owned enterprises was to operate as an integrated part of the planned 
economy. To legitimate their social status, enterprises were required to provide stable and 
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secure working conditions for Chinese workers and contribute to equal wealth distribution. 
Since the late 1970s, the economic reform and establishment of the Chinese stock market 
dramatically changed the operating environment of state-owned enterprises, especially those 
that had been privatized and transformed into listed firms. In a market-oriented economy, 
enterprises rely on investors and creditors for capital resources. Consequently, the investment 
community expects more transparent disclosure from listed firms, in order to make more 
informed economic decision-making. Legitimacy theory underpins the basic assumption that 
listed firms would change their disclosure behavior due to the demands of various 
stakeholders, including public investors, creditors and regulatory bodies. Therefore, the 
changed disclosure environment is expected to motivate listed firms to improve disclosure 
transparency and make their information disclosure more external-user oriented. 
 
Stakeholder theory addresses the functional aspect of legitimacy theory, considering how 
firms legitimate their behavior and operation in order to satisfy stakeholders’ demands. Under 
the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, power is a crucial variable in a stakeholder-
management relationship. Roberts (1992) suggests that a major role of corporate management 
is to assess the importance of meeting stakeholder demands, in order to achieve the strategic 
objectives of the firm. A stakeholder’s power to influence corporate management is viewed 
as a function of the stakeholder’s control over resources required by the organization 
(Ullmann, 1985). The stakeholders of firms possess powers that may be used to command 
limited financial or labor resources, legislate against firms, and influence the consumption of 
firms’ goods and services. However, firms will not respond to all stakeholders equally. The 
most powerful stakeholders’ will be attended to first (Nasi et al., 1997) and a successful 
corporation is considered to be one that satisfies the demands of the various powerful 
stakeholder groups (Ullmann, 1985). 
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In the Chinese context, the only stakeholder of state-owned enterprises is the Chinese 
government. The results of privatization of SOEs and transformation of SOEs into publicly-
listed firms have made investors and creditors the main stakeholders of listed firms, as they 
provide the capital resources. Under a market-oriented economy, business needs to be more 
competitive in order to survive and succeed; customers have the freedom to choose better 
products and seek lower prices in an open commodity market. Employees, however, lose 
their job security. Professional associations in the area related to financial reporting and 
corporate disclosure, start to undertake some roles in implementing the accounting standards 
and disclosure rules among listed firms; people living in communities are concerned about 
the social issues such as safety of products, unemployment and environmental protection. The 
Chinese government has changed its role from direct intervention in the economy to actively 
managing it. Thus, investors, creditors, regulatory agencies, employees, customers, suppliers, 
professional associations and the community affect the operation and behavior of listed firms 
on one hand; while those parties’ political and economic stakes are also affected by the 
performance and behavior of listed firms on the other. Applying the definition of stakeholders 
proposed by Freeman (1984), all the above parties can be classified as the stakeholders of 
listed firms in China. To legitimate their social status, listed firms’ behaviors need to be in 
line with stakeholders’ expectations, especially those stakeholders that control the financial 
resources of listed firms. 
 
Applying stakeholder theory in this study, the stakeholder sorting model developed by 
Mitchell et al. (1997) is used in this chapter to identify powerful stakeholders for listed firms 
in the Chinese stock market. Stakeholder salience theory is used to predict the disclosure 
behavior changes of listed firms as a group. Stakeholders of listed firms will be classified into 
147 
 
latent stakeholders, expectant stakeholders and definitive stakeholders, based on Mitchell et 
al.’s (1997) analysis of stakeholder attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency). The research 
findings of Agle et al. (1999) suggest that in the minds of management, the stakeholder 
attributes are individually and cumulatively related to stakeholder salience across all groups. 
Therefore, listed firms in the Chinese stock market are predicted to use voluntary information 
disclosure to respond to the demand and pressure from the most powerful stakeholders. 
 
Several characteristics related variables of firms are also used in this study to predict firms’ 
disclosure behavior changes. However, this is considered under the stakeholder theory setting 
rather than under economics-based views. Ownership structure reflects equity stakes of 
majority shareholders and public shareholders in listed firms, either domestic or foreign 
investors. Corporate governance mechanisms are imposed on listed firms by regulatory 
agencies and represent the political stake of the Chinese government. Economics-based 
variables include leverage, profitability and growth opportunity. They are closely related to 
stakeholders who have economic stakes in listed firms. It is expected these variables would 
influence firms’ disclosure decision-making to various degrees during different periods, as 
China opens up its economy to the global market. Figure 5.1 summarizes the theoretical 
framework of listed firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior in the Chinese stock market. 
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Figure 5.1 Theoretical framework of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market 
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5.3 Stakeholder attributes 
 
 
This section applies Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder sorting criteria to identify the 
stake and assess the power possessed by various stakeholder groups of listed firms in 
the Chinese stock market. Stakeholder attributes of the creditor group, shareholder 
group, regulatory agency group and professional association group are specifically 
assessed in this section, as they are the stakeholder groups most relevant to disclosure 
transparency in the Chinese stock market. This assessment classifies these 
stakeholders into different types and identifies the most powerful stakeholder groups 
for listed firms, thus predicting firms’ disclosure behavior as a result of stakeholder 
salience. Table 5.1 recaps Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder sorting criteria and 
classifications discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Table 5.1 Stakeholder sorting criteria and classifications (Mitchell et al., 1997) 
Stakeholder     Classification Power Legitimacy Urgency 
Latent 
stakeholder 
Dormant stakeholder √   
Discretionary stakeholder  √  
Demanding stakeholder   √ 
Expectant 
stakeholder 
Dominant stakeholder √ √  
Dependent stakeholder  √ √ 
Dangerous stakeholder √  √ 
Definitive 
stakeholder 
 √ √ √ 
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5.3.1 Creditor group 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, banks became one of the main sources of SOEs’ capital 
when state-owned bank loans replaced the government’s budget allocation in the early 
1980s (Xu, 2005). Banks in China then formed a stakeholder group for listed firms as 
a result of China’s economic reform. As creditors for listed firms, the power 
possessed by this stakeholder group has changed during the past two decades. In the 
early stage of the economic reform, banks were under pressure from the government 
to provide “policy loans” to SOEs (Petkova, 2008). Banks, therefore, had no power to 
influence SOEs’ performance and information disclosure. They also did not have an 
urgent claim over the actualization of their economic stake. Therefore, between the 
early 1980s and mid-1990s, creditors could only be classified as a discretionary 
stakeholder of SOEs. 
 
Factors such as the entrance of China into the WTO, the opening up of the Chinese 
banking market and the listing of several large commercial banks, have all contributed 
to the changes in the operation of the banking system in China. Now, profit-oriented 
banks provide firms with loans on commercial terms. Regardless of being state-owned 
or private, commercial banks were expected to earn interest revenue from borrowers 
and have their loans repaid. Creditors now have a stronger economic stake in listed 
firms. The power and urgency possessed by the state-owned banks over listed firms 
gradually increased with the disconnection between the government’s loan policies 
and banks’ commercial activities. Banks can now independently determine which 
enterprises they want to lend funds to and how to avoid non-performing loans (NPLs). 
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Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese banks have developed stakeholder attributes, power 
and urgency. Therefore, banks can be classified as a definitive stakeholder of listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market. 
 
5.3.2 Investor group 
 
 
Investors, as a major capital resource provider of listed firms, form another 
stakeholder group. This group has one strong attribute, namely, urgency. Investors 
can buy or sell their shares freely. If they can’t have the management changed via 
their voting powers, they may sell their shares in the stock market and this action may 
lead to the devaluation of a firm’s share price. As investors have equity stakes in 
listed firms, they expect firms to make transparent disclosures to assist them in 
making efficient decisions in terms of how to allocate their financial resources. This 
group, however, does not have strong power over listed firms. Although investors in 
China have begun to use legal mechanisms to protect their interests from exploitation 
by majority owners, their actions are only strong enough to put external demands and 
pressure on listed firms to make transparent disclosures, rather than imposing 
sanctions on firms directly (Chen et al., 2005). With strong urgency and legitimacy 
but weak authoritative power, investor groups can only be classified as a dependent 
stakeholder of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
 
5.3.3 Regulatory agency group 
 
The regulatory agency group is identified as a corporations’ stakeholder by Freeman 
and Reed (1983). In the Chinese stock market, the regulatory agency group includes 
  152
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. In respect of corporate disclosure, 
the way the regulatory agency group legitimizes its existence is to develop and 
enforce corporate disclosure rules and regulations that satisfy community information 
demands (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
 
Regulatory agencies have a political stake in listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
Politically, a healthy capital market serves the government to further open up China’s 
economy, enhance enterprise reform and attract more investments from both domestic 
and overseas investors. However, due to the problems of “one dominating state-
owned share monopoly” and “insider control”, as discussed in Chapter 3, the minority 
or public investors’ interests have been expropriated by majority shareholders since 
the establishment of the stock market in China. Over the years, “investor protection” 
has been acknowledged by the regulatory agency group as one of the most important 
measures for supporting the steady growth of the Chinese stock market. 
 
Regulatory agencies have political power 23  over listed firms to ensure that the 
political stake of the Chinese government is actualized. The MOF has authoritative 
power over listed firms in terms of following accounting regulations and standards. 
The CSRC has power to regulate listed firms’ conduct and information disclosure. As 
described in Chapter 4, the CSRC and both stock exchanges have employed a series 
of strategies and actions to achieve “investor protection”. These actions include 
stipulating accounting and disclosure regulations, establishing a corporate governance 
régime, providing training for investors and independent directors, and imposing 
                                                      
23 Political power means the ability to influence due to use of the political process (Freeman and Reed, 
1983). 
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public sanctions against listed firms. These actions suggest an increased willingness 
by the Chinese leadership to subordinate the interests of controlling shareholders to 
the interests of other shareholders (Berkman, 2008). They have sent a clear and strong 
signal to listed firms over the years, that to legitimate their status in the Chinese stock 
market, listed firms need to devote themselves to protecting minority investors’ 
interests by disclosing transparent information to investors. 
 
The evidence provided in Chapter 4 shows the regulatory agency group in the Chinese 
stock market has three strong stakeholder-attributes. This group legitimates its 
existence by establishing the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure in the 
Chinese stock market. The enforcement of the regulations and sanctions it has 
imposed show its power and urgency over listed firms in the stock market. If listed 
firms are de-listed by the stock exchange, not only do they lose an important source of 
capital, but also their reputation in society is damaged. Based on the stakeholder 
sorting criteria of Mitchell et al. (1997), the regulatory agency group can be identified 
as a definitive stakeholder for listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
 
5.3.4 Professional association - CICPA 
 
 
Chapter 4 also illustrates the establishment and development of the Chinese Institute 
of CPAs (CICPA). This professional body has played a positive role in improving the 
quality of financial disclosure in the Chinese stock market. However, as one of the 
stakeholders of listed firms, CICPA only possesses one of the three stakeholder 
sorting criteria – legitimacy. CICPA doesn’t have power and urgency over listed firms 
and CPA firms. Rather, it is the CSRC and the MOF that possess authoritative power 
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over listed firms and CPA firms. As mentioned previously, it is the CSRC and the 
MOF that can impose a penalty on CPA firms that do not apply appropriate standards 
and such a penalty can include cancellation of a CPA firm’s license, either 
temporarily or permanently. Therefore, the CICPA can only be classified as a 
discretionary stakeholder of listed firms in the Chinese stock market, as it cannot 
threaten listed firms’ capital resources. 
 
5.3.5 Environmentalists in Chinese society 
 
Another stakeholder group of listed firms are environmentalists and the environmental 
authority. The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) has issued 
several regulations and provisions related to environmental disclosure and reporting. 
The Management Provision on Reporting and Registration on Pollutant Emissions 
(1992) was the earliest regulation, requiring enterprises to report to the government 
the details of the pollutants they are responsible for and how they are managed. The 
Environmental Management Provision for Construction (1998) requires enterprises 
that run construction projects to produce an Environmental Impact Assessment report 
(EIA). The Bulletin on Information Disclosure for Corporate Environmental 
Performance (2003) stipulates that non-compliant enterprises should disclose their 
corporate environmental performance to the public. Local environmental protection 
bureaux must release corporate non-compliance lists periodically to the public 
through newspapers and television. This regulation requires that listed firms must 
disclose their environmental performance information for the previous year by March 
31st every year. Another regulation released in 2003, Regulations on the 
Environmental Inspection of Companies Accessing or Refinancing from the Stock 
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Market, aims to prevent environmental risk associated with listed firms from certain 
heavily polluting industries such as metal, chemicals, oil, coal, thermal power and 
construction materials. The CSRC requires firms wanting to be listed on the Chinese 
stock exchanges to include their environmental risk and how they meet environmental 
standards and environment-related measurements in their Prospectus of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO), Application files for IPO and Legal Statement and Working Reports 
of Lawyers for IPO. 
 
The survey of annual reports of 1195 listed firms conducted in 2003 by Guo (2005) 
concludes that firms in China pay less attention to corporate environmental reporting 
and disclosure compared to some of their western counterparts. As most of the 
regulations in the Chinese stock market focus on improving corporate disclosure and 
reporting of firms’ financial performance rather than social and environmental issues, 
environmental disclosure is not popular, and annual reports of listed firms rarely 
include environmental issues. Environmentalists and environmental authorities in 
China can be classified as discretionary stakeholders of listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market. Although possessing legitimacy attributes, they do not have strong 
power and urgency over the financial resources of listed firms. 
 
5.3.6 Summary of stakeholder attributes 
 
 
Applying Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder sorting criteria, the assessment of 
stakeholder attributes clearly shows the regulatory agency group is the most powerful 
stakeholder group for listed firms in the Chinese stock market. The MOF, the CSRC 
and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges can be jointly identified as definitive 
  156
stakeholders, as they possess three strong stakeholder attributes, namely, power, 
legitimacy and urgency over the capital resources of listed firms. To be continuously 
listed in the Chinese stock market and obtain financial resources from shareholders, 
listed firms must follow the rules and regulations enforced by those regulatory 
agencies. Investors are dependent stakeholders and, due to relatively weak legal 
mechanisms, have limited power over listed firms. However, investors strongly 
exhibit one of the attributes, namely, urgency. They can take immediate actions by 
selling their shares when they feel their legitimate interests are not being served by the 
management of listed firms. The changed banking environment in China has 
transferred the creditor group from a discretionary stakeholder to a definitive 
stakeholder. The creditor group now possesses three stakeholder attributes. These 
attributes are closely related to the economic stake creditors have in listed firms. 
Being profit-oriented itself, this group possesses power to control the capital resources 
relied upon by listed firms. The professional association, CICPA, exhibits strong 
legitimacy but lacks power and urgency over listed firms in the Chinese stock market, 
which makes it a discretionary stakeholder. Table 5.2 summarizes stakeholders and 
their attributes in the Chinese stock market. 
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Table 5.2 Stakeholders and stakeholder attributes in the Chinese stock market 
 
Stakeholder 
group 
 
Stake Inducement Power Legitimacy Urgency Classification 
Creditor 
group 
 
Economic 
stake Interest High High High 
Definitive 
stakeholder 
Shareholder 
group 
 
Equity 
stake 
Shareholder 
value Low High High 
Dependent 
stakeholder 
Regulatory 
agency group 
 
Political 
stake 
Effective 
investor 
protection 
High High High Definitive stakeholder 
Professional 
association 
group 
 
Political 
stake 
Quality of 
information 
disclosure 
Low High Low Discretionary stakeholder 
Environmental 
authority 
 
Environm
ent stake 
Environment 
protection Low High Low 
Discretionary 
stakeholder 
 
5.3.7 Stakeholder salience 
 
The management of listed firms needs to manage the stakeholder-management 
relationship. Mitchell et al. (1997) observe that an organization is an environmentally-
dependent coalition of divergent interests. All interested parties try to gain the 
attention of management at the centre of the nexus of contracts between stakeholders 
and management. Thus, they propose that the perspective of managers is vital; it is the 
managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and, therefore, deserve 
management attention. So, which factor particularly influences managers’ 
perspectives? It is believed that it is stakeholder power. “Control over resources” can 
be achieved through commanding limited finance resources, influencing media and 
using legislation against organizations. The more critical the stakeholder’s resources 
are to the survival and success of the organization, the greater the expectation that the 
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stakeholder’s demands will be addressed (Ullmann, 1985). Mitchell et al. (1997) 
support this view by suggesting that managers’ perceptions of a stakeholder’s 
attributes are critical to the managers’ views of stakeholder salience. Stakeholder 
salience is high where all three of the stakeholder attributes - power, legitimacy and 
urgency - are perceived by managers to be present. They claim that stakeholder 
salience is moderate where two of the stakeholder attributes are perceived by 
managers to be present, and stakeholder salience is low where only one of the 
stakeholder attributes is perceived by managers to be present. 
 
Applying the theory of stakeholder salience, the management of listed firms will give 
priority to managing their relationship with regulatory agencies in the Chinese stock 
market, as they are the most powerful stakeholder group. Although the investment 
community is a demanding stakeholder group, investors’ interests are advocated by 
the regulatory agency group for political reasons. Satisfying the demands of the 
regulatory agency group literally enables listed firms to satisfy the expectations of the 
investment community. The requirement of the regulatory agency group on listed 
firms, in terms of disclosure, is to provide transparent information which supports 
efficient decision-making by investors in respect of their financial resource 
allocations. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, voluntary disclosure reduces firms’ cost of capital and 
improves transparency by reducing information asymmetry. Investors react to 
information voluntarily disclosed to the stock market, meaning voluntary disclosure is 
value-relevant to investors’ decision-making. The Chinese regulatory agencies have 
always encouraged firms to voluntarily disclose information which is relevant to 
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investors’ decision-making, in addition to their mandatory information disclosure. 
Several examples can be found from the disclosure regulations implemented by the 
CRSC since the early stages of the development of the stock market:  
“Listed firms should report any other information related to firms’ operations 
which they think is necessary to disclose to investors” – Item 5, Section 3, Chapter 2, 
The Standards of Contents and Formats of Information Disclosure by Public Issuing 
Companies, the CSRC, 1993. 
“This regulation represents the minimum requirement of information 
disclosure of listed firms. Firms should also disclose any other information which will 
affect investors’ economic decision-making, no matter this information is required to 
be disclosed by this regulation” – Item 3, Chapter 1, The Standards of Contents and 
Formats of Information Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies, the CSRC, 2001 
(revision) and 2003 (revision). 
“In addition to disclosing mandatory information, a company shall also 
voluntarily and timely disclose all other information that may have a material effect 
on the decisions of shareholders and stakeholders, and shall ensure equal access to 
information for all shareholders” – Item 88, Section 1, Chapter 7, Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China, the CSRC, 2002. 
“One of the basic principles of establishing a good investor-firms relationship 
is to have transparent information disclosure. In addition to mandatory disclosure, 
firms should voluntarily disclose other information which the investors care about” - 
Item 1, Article 4, The Guidance of the Relationship between Listed Firms and Public 
Investors, the CSRC, 2005. 
The stakeholder attributes section and the discussion of stakeholder salience above 
provide evidence that in the Chinese stock market, regulatory agencies’ self-
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promotional behaviors legitimize their own existence in the perceptions of Chinese 
and international investors. The power, legitimacy and urgency possessed by the 
regulatory agencies enable them to exert pressure on “regulatees", that is, the listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market, to legitimate their behavior. As the regulatory 
agencies strongly advocate that listed firms voluntarily disclose information in the 
Chinese stock market, it is expected that firms will adopt voluntary disclosure as a 
means of stakeholder salience. Listed firms would use voluntary information 
disclosure as part of a strategic management process to manage the relationship 
between firms and the most powerful stakeholders, in order to gain their support and 
approval or to avert their opposition and disapproval. Therefore, it is expected that the 
level of voluntary disclosure would have increased in the Chinese stock market 
throughout the 1995-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.4 Hypothesis development 
 
 
Discussion of the application of legitimacy theory has suggested that the changed 
corporate disclosure environment created the pressure on listed firms to disclose more 
transparent information, and that listed firms in the Chinese stock market would 
change their disclosure behavior to legitimate their social status in Chinese society. 
The assessment of stakeholder attributes has identified the most powerful stakeholder 
group for listed firms in the Chinese stock market. This section translates those 
theoretical underpinnings into research hypotheses. The changes in disclosure 
behavior of listed firms will be empirically investigated through five propositions and 
a set of hypotheses developed based on the five propositions. 
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The propositions are formed from the theoretical framework established in Section 5.2 
and stakeholder attribute analysis in Section 5.3. The first proposition is that voluntary 
disclosure is a result of stakeholder salience. Listed firms as a group assess each 
stakeholder’s attributes and identify powerful stakeholders. In the Chinese stock 
market, powerful stakeholders demand information disclosure from firms. One of the 
strategies to manage the stakeholder-firm relationship is to adopt voluntary disclosure. 
The second proposition is for the ownership structure among listed firms to reflect 
shareholders’ financial stakes in listed firms, and the various ownership types, 
including state ownership, legal-person ownership and foreign ownership would have 
an influence on firms’ disclosure behavior through their financial stakes. The third 
proposition is for the corporate governance variables to reflect the political stakes of 
the regulatory agencies in the Chinese stock market. The corporate governance régime 
is established by the regulatory agencies, aiming to protect investors’ interests and 
improve the efficiency of the stock market. Corporate governance variables such as 
the proportion of independent directors on the board and the existence of an audit 
committee would have an influence on a firm’s disclosure decisions. The fourth 
proposition is for firms’ economic attributes to be closely related to creditors’ and 
shareholders’ financial stakes. Stakeholders’ power and urgency can be reflected by 
firms’ economic attributes, including profitability, leverage and potential growth 
opportunity. Therefore, these specific firm characteristics would be associated with 
firms’ disclosure behavior. The fifth proposition is that listed firms use auditing firms 
with a good reputation to legitimate their social status. The auditing market has been 
gradually established in China and auditing firms are playing an important role in the 
Chinese stock market in ensuring relevant and reliable information disclosure. 
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Legitimacy theory suggests that firms employing an auditor that has a good reputation 
in the professional service industry are most likely to disclose more information. 
 
5.4.1 Longitudinal disclosure levels 
 
This study investigates listed firms’ voluntary disclosure during the period 1995 to 
2006. To determine firms’ voluntary disclosure and factors affecting firms’ voluntary 
disclosure during different phases of the Chinese stock market, the entire testing 
period is further divided into three distinct testing phases: Phase I, 1995-1998; Phase 
II, 1999-2002; and Phase III, 2003-2006. These three phases represent three distinct 
phases of the history of the Chinese stock market. As explained below, each of these 
phases may have an impact on voluntary disclosure made by listed firms. Hypotheses 
are identified based on these assumptions. The level of voluntary disclosure made by 
listed firms in each phase is expected to be different from the other two. According to 
the main features of each phase, they are named as the “developing phase”, “corporate 
governance régime phase” and “convergence phase”, respectively. 
 
Phase I - Developing phase (1995-1998) 
 
The opening of two stock exchanges, one in Shanghai and one in Shenzhen in 1990 
and 1991 respectively, marks the establishment of the Chinese stock market. Of the 
three testing periods, the 1995-1998 period represents the initial, developing phase of 
the Chinese stock market. During this testing phase, the regulatory agency, the CSRC, 
undertook the administration role in the stock market, rather than strategically 
managing its development. Banks in China were under pressure from local or state 
governments to make “Policy Loans” to Chinese enterprises. Also during that period, 
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several public investors had taken actions against listed firms for fraudulent 
information disclosure, and the professional association – CICPA - was in its initial 
establishment phase. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the accounting reform which fundamentally changed the 
accounting system in China was triggered by the opening of the Chinese stock market 
at the beginning of the 1990s. During the early phase of the Chinese stock market, a 
uniform accounting system and specific accounting standards were yet to be 
developed in China. It was not until mid-1992 that the State Council, the MOF and 
the CSRC started to promulgate a series of accounting and reporting regulations to 
regulate accounting information in the stock market. Although the Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises released by the MOF in 1993 introduced some 
accounting regulations with western theoretical underpinning, an investor-oriented 
market was still far from reality and the establishment of the accounting and reporting 
regulatory framework was a long way from completion. Therefore, the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the reporting periods 1995-1998 is expected to be lower than 
in the other two phases. 
 
Phase II - Corporate governance régime phase (1999-2002) 
 
The second testing phase covers the reporting periods 1999-2002. During this phase, 
the Chinese government and its regulatory agencies had further committed to 
development of the stock market regulatory framework. Significant accounting and 
reporting regulations implemented during this phase included a series of Chinese 
accounting standards, the Securities Law and more information disclosure rules. The 
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CSRC changed its emphasis from market administration to public investor protection. 
The Guidelines for Establishing Independent Directors System for Listed Companies 
and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies released by the CSRC 
in 2001 and 2002, respectively, highlighted the regulatory agencies’ belief that strong 
corporate governance among listed firms would play a positive role in improving 
investor interest protection. China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001 also 
provided impetus to motivate listed firms to improve their information transparency. 
Several high-profile legal actions against listed firms, caused by misleading and 
fraudulent information disclosure, increased demands from the investment community 
for improved disclosure. The pressure from stakeholders such as the regulatory 
agencies and shareholders increased dramatically during this phase. Therefore, the 
level of voluntary disclosure in this phase is expected to be higher than that in the 
reporting periods 1995-1998. 
 
Phase III - Convergence phase (2003-2006) 
 
The last testing phase includes the reporting periods 2003-2006. In this phase, the 
regulatory framework of corporate disclosure was further augmented by the MOF’s 
release of the new accounting system and more accounting standards based on IFRS. 
In 2006, the Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises (ASBE), which includes 
the Basic ASBE system and 38 specific ASBEs promulgated by the MOF, marked 
substantial harmonization between China GAAP and IFRS. As required by CSRC 
regulation, listed firms have all implemented the independent director system, and at 
least one-third of the directors on their boards are independent directors. The CSRC’s 
aim of establishing the independent director system was to further improve corporate 
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governance of listed firms and protect the interests of investors in the Chinese stock 
market. The level of voluntary disclosure in this phase is, therefore, expected to be 
higher than that in both the “developing phase” and the “corporate governance 
phase”. 
 
Table 5.3 lists the major activities and events of the four stakeholder groups during 
each testing phase. It shows major events, actions taken and progress made by the 
creditor group, investor group, regulatory agency group and professional association 
group, in exerting pressure on listed firms in respect of transparent information 
disclosure. 
 
In terms of the longitudinal disclosure level, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H1: The level of voluntary disclosure increased in the Chinese stock market 
throughout the 1995-2006 reporting periods. 
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Table 5.3 The three testing phases and relevant regulations/events 
Testing period Creditor group Shareholder group Regulatory agency group Professional association group 
Phase I 
(1995-1998) 
 
-Transition period for 
state-owned 
commercial banks. 
They changed from 
lending “policy loans” 
to enterprises only to 
lending funds to 
enterprises at normal 
commercial rates. 
-Non-performing 
loans are a very 
common problem in 
China. 
 
-Number of individual 
investors is increased from 12 
million in 1995 to 39 million 
in 1998 (there were only 2.2 
million individual investors in 
1992).  
-In 1996, investor Liu 
Zhongming brought the first 
civil action against Bohai 
Group for making a 
fraudulent statement.  
-In 1998, several plaintiffs 
sued Hongguang Shiye for 
civil compensation, and the 
trial court of Shanghai 
Pudong New District 
dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
 
-The MOF implements the Accounting 
system for Pilot Enterprises with 
Shareholding System in May 1992. 
-The MOF releases the Accounting 
Standards for Business Enterprises 
(effective July 1, 1993). It functions as 
the conceptual framework.  
-The State Council releases the 
Temporary Regulation of Share Public 
Issuing and Trading in 1993. 
-The CSRC releases the Detailed Rules 
for Implementation of Information 
Disclosure of Publicly Listed 
Companies in 1993. 
-The CSRC releases the Standards of 
Contents and Formats of Information 
Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies 
in 1993 (revision is released in 1994).  
-The Company Law is implemented in 
1993. 
-The MOF releases first Chinese 
Accounting Standards for Business 
Enterprises: Related party transactions 
in May 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-In January 1994, the People’s 
Republic of China Registered 
Accountant Law (Certified 
Public Accountants Act) was 
promulgated. 
-CICPA became a member of 
the Confederation of Asian and 
Pacific Accountants (CAPA) 
and the International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC) in 
October 1996 and May 1997, 
respectively. 
-In 1998, CPA firms were de-
linked from the MOF. 
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Testing period Creditor group Shareholder group Regulatory agency group Professional association group 
Phase II 
(1999-2002) 
 
 
To tackle the Non-
Performance Loan 
(NPL) problem, the 
Chinese government 
forms four financial 
asset management 
companies in 1999, 
and transferred 
RMB459 billion yuan 
NPL from state-
owned commercial 
banks to the asset 
management 
companies. 
-Number of individual 
investors increased from 45 
million in 1999 to 68 million 
by the end of 2002. 
-By September 2001, 900 
compensation cases regarding 
fraudulent statements, insider 
trading and market 
manipulation were brought by 
individual investors to the 
lower courts.  
 
- The MOF releases seven Chinese 
accounting standards between 1998 and 
1999 and another six accounting 
standards in 2001.  
- The Securities Law is implemented in 
1999 (effective in 2000). 
- The CSRC releases Preparing Rules of 
Information Disclosure by Public 
Issuing Companies in 2000. 
-The MOF promulgated the Accounting 
System for Business Enterprises in 
2001.  
-In August 2001, the CSRC introduced 
the ‘Guide Opinion on Establishing 
Independent Director System by Listed 
Companies’. 
-China became a formal member of the 
WTO in December 2001.  
-The CSRC issues Code of Corporate 
Governance on January 7, 2002. 
-In 2002, the CSRC sanctioned 17 listed 
firms and investigated an additional 17 
firms. The MOF sanctioned 4 listed 
firms. Six firms were under criminal 
prosecution, of which one was found 
guilty at trial.  
 
 
 
 
 
-CICPA conducts “accounting 
and auditing market cleaning 
campaign” in 1999.  
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Testing period Creditor group Shareholder group Regulatory agency group Professional association group 
Phase III 
(2003-2006) 
China Construction 
Bank is listed in 2005 
and Bank of China is 
listed in 2006.  
Up to 2008, 14 
national and regional 
commercial banks are 
listed in the Chinese 
stock market. 
 -In 2005, the CASC (under the MOF) 
issued 21 Exposure Drafts and also 
reviewed its 16 existing CASs. 
-On 16th February 2006, the MOF 
announced the new Accounting 
Standard for Business Enterprises 
(ASBE). The ASBE consists of the Basic 
ASBE and 38 specific ASBEs that are 
substantially in line with international 
standards. 
-By May 2006, CICPA has more 
than 5,600 group members 
(accounting firms), over 140,000 
individual members, of whom 
about 69,700 are practising 
members and over 70,000 are 
non-practising members. The 
total revenue of the whole 
profession in 2005 exceeded 
RMB 18 billion.  
-CICPA is a member of the 
IFAC Board and CAPA 
Executive Committee, and has 
developed friendly cooperation 
and communication with more 
than 50 professional accounting 
bodies in other jurisdictions. 
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5.4.2 Ownership structure 
 
 
Ownership of the share capital of listed firms on the Chinese stock market is spread over 
domestic public investors, foreign investors, legal persons and the state. This multi-class 
ownership structure represents the equity interest of various shareholder groups in listed firms 
and it has implications for listed firms’ disclosure behavior over the period 1995 to 2006. 
5.4.2.1 State ownership 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, given that state ownership leads to problems of “one dominant 
shareholder” and “insider control” in China, firms with higher state ownership are expected 
to lack motivation for the voluntary disclosure of information to public shareholders. It is 
suggested that state shareholders are able to obtain information from internal resources (Xiao 
et al., 2004). It emerges from the above illustration that the different priorities between state 
ownership and public shareholders and the “insider control” in listed firms, should weaken 
the pressures for voluntary disclosure. It is, therefore, hypothesized that:  
 
H2a. The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to state ownership 
throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H2b. The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to state ownership 
throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H2c. The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to state ownership 
throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
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5.4.2.2 Legal-person ownership 
 
Although not tradable shares, shareholders of legal-person shares receive dividends from 
their investment. Therefore, legal-person ownership is a real stakeholder of listed firms, as it 
has an equity stake. Thus, compared to state shareholders, legal-person shareholders are more 
economically oriented and geared towards profit maximization (Tan and Wang, 2004). Legal-
person shareholders have industry expertise and management skills. If legal-person 
ownership is a majority shareholder of a listed firm, it will put pressure on the listed firm to 
maximize profits in order to increase shareholders’ return on investment. In respect of 
corporate governance of listed firms, legal-person shareholders can monitor the management 
more effectively than domestic public investors through their control over the board of 
directors, the selection of corporate officers and the compensation of chief corporate officers 
(Xu and Wang, 1999). Representatives of legal-person shareholders are elected to the board 
of directors and the supervisory committee (Sun et al., 2002). 
 
Research findings show that legal-person shareholders have played a positive role in 
improving corporate governance among listed firms and helping to strengthen the alignment 
of interests between managers and shareholders, as evidenced by the positive relationships 
between the legal-person shareholding and firm valuation (Hovey et al., 2003) and also firm 
profitability (Xu and Wang, 1999; Delios and Wu, 2005). Thus, it is expected that legal-
person ownership would play a significant role in demanding transparent information for the 
purpose of their own equity stake as shareholders. Meanwhile, as controlling owners, legal-
person ownership undertakes a positive role in improving firms’ corporate governance and 
disclosure transparency. However, due to the strong state-related roots of legal-person 
ownership in the early stage of the Chinese stock market (Delios and Wu, 2005), it is not 
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expected that legal-person ownership would have a positive association with firms’ voluntary 
disclosure during the 1995-1998 periods. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H3a: The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively related to the legal-person 
ownership throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H3b: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the legal-person 
ownership throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H3c: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the legal-person ownership 
throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.4.2.3 Foreign ownership 
 
 
B shares were held exclusively by foreign investors before 2001. Most B shareholders are 
international financial institutions, whereas most tradable A shareholders are individuals. As 
equity stakeholders of listed firms, foreign investors have behaved as effective external 
monitoring agents. Empirical research demonstrates that investors in the B-share market have 
better and more timely information than those in the A-share market (Chui and Kwok, 1998). 
Listed firms issuing B shares are required to follow International Accounting Standards 
which require a broader scope in respect of disclosure than the domestic GAAP (Xiao et al., 
2004). The research findings of a number of studies comparing the quality of financial 
information prepared under International Accounting Standards and China’s GAAP (Bao and 
Chow, 1999; Haw et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2003; Sami and Zhou, 2004; Lin and Chen, 2005) 
show the earnings and book value of equity under IAS-GAAP are more value-relevant than 
the China-GAAP-based earnings and book value of equity. 
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Firms with foreign ownership are more politically visible and subject to more public scrutiny 
in China. Improving disclosure transparency may potentially reduce political costs (Liu and 
Eddie, 2007). The disclosure behavior of listed Chinese firms in the Hong Kong stock market 
is investigated by Ferguson et al. (2002). The different political régime and legal and 
economic system in Hong Kong mean their stock market is arguably more mature than its 
counterpart in Mainland China. The Chinese firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
are, therefore, subject to a more comprehensive and rigorous disclosure environment. Chinese 
Mainland firms issuing H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange interestingly were found 
to voluntarily and significantly disclose more strategic and financial information than the 
local Hong Kong firms. Despite Mainland Chinese firms being relatively new entrants to the 
competitive capital market in Hong Kong, the disclosure practices of the former SOEs appear 
sensitive to external investors’ information demands. Ferguson et al. (2002) suggest that the 
voluntary disclosure behavior of SEHK-listed Chinese firms is “showcasing” – to signal to 
international investment communities that Mainland Chinese firms are willing to increase 
transparency and act as good corporate citizens in the worldwide capital market. 
 
Presumably, in line with the continually updated disclosure regulations being implemented in 
the Chinese stock market and pressure from both domestic and international investors, listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market will exhibit similar behavior to that in the Hong Kong 
stock market. It is hypothesized, therefore, that: 
 
H4a: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher when the foreign ownership increases 
throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H4b: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher when the foreign ownership increases 
throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
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H4c: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher when the foreign ownership increases 
throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.4.3 Corporate governance 
 
 
In a stakeholder theory setting, the corporate governance mechanism is one of the key 
strategies to help an organization understand, respond to and relate to different stakeholder 
relationships. An implication of the corporatization of SOEs in China and their overwhelming 
state ownership is that corporate governance is very relevant to listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market. Tam (1995) has pointed out that as an integral part of China’s reform process, 
several issues must be addressed by the corporate governance mechanisms in listed firms: 
Who are the stakeholders of listed firms? How can their interests be represented and 
protected? Who is, and who should be, in charge of the firm? How is, and how should, senior 
management be monitored and made accountable? 
5.4.3.1 Independent directors 
 
 
In the literature of corporate governance, the board of directors is often thought of as an 
important mechanism to represent and protect shareholders’ interests, provide strategic 
direction and monitor the performance of corporate management. The composition of the 
board, as discussed in Chapter 2, has a significant impact on its role. An effective board 
should include both inside directors and independent directors. Although independent 
directors do not normally have an equity stake in listed firms, nor relationships with the 
management and employees, they provide firms with tangible and intangible resources, 
monitor senior management and should be responsive to shareholders. 
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As discussed in Chapter 4, having a board comprised of at least one-third independent 
directors in listed firms is the result of the regulatory agency, the CSRC’s commitment to 
investor protection. Therefore, the independent director system reflects the Chinese 
government’s political stake in listed firms. An increased number of independent directors 
are expected to play a positive role in improving listed firms’ disclosure transparency. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H5a: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the increased number of 
independent directors throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H5b: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the increased number of 
independent directors throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H5c: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the increased number of 
independent directors throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
5.4.3.2 Audit committees 
 
 
The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China issued by the CSRC in 
2001 suggests that boards of directors of listed firms should establish four specialized 
committees including a corporate strategy committee, an audit committee, a nomination 
committee and a remuneration and appraisal committee. All committees shall be composed 
solely of directors. In particular, the audit committee should be chaired by an independent 
director, and independent directors shall constitute the majority of the committee. At least 
one independent director in the audit committee shall be an accounting professional. Item 54 
of the Code states, “the main duties of the audit committee are: to recommend the 
engagement or replacement of the company’s external auditing institutions; to review the 
internal audit system and its execution; to oversee the interaction between the company’s 
internal and external audit institutions; to inspect the company’s financial information and 
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its disclosure; and to monitor the company’s internal control system”. The literature review 
in Chapter 2 shows that an internal audit committee plays a significant role in improving the 
quality of financial information, reduces agency costs and improves a firm’s internal control 
system (Forker, 1992; Collier, 1993; Hong and Wong, 2001). It is expected, therefore, that 
audit committees established in listed firms in China will contribute to the firms’ voluntary 
disclosure behavior. Prior to the release of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China in 2001, no audit committees are expected to have existed in listed 
firms. Therefore, the following hypotheses only cover the period after 2001. It is 
hypothesized that24: 
 
H6b: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the existence of an audit 
committee throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H6c: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the existence of an audit 
committee throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.4.4 Firms’ economic attributes 
 
Three firm-specific economic attributes, namely, leverage, profitability and growth 
opportunities, are closely related to shareholders’ and creditors’ economic benefits in listed 
firms. This section looks at the potential relationship between these attributes and firms’ 
voluntary disclosure. 
                                                      
24 To match the other hypotheses, there is no H6a established as no audit committee were found to be in 
existence during Phase I when data was collected from sample firms’ annual reports. 
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5.4.4.1 Leverage 
 
 
Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and disclosure. Further, 
agency costs are increased as creditors try to restrict and monitor managerial behavior 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Reducing monitoring costs will motivate management to 
voluntarily disclose more information to satisfy creditors’ information needs. Inconclusive 
and inconsistent research findings are noted in respect of the association between leverage 
and voluntary disclosure. While Zarzeski (1996) showed a negative relationship between 
financial leverage and disclosure, Jaggi and Low (2000), however, suggested leverage had a 
positive impact on the level of disclosure. In China, the banking system is an important 
external source of financing for enterprises. In the early stages of economic reform when 
banks were subject to political control rather than being market-oriented, the banks neither 
allocated financial resources efficiently nor monitored the enterprises adequately. With the 
further development of the Chinese enterprise reforms, banks have resumed their role as 
important intermediaries of financial resources. As the total amount and ratio of non-
performing loans (NPL) in China's major commercial banks have declined considerably and 
banks have been geared towards profit-seeking, the banking system is expected to have 
established the ability to serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism in the 
Chinese stock market. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H7a: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to leverage throughout the 
1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H7b: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to leverage throughout the 
1999-2002 reporting periods. 
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H7c: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to leverage throughout the 
2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.5.4.2 Profitability 
 
 
Agency theory predicts a positive association between a firm’s profitability and its 
information disclosure. Profitable firms are subject to greater public scrutiny and will, 
therefore, apply self-regulatory mechanisms, such as voluntary disclosures, to avoid external 
regulation (Ng and Koh, 1994), and to support the continuance of their positions and 
compensation arrangements (Inchausti, 1997). Signaling theory predicts that profitable firms 
will disclose more information in order to signal their strong financial position to investors 
(Watson et al., 2002). On the other hand, Skinner (1994) suggests that less-profitable firms 
may disclose more information to explain the reasons for negative performance, to reassure 
the market about future growth, and to avoid severe devaluation of share capital and loss of 
reputation in the stock market by disclosure of “bad news”. 
 
In the Chinese stock market, the establishment of the Special Treatment (ST) and Particular 
Transfer (PT) for stocks of firms operating at a loss was an effort to remind investors of the 
risks involved in the trading of such stocks during the 1990s. However, the ST and PT 
systems, intended to avoid irrational investment, did not lead to more delistings in the 
Chinese stock market. Many analysts have pointed out that these systems mislead investors 
into falsely believing that the listed firms wouldn't go bankrupt or be delisted (People’s Daily, 
2001). To improve the quality of listed firms, and to advocate rational investment and 
promote the sustainable development of China’s stock market, the CSRC released in 2001 
The Implementation Measures for Suspending and Terminating the Listing of Loss-Incurring 
Listed Companies. A stock-trading suspended firm that fails to make profits in the first six 
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months following suspension will be delisted. If the firm begins to make profits in that 
period, it can apply for reinstatement with approval from the regulators. Confronted with 
more stringent regulations, loss-making firms will disclose more information to the market in 
order to maintain investors’ confidence and to avoid the risk of being delisted. In view of the 
mixed motivations for disclosure, as discussed above, there is no specific expectation about 
the direction of firms’ association with voluntary disclosure and profitability. It is 
hypothesized: 
 
H8a: The level of voluntary disclosure is related to profitability throughout the 1995-
1998 reporting periods. 
H8b: The level of voluntary disclosure is related to profitability throughout the 1999-
2002 reporting periods. 
H8c: The level of voluntary disclosure is related to profitability throughout the 2003-
2006 reporting periods. 
5.4.4.3 Growth opportunity 
 
 
Growth opportunity has rarely been used as one of the explanatory variables in studies of the 
Chinese stock market. A common proxy for growth opportunity is the Market-to-Book 
Equity Ratio (MBE ratio). The market value of equity measures the present value of all future 
cash flows to equity holders, while the book value of equity represents the accumulated value 
generated from existing assets only. Therefore, the MBE ratio measures the mix of cash flows 
from future investment opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2007). The relationship between a 
firm’s growth opportunity and its level of voluntary disclosure has been investigated in 
several studies (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; Hossain et al., 2005; Akhtaruddin and Hossain, 
2008). While both Hossain et al. (2005) and Akhtaruddin and Hossain (2008) find a positive 
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relationship between voluntary disclosures and growth opportunities, Chalmers and Godfrey 
(2004) find no significant relationship between these two factors. In the Chinese stock 
market, under stakeholder theory, a higher MBE ratio is closely related to a potential 
increment in the existing shareholders’ equity investment and, meanwhile, attracts more 
investors. Thus, it is expected that growth firms would provide more frequent voluntary 
information to signal that they are performing well and are a good investment option. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H9a: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to a firm’s growth 
opportunity in the Chinese stock market throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H9b: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to a firm’s growth 
opportunity in the Chinese stock market throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H9c: The level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to a firm’s growth 
opportunity in the Chinese stock market throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.4.5 Auditors 
 
 
Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that the level of disclosure is influenced by auditors. Larger 
audit firms try to improve the perceived quality of disclosure by having clients disclose more 
information. The effectiveness of auditing and the auditor’s ability to influence disclosures is 
expected to vary with auditor quality. Auditor reputation is used to differentiate audit quality 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). As a result, firms audited by one of the Big 4 accounting 
firms may disclose more information than other firms. In the Chinese stock market, two 
forces worked together to bring the Big 4 international accounting firms into China (Zhang, 
2007). First, market forces forced the Big 4 to establish firms in China to provide accounting 
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and auditing services to their multinational clients and, secondly, under the open-door policy, 
the Chinese government devised arrangements to settle the large accounting firms into their 
new environment. While firms issuing B and H-shares are required to have their financial 
reports audited by international audit firms, some listed firms issuing only A-shares 
voluntarily choose international firms as their auditors. Given that international audit firms 
have an established reputation and more experience than domestic audit firms, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H10a: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher for firms with international auditors 
than for firms with domestic auditors throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H10b: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher for firms with international auditors 
than for firms with domestic auditors throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H10c: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher for firms with international auditors 
than for firms with domestic auditors throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
5.4.6 Control variables 
 5.4.6.1 Size 
 
 
Firm size has been identified as a significant explanatory factor in some disclosure studies 
(Wallace et al., 1994; Zarzeski, 1996; Watson et al., 2002; Archambault and Archambault, 
2003). The impact of a firm’s size on increased information disclosure has been explained as 
a result of large firms’ dependence on international resources (Zarzeski, 1996), motivation to 
reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), and agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Confronted with greater information demands from the public, large firms 
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are more likely to disclose extra information to the market. Firm size, therefore, is included as 
a control variable which is measured in this paper by the value of assets (log). 
5.4.6.2 Industry 
 
 
Industry classification is another significant explanatory factor for voluntary disclosure 
(Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Higher political costs in regulated industries are likely to 
result in higher voluntary disclosure, while highly competitive industries may hinder 
disclosure to avoid proprietary costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In addition, Cooke 
(1991) reported a “follow the leader effect”, meaning that the existence of a dominant 
company in an industry with high levels of voluntary disclosure may create a bandwagon 
effect for the other firms in the same industry. The industry factor is, therefore, included as 
another control variable. 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
 
This chapter develops hypotheses predicting changes in listed firms’ disclosure behavior 
during the 1995 to 2006 financial reporting periods in the Chinese stock market. The 
identification of stakeholders’ positions and an assessment of the power possessed by 
creditors, shareholders, regulatory agencies and professional associations lead to the 
prediction that throughout the 1995 to 2006 period, the level of voluntary disclosure will 
gradually increase due to the demands and pressure from the most powerful stakeholders of 
listed firms. The hypotheses are designed to test the association between voluntary disclosure 
strategies and firm attributes. The attributes examined in this chapter are related to either 
stakeholders’ economic stakes or political stakes. Chapter 6 describes the research and data 
collection methods employed to enable the hypothesis testing. 
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Table 5.4: Summary of proposition, hypotheses and independent variables 
 
Propositions 
 
Hypotheses 
Independent 
Variables 
Disclosure 
Prediction 
Voluntary disclosure 
is a result of 
stakeholder salience  
H1: The level of voluntary disclosures increased 
in the Chinese stock market throughout the 
1995-2006 reporting periods. 
  
Ownership structure 
reflects 
shareholders’ 
financial stake in 
listed firms and 
influences firms’ 
disclosure behavior  
H2a: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
negatively related to state ownership throughout 
the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H2b: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
negatively related to state ownership throughout 
the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H2c: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
negatively related to state ownership throughout 
the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
H3a: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
negatively related to the legal-person ownership 
throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H3b: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the legal-person ownership 
throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H3c: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the legal-person ownership 
throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
H4a: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher 
when the foreign ownership increases throughout 
the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H4b: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher 
when the foreign ownership increases throughout 
the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H4c: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher 
when the foreign ownership increases throughout 
the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
State 
ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal-person 
ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
Corporate 
governance variables 
reflect the political 
stakes of regulatory 
agencies and how 
they influence firms’ 
disclosure behavior  
H5a: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the increased number of 
independent directors throughout the 1995-1998 
reporting periods. 
H5b: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the increased number of 
independent directors throughout the 1999-2002 
reporting periods. 
H5c: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the increased number of 
independent directors throughout the 2003-2006 
reporting periods. 
 
 
Independent 
directors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
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H6b: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the existence of an audit 
committee throughout the 1999-2002 reporting 
periods. 
H6c: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to the existence of an audit 
committee throughout the 2003-2006 reporting 
periods. 
Audit 
committee 
+ 
Firms’ economic 
attributes are closely 
related to creditors’ 
and shareholders’ 
financial stakes and 
they are associated 
with firms’ 
disclosure behavior  
H7a: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to leverage throughout the 
1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H7b: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to leverage throughout the 
1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H7c: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to leverage throughout the 
2003-2006 reporting periods. 
 
H8a: The level of voluntary disclosure is related 
to profitability throughout the 1995-1998 
reporting periods. 
H8b: The level of voluntary disclosure is related 
to profitability throughout the 1999-2002 
reporting periods. 
H8c: The level of voluntary disclosure is related 
to profitability throughout the 2003-2006 
reporting periods. 
 
H9a: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to growth opportunity 
throughout the 1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H9b: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to growth opportunity 
throughout the 1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H9c: The level of voluntary disclosure is 
positively related to growth opportunity 
throughout the 2003-2006 reporting periods. 
Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profitability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth 
opportunity 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Listed firms use 
auditing firms with 
good reputations to 
legitimate  
their social status 
H10a: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher 
for firms with international auditors than for 
firms with domestic auditors throughout the 
1995-1998 reporting periods. 
H10b: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher 
for firms with international auditors than for 
firms with domestic auditors throughout the 
1999-2002 reporting periods. 
H10c: The level of voluntary disclosure is higher 
for firms with international auditors than for 
firms with domestic auditors throughout the 
2003-2006 reporting periods. 
International 
auditor 
+ 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The main research question addressed in this study is to what extent the changed 
corporate disclosure environment during the past thirty years has impacted on the 
level of corporate disclosure made by listed firms in China. Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate 
the political, economic and social changes that have occurred in China since the late 
1970s, and the development of corporate reporting and the regulatory framework 
regarding disclosure since the opening of the Chinese stock market. Chapter 5 
suggests that the changed corporate disclosure environment has led to the emergence 
of other stakeholder groups related to listed firms in the stock market, in addition to 
the government. The most powerful stakeholder for listed firms identified in Chapter 
5 is the regulatory agency group, CSRC. This group established the regulatory 
framework for corporate reporting, and developed the corporate governance régime in 
the stock market. It also advocates minority investor protection in listed firms. 
Investors and creditors are identified as another two key stakeholder groups who have 
increased their demands for information disclosure by listed firms. It is expected that, 
when confronted with social pressures from both the government and the investment 
community to make disclosure more transparent, listed firms in the Chinese stock 
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market should have responded in a manner that can be mainly explained by 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. 
 
The preceding chapter develops hypotheses relating to listed firms’ decisions to 
voluntarily disclose their strategic, financial and non-financial information in annual 
reports. This chapter describes the research methodology used in this study and the 
specific methods employed to capture dependent and independent variables and test 
the voluntary disclosure model developed. A quantitative research method is adopted 
to provide the empirical evidence. This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2, 
methodology, justifies the adoption of the longitudinal research method used and why 
annual reports are preferred to other disclosure channels for examining firms’ 
voluntary disclosure. Section 6.3 justifies the testing period and the further division 
into three testing phases. Section 6.4 discusses the sample selection criteria and 
process. Three steps are involved in developing the voluntary disclosure checklist for 
this study. Weighting of the checklist items and how to ensure the reliability of the 
checklist are addressed in Section 6.5. How to measure the level and extent of 
voluntary disclosure and the relationships between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and influential factors, are illustrated in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 summarizes the 
chapter. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of a changed disclosure 
environment on listed firms’ disclosure behavior. The main research questions are: 
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1. To what extent did the level of voluntary disclosure of listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market change over the 1995-2006 periods? 
2. What are the factors that have contributed to the changes in the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market? 
 
These research questions are tested in eleven hypotheses, as fully described in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The primary purpose of the first research question is to track disclosure behavior 
changes in listed firms in the stock market as an aggregate of effects. The primary 
purpose of the second research question is to gain more detailed insight into behavior 
changes at individual firm level and track changes in disclosure behavior as a result of 
individual firm attributes. The following discussion considers the methodology used 
to answer both research questions. 
 
To investigate the impact of the changed disclosure environment on corporate 
disclosure in the stock market, this study is based on an analysis of the voluntary 
disclosure made through corporate annual reports, covering the period from 1995-
2006. This period saw significant changes in the information disclosure environment 
in China. The total mandatory contents disclosure requirements increased rapidly 
under the impetus of the MOF, the CSRC and the stock exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Meanwhile, increasing openness in the Chinese economy, China’s 
admission to the WTO and increased information demands from public investors over 
the years have also contributed to the formation of the modern corporate disclosure 
environment in China. The annual reports of 297 firms listed in the stock market for 
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the twelve years from 1995 and 2006 are examined for detailed testing, in order to 
establish the main patterns and trends of disclosure behavior changes over time, and 
the main factors contributing to those changes. 
6.2.1 Using a longitudinal approach 
 
A longitudinal research method is chosen as it involves repeated observations of the 
same samples relating to multiple time points. The longitudinal approach provides an 
understanding of social change, of the trajectories of individual life histories and of 
the dynamic processes that underlie social and economic life, which is not possible 
from research based on cross-sectional data. The rationale for using a longitudinal 
approach is either to infer causation from temporal ordering, or to investigate the 
effects of events (Buck, 1990). 
 
There are two types of longitudinal studies. Cohort longitudinal studies sample a 
cohort, defined as a group experiencing some events, in a selected time period and 
study them at intervals through time. Panel studies sample a cross-section and survey 
it usually at regular intervals. Observation of the same group of listed firms that have 
experienced dramatic changes in their disclosure environment in the Chinese stock 
market over a decade, can make observing changes more accurate than choosing 
different firms each year. The trends of changes can be developed by observing the 
same firms (Buck, 1990). This study looks back in time, focusing on the period from 
1995-2006. Therefore, it is a retrospective and cohort longitudinal study, with firms 
continuously listed on the Chinese stock market from 1995-2006 used as the sample 
firms. 
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The drawbacks of a longitudinal study are discussed by Yee and Niemeier (1996). 
They point out the coverage problem a longitudinal study could have. Coverage refers 
to “the set of units constituting the target population” and includes issues associated 
with both selecting and tracking individual sample respondents. The coverage 
limitations of a longitudinal study are, first, the study is restricted to the members of 
the sample, although changes in the population may occur. Secondly, there is 
invariably a fair amount of attrition. They suggest the design of longitudinal data is 
particularly well-suited for stationary populations that reside in a closed system. By 
keeping the sample population fixed, there is a risk of making inaccurate conclusions 
about the true population, which may have changed as a result of a reduction or an 
influx of a population with different behavioral characteristics from the indigenous 
population. 
 
These two drawbacks of a longitudinal study, however, will not significantly affect 
the findings of this study. Since the establishment of the stock market in China, the 
number of listed firms has gradually increased. Statistics show the numbers of listed 
firms increased from 10 in 1990, to 311 in 1995, 923 in 1999, 1200 in 2002 and 1408 
in 2006. Therefore, changes did occur in the population of the Chinese stock market. 
This study tries to investigate firms’ disclosure behavior changes over a period of 
time. In order to establish the trend of disclosure behavior changes, the actual 
population of this study is the firms listed on the Chinese stock market in its early 
stages. This population has experienced some dramatic changes in the corporate 
disclosure environment. Firms listed in the stock market in more recent years have a 
disclosure environment which is significantly different from the disclosure 
environment when the two stock exchanges opened in early 1990s. Their information 
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disclosure behavioral characteristics are, accordingly, different from the firms listed in 
the stock market in China nearly a decade ago. Hence, the first drawback of coverage 
is irrelevant to this study. In terms of the second drawback, the attrition problem can 
be overcome by the sample selection process. Caution was taken in selecting listed 
firms for the sample. To qualify for the sample, a firm must have been continuously 
listed on the Chinese stock exchange between the 1995 and 2006 financial reporting 
periods. A sample of 297 listed firms was chosen through this selection process. 
Therefore, the attrition problem is not an issue in this study. Details of the sample 
selection will be discussed in the ‘Sample Selection’ section.  
  
As a longitudinal approach focuses on changes, it has been widely used in social 
science research, such as in the dynamics of poverty, employment instability, social 
mobility and demographic events: births, marriages, divorce, deaths and migration 
(Buck, 1990). There are also a large number of corporate disclosure studies, 
particularly focusing on firms’ disclosure behavior changes. These empirical studies 
can be further categorized into multi- and single-firm studies (Bartlett and Jones, 
1997). Among the multi-firm studies, Gray et al. (1995) provide an overview of social 
and environmental disclosure by UK firms over a 13-year period (1979-1991). They 
suggest legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory enrich our understanding of 
corporate social disclosure practices. Deegan and Gordon (1996) review corporate 
disclosure practices in the period from 1980 to 1991 and find there is a general 
increase in environmental disclosures during the period 1988 to 1991, caused by 
increases in environmental group membership. Tsang (1998) fills in the literature gap 
by looking at corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure for a ten-year period 
from 1986 to 1995, in a developing country, Singapore. The time period chosen is to 
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capture the steady increase in CSR disclosure during the late 1980s and the stable 
level of disclosure since 1993. Campbell et al. (2003) captured social disclosure data 
from annual corporate reports between 1975 and 1997 in order to trace the effect of an 
oil spillage event on corporate social reporting in the annual reports of five oil 
companies in the UK. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) investigated managers’ 
responses to derivative financial instrument disclosure requirements proposed by the 
Australian accounting standard setting bodies, by looking at the voluntary derivative 
disclosure made by Australian firms in their annual reports for the period 1992 to 
1996. Among single-firm studies, Bartlett and Jones (1997) examined the annual 
report disclosures in a UK listed company, Bulmers, from 1970 to 1990. They found 
that while mandatory disclosure increased sharply, the even steeper increase in 
voluntary disclosure was part of a wide-ranging package of measures introduced to 
reflect a new corporate philosophy. Deegan et al. (2002) examined the social and 
environmental disclosures of one of the largest Australian companies, BHP, from 
1983 to 1997, to ascertain the extent and type of social and environmental disclosures 
in their annual reports over the period. Their findings lend support to legitimacy 
motives for a company’s social and environmental disclosures, and also show a trend 
in providing greater social and environmental information in BHP’s annual reports in 
recent years. 
 
Following prior longitudinal studies, the longitudinal approach adopted in this study is 
expected to document the gradual impact of the changed corporate disclosure 
environment on the Chinese corporations studied in respect of their information 
disclosure. In addition, this approach is also expected to provide valuable insight into 
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the nature, extent and motivation behind the 297 firms’ voluntary disclosures and will 
report the trends and switch points in their voluntary disclosure. 
6.2.2 Annual report examination 
 
The channels of corporate disclosure may include quarterly reporting, interim reports, 
annual reports, press releases and direct communication with investors and analysts. 
Data collection based on the voluntary disclosures made in the annual reports 
published by listed firms in the Chinese stock market is used for the following 
reasons. First, reporting and disclosure are the most important tools that firms use to 
communicate with their stakeholders. Chang and Most (1985) used a mail survey to 
study the perceived usefulness of financial statements for investment decisions of 
various groups of investors, including institutional and individual investors. Although 
investors refer to all sources of information to make decisions about companies they 
invest in, the investors in the Chang and Most (1985) study ranked the annual report 
highest as a communication source. Their finding is supported by Kent and Ung 
(2003) and Aljifri and Hussainey (2007). Secondly, there is strong support for the 
view that annual corporate reports can be accepted as an appropriate source of a 
company’s attitudes towards reporting and disclosure (Gray et al., 1995). Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) and Botosan (1997) also find that annual report disclosure is 
positively related to corporate disclosure in other media, suggesting that firms 
coordinate their overall disclosure policy. Thirdly, listed firms in the Chinese stock 
market have been required by the CSRC since 1993 to release their annual reports 
four months (30th April) after the reporting date, 31 December, using a uniform 
format stipulated by the CSRC - The Standards of Contents and Formats of 
Information Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies. Therefore, comparability of 
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annual reports of listed firms is higher than for other information disclosure channels. 
In addition, the timing differences of annual reports are minimized (Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007). Finally, the use of annual reports alone in this study is also 
influenced by availability and completeness. In comparison to the information 
disclosed by listed firms through other disclosure channels, information released in 
annual reports is the best archived data. By using the CSMAR database, access to the 
full context of annual reports of all sample firms over the entire testing period is 
available. Through reading the full context of annual reports, it is possible to identify 
voluntary disclosure made by listed firms and score voluntary disclosure items 
according to the voluntary disclosure checklist developed for this study. 
 
6.3 Testing period 
 
Time is part of the definition of a longitudinal approach which requires a long period 
of longitudinal data. The annual reports of the reporting period, 1995-2006, are 
examined in order to determine the voluntary disclosures of strategic information, 
financial information and non-financial information made by listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market. The primary purpose of such an examination is to determine a 
general trend of the gradual changes in voluntary disclosure made by listed firms over 
the twelve annual reporting periods. To determine factors affecting firms’ voluntary 
disclosure during different phases of the Chinese stock market, in Chapter 5 the entire 
testing period is further divided into three distinct testing phases. The three phases are 
named Phase I, the developing phase 1995-1998, Phase II, the corporate governance 
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régime phase 1999-2002, and Phase III, the convergence phase, 2003-2006, 
respectively. 
 
6.4 Sample selection 
 
To be included in the sample, listed firms must satisfy the following selection criteria 
in order to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5: 
(1) Firms must be listed continuously on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange spanning 1995-2006 and, thus, twelve years’ 
annual reports are available for examination. 
(2) Firms must belong to an industry classification other than banking and 
financial institutions, which are subject to a different accounting system and 
disclosure requirements in China. 
(3) Firms must issue either only A shares, both A and B shares, or only B shares. 
 
The first selection criterion is to ensure the continuous observation of the disclosure 
behavior of the same group of listed firms during the entire testing period to satisfy 
the minimum requirement of a longitudinal study. The second selection criterion is to 
ensure that all sample firms are under the same regulatory régime in respect of their 
information disclosure. In such a way, the information disclosed by sample firms is 
comparable. Application of the above criteria results in a sample of 297 firms across 
12 industries, and the sample is broad enough to cover large, medium and small firms 
within a majority of the industries. Table 6.1 documents the components of the 
sample. There are 227 firms that only issue A-shares; 66 firms issue dual-class shares, 
both A-shares and B-shares; and 5 firms only issue B shares. As the preceding 
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discussion shows, firms issuing A-shares need to follow the Chinese GAAP and 
accounting standards, while firms issuing B-shares need to satisfy the requirements of 
the IAS when they compile financial reports. Firms issuing dual-class shares need to 
cope with different reporting requirements which co-exist as they expose their 
disclosure to foreign investors as well. As a result, firms issuing dual-class shares 
need to prepare two sets of financial statements, one under China GAAP and a second 
according to international accounting standards, respectively, for each year’s annual 
reports. 
Table 6.1 Industry classification of the sample 
 
Industry 
Classification 
No. of firms 
issuing A-shares 
only 
No. of firms 
issuing dual 
class shares 
No. of firms 
issuing B-shares 
only 
Agriculture, fishing and 
forestry 
1 1 0 
Mining 1 1 0 
Manufacturing 90 42 4 
Electrical and power 12 2 0 
Construction  4 0 0 
Transportation and 
storage 
3 1 0 
Information technology 18 2 0 
Wholesale and retail 33 4 0 
Real estate development 22 7 0 
Social services 5 2 1 
Culture 4 2 0 
Miscellaneous 33 2 0 
Total 226 66 5 
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6.5 Construction of a voluntary disclosure checklist 
 
6.5.1 Voluntary disclosure checklist construction 
 
To investigate the impact of a changed disclosure environment in China on the 
disclosure behavior of listed firms over a twelve-year period, a measurement tool of 
voluntary disclosure needs to be employed. This measurement tool should be able to 
identify the type, and measure the extent, of information disclosed voluntarily by 
listed firms in this study. A voluntary disclosure checklist needs to be designed. To 
standardize the measurement of the extent of voluntary disclosure among firms, prior 
academic studies normally construct a disclosure checklist that allows comparison 
between sample firms. The construction of a disclosure checklist for a disclosure 
study must involve the consideration of the purpose of the study and the method of 
item selection. Botosan (1997) indicates such a practical research tool involves some 
degree of subjectivity when selecting voluntary disclosure items to be included in the 
checklist. Marston and Shrives (1991) also argue that subjectivity cannot be 
completely removed, nor is it reasonable to expect that it can be. 
 
Owusu-Ansah (1997) suggests researchers, however, could minimize the subjectivity 
effect by reviewing existing practices, consulting previous studies and considering the 
socio-economic environment of the country subject to the study. Applying these 
ideas, three systematic steps are taken in designing the voluntary disclosure checklist 
for this study, in order to ensure its validity and credibility: (1) compile three 
voluntary disclosure checklists for the preliminary test over the three testing periods; 
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(2) survey the academic literature; and (3) refer to the voluntary disclosure framework 
recommended by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US. 
 
Step One – Checklists developed for a preliminary test 
 
Three voluntary disclosure checklists were developed for testing periods 1995, 2000 
and 2005, respectively, for the purpose of preliminary tests. The primary purpose of a 
preliminary test is to test whether there are voluntary disclosures in sample firms’ 
annual reports, and whether the level of voluntary disclosure shows an increasing 
trend in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 periods. In this process, all mandatory disclosure 
requirements released by the MOF and the CSRC in these three testing periods are 
collected. The comparison of these three mandatory disclosure lists enables 
identification of the differences between the disclosure items required by the 
government regulators during the three financial reporting periods. Over the years, the 
mandatory disclosure items increase gradually as a result of a more regulated 
disclosure régime in the Chinese stock market. Some mandatory disclosure items in 
the reporting periods 2000 and 2005, therefore, were voluntary disclosure items in the 
1995 reporting period. Some mandatory disclosure items in the 2005 reporting period 
were voluntary disclosure items in the 2000 reporting period. The voluntary 
disclosure items for 2005 are established by referring to the Corporate Governance 
Disclosure in Annual Reports – A Guide to Current Requirements and 
Recommendations for Enhancement, released by the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants in March 2001. Items such as “Prospects and plans for the future”, and 
“Forecast” are voluntary disclosure items for all three testing periods. 
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Of the three voluntary disclosure checklists, the 1995 one is longest, with 65 
voluntary disclosure items. The number of voluntary disclosure items is reduced to 59 
in the year 2000 checklist. The 2005 checklist consists of 51 items. The preliminary 
test is conducted based on these three checklists. The results of preliminary tests show 
that voluntary disclosures have increased gradually over the 1995, 2000 and 2005 
periods. 
 
Step Two – Survey of the academic literature 
 
The checklist item selection generally includes a review of the relevant literature 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). The purpose of the academic literature review is to 
identify commonly-used voluntary disclosure items in voluntary disclosure research. 
A disclosure checklist has been used as a research instrument in numerous voluntary 
disclosure studies (Buzby, 1974; Cooke, 1989; Meek et al., 1995; Botosan, 1997; Eng 
and Teo, 1999; Eng et al., 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). 
Most researchers make attempts to create a checklist that is valid in the particular 
research environment being investigated (Marston and Shrives, 1991). To examine the 
relationship between disclosure level and cost of equity capital in the US, Botosan 
(1997) compiled a checklist, guided by recommendations provided in the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ (1994) study of business reporting, the SRI 
International (1987) survey of investor information needs, and the Canadian Institute 
of Chartered Accountants’ (1991) study of the annual report. Botosan’s (1997) 
checklist includes five categories of voluntary information which are identified by 
investors and financial analysts as useful in investment decision-making: background 
information; ten or five year summary of historical results; key non-financial 
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statistics; projected information; and management discussion and analysis. Meek et al. 
(1995) compiled their checklist based on an analysis of international trends and 
observations of standard reporting practices of the US, UK and continental European 
multinational corporations, taking into account the disclosure index used by Tonkin 
(1989) in his comprehensive surveys of 200 annual reports from the world’s leading 
companies. The sample of Eng et al. (2001) is listed firms on the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore, and the checklist constructed by Eng et al. (2001) is based on the 
recommendations provided by the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of 
Singapore (ICPAS). Both Meek et al.’s (1995) and Eng et al.’s (2001) checklists 
consist of three categories of voluntary information: strategic information, non-
financial information, and financial information. The sub-categories both studies 
identified under every information category are also consistent with each other. Most 
of the Botosan (1997) checklist items are covered by the checklists established by 
Meek et al. (1995) and Eng et al. (2001). A combination of the three checklists from 
Meek et al. (1995), Botosan (1997) and Eng et al. (2001) is then used as the main 
reference for the checklist constructed for this study. 
 
Three checklists used for the preliminary tests are then compared against the 
combined checklist from the academic literature review, in order to decide which 
disclosure items should be included in the final checklist used for this study. This 
study examines twelve years of voluntary disclosures among 297 listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market. As a result of increased disclosure regulations, some of the 
voluntary disclosure items in the early stages of the testing periods become mandatory 
disclosure items in the later stages of the testing periods. These items are eliminated 
from the final checklist to ensure that it enables comparison of voluntary disclosures 
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across the entire testing period, 1995-2006. Some items in the checklists for the 
preliminary test purpose are combined or simplified in the final checklist. For 
example, categories such as “Prospects and plans for the future” and “Forecast” in the 
checklists for the preliminary tests are combined into one category, “Future 
prospects”, in the final checklist. The above changes result in a checklist used for this 
study which is very similar to the checklist compiled by Meek et al. (1995). The main 
information categories and sub-categories of the final checklist are as follows: 
 Section 1: Strategic information 
o Category one: General corporate information 
o Category two: Corporate strategy 
o Category three: Management discussion and analysis, including 
operating review and financial review 
o Category four: Future prospects 
o Category five: Other useful strategic information 
 Section 2: Financial information 
o Category one: Performance indicators (not from financial statements) 
o Category two: Financial review 
o Category three: Project information 
o Category four: Foreign currency information 
o Category five: Stock price information 
o Category six: Other useful financial information 
 Section 3: Non-financial information 
o Category one: Information about directors 
o Category two: Employee information 
o Category three: Social policy 
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o Category four: Other useful non-financial disclosures 
Including “Social policy” as one of the voluntary disclosure categories in the checklist 
can be justified by the increasing pressure put on firms in China, from a number of 
different sources, including the state and local government, the State Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) and the CSRC, to engage in voluntary environmental 
reporting and disclosure over the years (Guo, 2005). The aim of including 
environmental issues related to a voluntary disclosure item in the checklist of this 
study is to find out the changes made by listed sample firms in respect of their social 
corporate responsibility disclosure over the period of 1995-2006. 
 
Step Three – Consider the voluntary disclosure framework recommended by the 
FASB 
 
To further assess whether the established checklist for this study has captured the 
significant financial and non-financial information which should be contained in 
corporate annual reports over the testing period, the voluntary disclosure framework 
recommended by the FASB in the US is also used as a reference. In 2001, a Steering 
Committee under the FASB issued a report named Improving Business Reporting: 
Insights in Enhancing Voluntary Disclosure (FASB, 2001). The Steering Committee’s 
framework for providing voluntary disclosures is: 
 Identify the aspects of the company’s business that are especially important to 
the company’s success. These are the critical success factors for the company. 
 Identify management’s strategies and plans for managing those critical success 
factors in the past and in the future. 
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 Identify metrics (operating data performance measures) used by management 
to measure and manage the implementation of their strategies and plans. 
 Consider whether voluntary disclosures about the company’s forward-looking 
strategies and plans and metrics would adversely affect their competitive 
position, and exceed the expected benefit of making the voluntary disclosure. 
 If disclosure is deemed appropriate, determine how best to voluntarily present 
that information. The nature of metrics presented should be explained, and 
those metrics should be consistently disclosed from period to period to the 
extent that they continue to be relevant. 
 
Five Working Groups identified present practices in eight industries in the US for the 
voluntary disclosure of useful business information. The findings show that for 
companies in the US, voluntary disclosure can be classified into six categories: 
business data; management’s analysis of business data; forward-looking information; 
information about management and shareholders; background about the company; 
and information about intangible assets. 
 
A comparison between the checklist used for this study and the above framework and 
research findings in the US, shows the checklist has covered most of the areas 
outlined in the framework and the six categories of voluntary disclosure by firms in 
the US. Table 6.2 shows the details of this comparison. 
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Table 6.2 How disclosure checklist addresses FASB voluntary disclosure framework 
FASB Voluntary Disclosure Framework Voluntary Disclosure Checklist 
1 Identify the aspects of the company’s business that are especially 
important to the company’s success. 
Section 1, category three 
Section1, category four 
Section 3, category one 
Section 3, category two 
Management discussion and analysis 
Future prospects 
Information about directors 
Employee information 
2 Identify management’s strategies and plans for managing those critical 
success factors in the past and in the future. 
Section 1, category two 
Section 1, category four 
Corporate strategy 
Future prospects 
3 Identify metrics (operating data performance measures) used by 
management to measure and manage the implementation of their 
strategies and plans. 
Section 2, category one 
Section 2, category two 
Section 2, category three 
Section 2, category four 
Section 2, category five 
Performance indicators 
Financial review 
Project information 
Foreign currency information 
Stock price information 
4 Consider whether voluntary disclosures about the company’s forward-
looking strategies would adversely affect competitive position and exceed 
the expected benefit of making the voluntary disclosure. 
Can’t be measured by using voluntary disclosure checklist 
 
5 If disclosure is deemed appropriate, determine how best to voluntarily 
present that information. 
Can’t be measured by using voluntary disclosure checklist 
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6.5.2 Checklist weighting 
 
Consideration is also given to the weighting or non-weighting of checklist items used 
in this study, and to the different opinions and approaches adopted by researchers in 
respect of voluntary disclosure weighting. While Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), 
Firth (1980), Cooke (1989), Meek et al. (1995) and Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) 
choose not to weight their checklist items, Buzby (1974), Botosan (1997), Eng and 
Teo (1999), Eng et al. (2001) and Eng and Mak (2003) take the opposite view. 
 
Three main reasons are given by researchers who choose not to weight their voluntary 
disclosure checklists. The first is that subjectivity could be involved in assigning 
weights when users’ preferences are unknown (Meek et al., 1995). Second is the 
necessity for disclosure. Both Cooke (1989) and Meek et al. (1995) use the research 
findings of Spero (1979) to back up their argument. Spero (1979) reports that 
companies better at disclosing “important” items are also better at disclosing “less 
important items”. Therefore, companies would be scored the same way regardless of 
whether items are weighted or un-weighted. The third reason is that weighted and un-
weighted scores show similar results (Firth, 1980; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). To overcome the subjectivity problem and identify 
perceptions as to the importance of the checklist items in their study, Chalmers and 
Godfrey (2004) conducted a postal survey among equity analysts before assigning 
weighting to the disclosure items. The lack of differentiation between results based on 
a weighted checklist and an un-weighted checklist led to the abandonment of a 
checklist weighting approach in their study. 
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Supporters for attaching unequal importance to each item in a disclosure checklist 
argue different items of information can be perceived as having different degrees of 
importance for the user group (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Buzby (1974) surveys a 
number of respondents and takes the resulting means as his weighting. Botosan 
(1997) refers to the SRI International Survey (1987) of investor information needs. 
According to the SRI International Survey, a summary of historical results, key non-
financial statistics, projected information, and management discussion and analysis 
are as important, or extremely important, compared to investors’ rating of a 
company’s background information. Therefore, Botosan (1997) assigns one point for 
each background item disclosed, two points for company performance statistics and 
ratios, and three points to forward-looking information. A similar method is adopted 
by Eng and Teo (1999), Eng et al. (2001) and Eng and Mak (2003). 
 
In this study, the argument is that a different level of importance should be attached to 
different disclosure categories and to each specific item in order to reflect the 
significance of different types of information to investors’ decision-making during the 
development of the Chinese stock market. The method used by Eng et al. (2001) to 
score voluntary disclosure checklist items is followed. Giving different scores to 
checklist items is, essentially, an extension of the weighting system (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). Criteria for the computation of voluntary disclosure scores are as 
follows: 
 
Strategic information: 
One point is assigned to each “General corporation information” item, one point to 
each “Corporate strategy” item if a general statement is given, two points if a 
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quantitative statement is given, and three points if detailed elaboration on the strategy, 
with both qualitative and quantitative information, is given in the annual report 
examined. The same criteria are applied to some “Management discussion and 
analysis” items, including “Review of operations”, “Competitive environment” and 
“Significant events of the year”. To reflect the importance of “Future prospects”, one 
point is assigned to annual reports that provide only a general statement about a firm’s 
new developments, three points to annual reports providing quantitative information, 
and five points to detailed elaboration on this information. Table 6.3A shows the 
assignment of scores to the “Strategic information” section on the disclosure 
checklist. 
Table 6.3A Assignment of scores to the strategic information section 
 Section/category  Voluntary disclosure items Score 
Section 1 Strategic information 
Category One - General Corporate Information 
 brief history of company  1     
 organizational structure/chart 1     
 general description of business/activities 1     
 principal products 1     
 principal markets 1     
Category Two - Corporate Strategy 
 statement of corporate goals or objectives 1     
 current strategy 1 2 3 
 impact of strategy on current results 1 2 3 
 future strategy 1 2 3 
 impact of strategy on future results 1 2 3 
Category Three - Management Discussion and Analysis 
 review of operations 1 2 3 
 competitive environment 1 2 3 
 significant events of the year 1 2 3 
 change in sales/profits 1 2   
 change in expenses 1 2   
 change in inventory level 1 2   
 change in market share 1 2   
Category Four - Future Prospects 
 new developments 1 3 5 
 forecast of sales/profit 1 2   
 assumptions underlying the forecast 1 2   
Category Five - Other Useful Strategic Information                                                     1          2           3 
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Financial information: 
One point is assigned to financial ratios under “Performance indicators” and two or 
three points to “Historical figures for last five years or more”, as historical summaries 
of financial figures are useful in trend analysis (Eng et al., 2001). Only one point is 
assigned to all “Financial review” disclosure category items if voluntary disclosure is 
found from annual reports. To reflect the importance of the “Projected information” 
disclosure category, three points are assigned to any voluntary disclosure related to 
“Cash flow forecast”, “Capital expenditure and/or R&D expenditure forecast” and the 
“Earnings forecast”. For “Foreign currency information”, “Stock price information” 
and “Other useful financial information” categories, one point is assigned for a 
general statement, two points for quantitative information and three points for a 
detailed elaboration. Table 6.3B shows the assignment of scores to the financial 
information section on the disclosure checklist. 
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Table 6.3B Assignment of scores to the financial information section 
 Section/category  Voluntary disclosure items Score 
Section 2 Financial information 
Category One - Performance Indicators (not from financial statements) 
 historical figures for last five years or more 1 2 3
 profitability ratios 1     
 cash flow ratios 1     
 liquidity ratios 1     
 gearing ratios 1     
Category Two - Financial Review 
 disclosure of intangible valuations (except goodwill) 1     
 dividend payout policy 1     
Category Three - Projected Information  
 cash flow forecast 3     
 capital expenditure and/or R&D expenditures forecast 3     
 earnings forecast 3     
Category Four - Foreign Currency Information 
 impact of foreign exchange fluctuations on current results 1 2 3
 foreign currency exposure management description 1 2 3
 major exchange rates used in the accounts 1     
Category Five - Stock Price Information 
 market capitalization at year-end 1 2 3
 market capitalization trend 1 2 3
 size of shareholdings 1 2 3
 type of shareholder 1 2 3
Category Six - Other Useful Financial Information                                                      1          2         3 
 
 
Key non-financial information: 
One point is assigned to a general statement of information about directors items, two 
points to quantitative information, and three points to detailed qualitative and 
quantitative information. The same criteria are applied to social policy items as well. 
For employee information, one point is assigned to all items except “Data on 
accidents” and “Cost of safety measures”. These two items are assigned two points if 
disclosure is found in annual reports. 
 
The weighted voluntary disclosure checklist is presented in Table 6.3. Sample firms’ 
annual reports are examined and scored according to the degree of specificity of each 
of the information items in the checklist. The disclosure level of a sample firm, 
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therefore, is the aggregation of the scores in the voluntary disclosure checklist. A 
sample firm’s disclosure level is represented by a Voluntary Disclosure Score (VDS). 
Table 6.3C shows the assignment of scores to the key non-financial information 
section on the disclosure checklist.  
 
Table 6.3C Assignment of scores to the non-financial information section 
 Section/category  Voluntary disclosure items Score 
Section 3 Key non-financial information 
Category One - Information about Directors 
 commercial experience of the executive directors 1      2 3 
 other directorships held by executive directors 1      2 3 
Category Two - Employee Information 
 amount spent on training 1     
 nature of training 1     
 categories of employee trained 1     
 number of employees trained 1     
 data on accidents 2     
 cost of safety measures 2     
 redundancy information  1     
Category Three - Social Policy 
 safety of products 1      2 3 
 environmental protection programs - quantitative 1      2 3 
 charitable donations (amount) 1      2 3 
 community programs (general) 1      2 3 
Category Four - Other Useful Non-Financial Disclosure                                             1          2          3 
 
6.5.3 Reliability 
 
The reliability of the VDS score could be measured by the stability and 
reproducibility of the VDS. The objective of testing stability is to see, after a time 
lapse, whether the score assigned to the same item is consistent. Reproducibility 
involves choosing a small number of the sample across the testing period and re-
assigning the scores in order to find out whether the scores assigned and re-assigned 
are consistent. In respect of the stability of the VDS, the score assigned for the 
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same/similar item used in the checklists constructed for the preliminary test25  is 
compared with the formal data collection across the three periods, 1995, 2000 and 
2005. To test the reproducibility, thirty sample firms (10% of total sample firms) are 
randomly chosen across 1995-2006 and a score for their annual reports is assigned for 
the second time. For the majority of cases, both scores assigned to the same firms are 
consistent with each other. The above two steps suggest that the VDS measure in this 
study possesses stability and reproducibility. 
 
6.6 Measuring the impact of changed disclosure 
environment on firm disclosure behavior 
 
6.6.1 Measurement of the level of voluntary disclosure 
 
The level of voluntary disclosure is measured by the number of firms that voluntarily 
disclose information, the extent of voluntary disclosure and the type of voluntary 
disclosure. The number of disclosing firms shows how many firms voluntarily 
disclose information each year during the entire testing periods and each testing 
phase, respectively, covered in this study. The extent of voluntary disclosure is 
reflected by the voluntary disclosure scores assigned to sample firms. As disclosure 
items are weighted in the checklist, the disclosure score assigned is able to show both 
depth and extent of disclosure. Descriptive statistics of each disclosure category and 
item, including mean and number of observations, are used to reflect the type of 
                                                      
25 Preliminary test is conducted in May 2007 and formal test is conducted in March 2009 for this study. 
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voluntary disclosure. Thus, the type of information the firm prefers to disclose 
voluntarily can be shown. 
 
6.6.2 Factors affecting firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions 
 
In this study, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is employed to examine the 
relationship between listed firms’ voluntary disclosure and factors affecting listed 
firms’ disclosure decision-making. The following regression is estimated: 
 
               VDS + itSTA1 + itLEG2 + itTRB4 + itBOD5 + itIAC6 + 
          itLEV7 + itPRO8 + itGRO9 + itAUD10 + itSIZE11 + itIND12 + it  
        (Equation 6.1) 
 
Where: 
VDS = voluntary disclosure score firm i in time t 
STA = percentage of state ownership for firm i in time t 
LEG = percentage of legal-person ownership for firm i in time t 
TRB = percentage of tradable share B ownership for firm i in time t 
BOD = percentage of independent directors on the board for firm i in time t 
IAC = dummy variable, coded as 1 if there is an internal audit committee for firm i in 
time t, 0 otherwise 
LEV = a ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i in time t 
PRO = a ratio of return of shareholder’s equity for firm i in time t 
GRO = a ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity for firm i in time t 
AUD = dummy variable, coded as 1 if the auditor for firm i in time t is an 
international auditor, 0 otherwise 
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SIZE = logarithm of total assets for firm i in time t 
IND = dummy variable, coded as 1 if firm belongs to manufacturing industry for firm 
i in time t, 0 otherwise 
 
6.6.2.1 Independent variable constructs 
 
This section discusses the measurement of the explanatory variables employed in the 
voluntary disclosure model in order to find out some specific factors which have 
influenced individual listed firms’ voluntary disclosure. The independent variables 
can be classified into four groups: ownership structure, corporate governance related, 
economics-based variables, and external auditor. 
Ownership structure group 
 
There are three independent variables in this group, namely, state ownership, legal-
person ownership and foreign ownership. It is predicted in Chapter 5 that these 
different types of share ownership in the Chinese stock market will influence the level 
of voluntary disclosure of listed firms. State ownership and legal-person ownership 
will have a negative impact on firms’ voluntary disclosure, while foreign ownership 
will have a positive impact on firms’ voluntary disclosure. State ownership is 
measured by the percentage of ordinary shares held by government agencies and 
state-owned enterprises. Legal-person ownership is measured by the percentage of 
ordinary shares held by legal-persons. The legal-person shareholders tend to have 
strong, state-related roots and the shareholders comprise various domestic institutions 
in China, including private companies, state-owned enterprises and non-backed 
financial institutions such as investment funds and security companies (Xu and Wang, 
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1999). Foreign ownership is measured by percentage of B shares or H shares issued 
by a listed firm. The full context of annual reports contained in the CSMAR database 
provides the total ordinary shares issued by sample firms and the number of shares 
held by state enterprises, legal-persons and foreign investors. 
Corporate governance related group 
 
Corporate governance-related factors are predicted to have a positive impact on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market, especially after 2001 when the 
CSRC advocates strongly the corporate governance régime among listed firms. Two 
independent variables used in voluntary disclosure regression are independent 
directors and the existence of an internal audit committee. Independent directors are 
measured by the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board of directors. 
The existence of an internal audit committee is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a 
listed firm has an internal audit committee, and coded as 0 if otherwise. The number 
of independent directors, total number of directors on the board, and the existence of 
an internal audit committee, can be identified from the annual report in the CSMAR 
database. 
Economics-based variables 
 
Economics-based variables used in the voluntary disclosure regression model include 
leverage, profitability, growth opportunity and two control variables - firm size and 
industry classification. Leverage is measured by the ratio of a firm’s total liabilities to 
total assets. Profitability is measured by a firm’s return on its shareholders’ equity. 
Growth opportunity is measured by the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity to the 
book value of equity. All Statement of Financial Position and Performance items are 
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obtained from the CSMAR database. Market value of the equity of sample firms is 
also obtained from the same data source. 
 
External auditors 
 
The voluntary disclosure model predicts that firms using international auditing firms 
will present a higher level of voluntary disclosure than firms using domestic CPA 
firms as an auditor. If a firm’s annual report is audited by an international auditing 
firm, a classification of 1 is assigned. If a firm’s annual report is audited by a 
domestic CPA firm, 0 is assigned to that firm. The information related to the status of 
external auditor can be collected from the annual reports in the CSMAR database. 
6.6.2.2 Control variables 
 
 
There are two control variables - firm size and industry classification. Firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm of total assets of each sample firm. The amount of 
total assets can be extracted from the balance sheet in the annual report. Industry 
classification is a dummy variable; coded as 1 if a firm is classified as a 
manufacturing firm, and coded as 0 if otherwise. 
 
Table 6.4 summarizes the construction of independent variables used in this study. 
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Table 6.4 Summary of the construction of independent variables 
Hypothesis established in 
Chapter 5 
Independent 
variable 
 
Label 
 
Measurement 
Data 
source 
H2a, H2b, H2c 
 
 
 
H3a, H3b, H3c 
 
 
 
H4a, H4b, H4c 
State 
ownership 
 
 
Legal-person 
ownership 
 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
 
STA 
 
 
 
LEG 
 
 
 
TRB 
= Number of shares issued to state shareholders/Total 
number of shares issued 
 
 
= Number of shares issued to legal-person 
shareholders/Total number of shares issued 
 
 
= Number of shares issued to foreign shareholders/Total 
number of shares issued 
Datastream 
 
 
 
Datastream 
 
 
 
Datastream 
H5a, H5b, H5c 
 
 
 
 
H6b, H6c 
Independent 
directors 
 
 
 
Internal audit 
committee 
BOD 
 
 
 
 
IAC 
= Number of independent directors/Total number of 
directors on the board of directors 
 
 
 
Dummy variable 
1 = if a firm has an internal audit committee 
0 = if a firm does not have an internal audit committee 
Manually 
identified from 
annual reports 
 
Manually 
identified from 
annual reports 
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Hypothesis established 
Independent 
variable 
 
Label 
 
Measurement 
Data 
source 
H7a, H7b, H7c 
 
 
 
H8a, H8b, H8c 
 
 
 
H9a, H9b, H9c 
 
 
 
 
Firm size – control variable 
 
Industry classification – control 
variable  
Leverage 
 
 
 
Profitability 
 
 
 
Growth 
opportunity 
LEV 
 
 
 
PRO 
 
 
 
GRO 
 
 
 
 
SIZE 
 
IND 
= Total liabilities/Total assets 
 
 
 
= Return/Total shareholders’ equity 
 
 
 
= Market value of equity/ Book value of equity by the end of 
financial period 
 
 
 
= log of total assets 
 
Dummy variable 
1 = manufacturing firm 
0 = non-manufacturing firm 
 
CSMAR-A 
Database 
 
 
CSMAR-A 
Database 
 
 
CSMAR-A 
Database and 
Datastream 
 
 
CSMAR-A 
Database 
 
CSRC Industry 
Classification 
H10a, H10b, H10c International 
auditor 
AUD Dummy variable 
1 = if a firm’s auditor is an international audit firm 
0 = if a firm’s auditor is a domestic firm  
Manually 
identify from 
annual reports 
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6.7 Summary 
 
This chapter focuses on the study’s research design. The research methodology used in this 
study is discussed, including the justification for adopting a longitudinal approach, 
examination of annual reports, and why voluntary disclosure can be used to represent firms’ 
disclosure behavior. Also explained are the reasons used to determine the appropriate testing 
period to investigate firm’s voluntary disclosure. The entire testing period is further divided 
into three phases which represent different stages of the development of the Chinese stock 
market. The sample selection procedure is then described. There are 297 listed firms selected 
as the sample. To satisfy the minimum requirement of a longitudinal study, the sample firms 
have been continuously listed on the Chinese stock market between 1995 and 2006. The 
voluntary disclosure checklist used for this study is a combination of the checklists developed 
for the preliminary test, a survey of checklists among prior voluntary disclosure studies and 
reference was also made to the voluntary disclosure framework recommended by the FASB 
in the US. The final checklist consists of three voluntary disclosure sections - strategic, 
financial and non-financial information. There are fifteen disclosure categories under three 
disclosure sections. Different scores are assigned to each disclosure item to reflect the 
importance of some disclosure items to investors’ decision-making. The validity of the 
checklist is ensured by its stability and reproducibility. The level of voluntary disclosure is 
measured by the number of disclosing firms over the testing period and the extent and type of 
voluntary disclosure. An OLS regression model is employed to explore the relationship 
between levels of voluntary disclosure and the independent variables identified in Chapter 5. 
The proxy variable measurement is also discussed. The purpose of the next chapter is to 
present and analyze the results of testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The longitudinal nature of this study requires data for multiple periods. Using the research 
methodology and specific research methods discussed in Chapter 6, voluntary disclosures are 
collected from 297 listed sample firms. The full context of their annual reports from 1995-
2006 are examined line by line. Voluntary disclosures are identified based on the voluntary 
disclosure checklist designed in Chapter 6. Each disclosure item is assigned with an 
appropriate score based on the extent and depth of disclosure made by the listed sample 
firms. 
 
This chapter describes and analyses the results. Section 7.2 reports the voluntary disclosures 
made by listed sample firms over the years. The results are presented in four sections: 
strategic information, financial information, non-financial information and a summary of 
three disclosure sections. The changes in voluntary disclosures are represented by the number 
of firms voluntarily disclosing information beyond statutory requirements in the three testing 
phases, the descriptive statistics of each disclosure category, and the main content of 
voluntary disclosure under each disclosure category. Section 7.3 summarizes and analyzes 
the main characteristics exhibited by sample firms’ voluntary disclosure over the years. The 
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comparison of disclosure levels between Phase I and Phase II, Phase II and Phase III are 
discussed.  Section 7.4 reports the results of regression tests which demonstrate whether the 
factors predicted in Chapter 6 are supported by the data collected from the sample. Section 
7.2, Section 7.3 and Section 7.4 group results into the three distinctive testing phases defined 
in Chapter 5. Phase I, Phase II and Phase III in this chapter represent “Developing phase: 
1995-1998”, “Corporate governance régime phase: 1999-2002”, and “Convergence phase: 
2003-2006”, respectively. Section 7.5 presents a summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
 
7.2 Voluntary disclosure made by listed firms 
 
This section looks at three aspects of voluntary disclosure made by the sample firms: the 
number of voluntarily disclosing firms, the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure 
categories and the main content of voluntary disclosures. The number of voluntarily 
disclosing firms reflects the increment or decrement of the number of firms voluntarily 
disclosing information in three testing phases. Descriptive statistics report the mean, 
maximum, median of second half (Q3), median and standard deviation of voluntary 
disclosure scores (VDS) assigned to strategic information, financial information and non-
financial information disclosures. Descriptive statistics reflect the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the Chinese stock market. The main content of voluntary disclosure for each 
disclosure category is illustrated in order to determine the sample firms’ preferences 
regarding voluntary disclosure. 
 
 
219 
 
 7.2.1 Strategic information 
7.2.1.1 Number of disclosing firms 
 
Table 7.1 reports the number of firms voluntarily disclosing strategic information in each 
individual reporting year throughout 1995–2006 and the average number of disclosing firms 
in three phases. During Phase I, the number of disclosing firms increased from 14 (5%) in 
1995, to 110 (37%) in 1996; 135 (45%) in 1997; and 206 (69%) in 1998. Thus, the average 
number of firms voluntarily disclosing strategic information in this phase is 116, representing 
39% of total sample firms. During Phase II, the number of firms disclosing strategic 
information changes from 228 (76%) in 1999 to 235 (79%) in 2000; to 266 (89%) in 2001; 
and 268 (90%) in 2002. The average number of disclosing firms in this phase is 250, 
representing 84% of sample firms. The number of disclosing firms slightly increased from 
269 (91%) in 2003 to 270 (91%) in 2004; 271 (91%) in 2005; and 272 (92%) in 2006 during 
Phase III. The average number of disclosing firms for this phase is 271, representing 91% of 
sample firms. 
 
The above results show that, first, there is a progressive increase in the number of firms 
making voluntary strategic information disclosures over the three testing phases. Secondly, 
there is a significant increase in the number of firms voluntarily disclosing strategic 
information during Phase II. The average number of disclosing firms in Phase II is more than 
double the average number of disclosure firms in Phase I. In summary, the examination of the 
number of firms disclosing strategic information indicates that listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market responded positively to the changed disclosure environment over the three 
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testing phases, especially during Phase II (1999-2002) when the Chinese government 
strengthened the financial reporting and disclosure regulations. 
 
7.2.1.2 Descriptive statistics of strategic information disclosure 
 
Table 7.2 details the descriptive statistics of five disclosure categories under the strategic 
information section. The Management Discussion and Analysis category has the highest 
disclosure mean across the three testing phases. The mean VDSs are 0.39, 1.14 and 1.69 for 
the three testing phases, respectively. The maximum disclosure score is 4 in Phase I, and 
reaches 7 in both Phase II and Phase III. Following this category is the Future Prospects 
category. The mean changes from 0.1 in Phase I to 0.55 in Phase II and 1.19 in Phase III. The 
maximum disclosure score reaches 8 in Phase III, indicating some sample firms’ willingness 
to disclose forward-looking information in their annual reports. The mean of the Corporate 
Strategy category sits in the middle of the strategic information section. The mean is 
increased from 0.07 in Phase I to 0.44 and 0.98 in Phase II and Phase III, respectively. 
General Corporation Information and Other Useful Strategic Information have a relatively 
low mean VDS. The maximum disclosure score reaches 3 for both disclosure categories. 
 
7.2.1.3 Content of strategic information disclosure 
 
The mean VDS of each strategic information disclosure item during the three testing phases 
are reported in Table 7.3. The primary purpose of further analysis of the mean of each 
disclosure item under disclosure categories is to determine listed firms’ preferences in 
disclosing strategic information. 
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General corporate information 
 
This category has five disclosure items, covering the history of the firm, organization 
structure, main business activities the firm is engaged in, principal products and market. 
There is no information disclosed voluntarily by listed firms to illustrate their firms’ history 
and organization structure throughout the three testing phases. The mean VDS of General 
Description of Business Activities is changed from zero in Phase I, to 0.5 in Phase II and 1 in 
Phase III. The example of voluntary disclosure is a detailed description of the scope of firms’ 
business assets and properties. Voluntary disclosures are made in respect of principal 
products and markets throughout the three testing phases. Firms are found detailing their 
products, brand names and registered trademarks in their annual reports. The strongest 
disclosure made under this information category is the principal market. Firms choose to 
indicate which provinces in China are their current markets and where their potential markets 
are located, both domestically and internationally. The mean VDS increase from 0.75 in 
Phase I, to 7.75 in Phase II and 11.75 in Phase III. 
 
Corporate strategy 
 
This category covers firms’ current and future strategies and their impact on firms’ results in 
the present and in the future. Voluntary disclosures are found for all five disclosure items 
throughout the three testing phases. Examples of current management strategies disclosed in 
annual reports are strategies to control operating expenses and strategies for spending on 
research and development. Strategies to develop new products with high-technology 
components, future acquisitions and expanding overseas markets are examples of future 
strategy disclosures. Both types of strategies are related to factors that are important to firms’ 
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success in the long run. The Future Strategy disclosure item sees the strongest trend in 
voluntary disclosure, with mean VDS increases from 13.25 in Phase I, to 84.5 in Phase II and 
193.8 in Phase III. This is followed by the Current Strategy disclosure item. Few firms 
voluntarily disclose the impact of their strategies on current and future results. The voluntary 
disclosures of the impact of strategies on current and future results are qualitative rather than 
quantitative. One of the possible reasons could be that the sample firms have difficulty in 
measuring and predicting the impact accurately. 
 
Management discussion and analysis 
 
This category focuses on firms’ operations. It includes management’s overview of a whole 
year’s operation, firms’ business environment, significant events during the year and changes 
in business input and output. Stronger disclosures are found for the review of operations, 
changes in sales, profits, expenses and market share. Details of growth or decline in market 
share in the main market and newly expanded markets are found in annual reports. Changes 
in sales, profits and expenses are discussed based on comparisons between the previous year 
and current years. Firms reporting decreased sales revenue often detail the reasons causing 
the decline, while firms with increased sales rarely provide more details. The low mean VDS 
of Competitive Environment and Significant Events of the Year show sample firms are not 
keen to disclose information in those two areas. It can be seen that listed firms avoid pointing 
out their main competitors or making comparisons with competitors in terms of sales and 
market share. Changed state government legislation and firms’ lawsuits are two typical 
examples disclosed under Significant Events during the year. Many firms describe the details 
of events but only a few discuss the impact of the events on their operations at the time or in 
the future. 
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Future prospects 
 
This category consists of forward-looking information disclosure items. They are new 
developments, forecasts of sales/profit and assumptions underlying the forecasts. The 
strongest voluntary disclosure can be seen from New Developments, with its average 
disclosure score increasing from 27.25 in Phase I, to 87.5 and 195.5 in Phase II and Phase III, 
respectively. Examples of new developments found from annual reports are detailed 
descriptions of products in the developmental stage, and new plans for expansion and brand 
introductions to specific domestic and international markets. Intensive investment in research 
and development activities is frequently mentioned as one of the most important measures to 
achieve new developments. Forming joint ventures with international partners is disclosed as 
a way for listed firms in China to expand their market. The mean VDS of forecasts of sales or 
profit increase significantly from only 2 in Phase I, to 53.75 in Phase II and 117.8 in Phase 
III. Many firms choose to quantify their targets for growth in revenues, net income and gross 
margin in the following financial year. Some also specify targeted sales revenues for 
particular products or production lines. Twenty–five observations are found to forecast a loss 
for the next year due to cash-flow liquidity problems and heavy interest payments associated 
with borrowing. Interestingly, firms disclosing their forecast are not willing to disclose the 
underlying assumptions on which the forecast is based. Fewer than half of the firms offering 
a forecast have explained the circumstances supporting their forecasts. 
 
Other useful strategic information 
 
This category only has one disclosure item, which is designed to capture any strategy-related 
information not covered by other disclosure categories. For example, one firm discloses the 
224 
 
potential risk that the firm would be delisted from the Shanghai Stock Exchange in the near 
future due to consecutive losses made in the past. This category presents a clear trend of 
decline in voluntary disclosure, with the mean of disclosure reduced from 0.083 in Phase I, to 
0.051 in Phase II and 0.001 in Phase III. The explanation could be that more strategic 
information is voluntarily disclosed in Phase II and Phase I, leaving fewer disclosures under 
the other useful strategic information category. 
 
In the analysis of the disclosing firms over the three phases of the Chinese stock market, the 
mean disclosure scores of each disclosure category, and each specific disclosure item under 
the Strategic Information section, show the level of voluntary disclosure increases over the 
three testing phases. These results lend support to H1. By comparing five voluntary 
disclosure categories and the individual disclosure items under each category, it is not 
difficult to identify what strategic information listed firms prefer to disclose voluntarily. 
Items include new development, future strategy, review of operations, change in sales/profit, 
change in market share, and forecast of sales/profit experience in the relatively strong 
increases in voluntary disclosure over time. It is also worthwhile to note that significant 
increments in the level of voluntary disclosure occurred in Phase II, which includes the 1999-
2002 reporting periods. 
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Table 7.1 Number of firms voluntarily disclosing strategic information 
 
 
Testing 
Phase 
 
Year 
No. of  
disclosing firms 
Percentage (%) 
(=No. of disclosing firms/297 sample firms) 
Average disclosing firms 
per period (%) 
Phase I 
1995   14   5 
116 (39) 
1996 110 37 
1997 135 45 
1998 206 69 
Phase II 
1999 228 76 
250 (84) 
2000 235 79 
2001 266 89 
2002 268 90 
Phase III 
2003 269 91 
271 (91) 
2004 270 91 
2005 271 91 
2006 272 92 
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Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of strategic information disclosure categories in the three testing phases 
 
 
  
Phase I 
 
Phase II Phase III 
 
Category 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
General 
corporate 
information 
0.009 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.043 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.066 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.289 
Corporate 
strategy 0.066 4.000 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.444 5.000 1.000 0.000 0.741 0.983 6.000 2.000 0.000 1.292 
Management 
discussion 
and analysis 
0.394 4.000 1.000 0.000 0.654 1.141 7.000 2.000 1.000 1.025 1.697 7.000 3.000 2.000 1.349 
Future 
prospects 0.101 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.323 0.546 4.000 1.000 0.000 0.803 1.189 8.000 2.000 1.000 1.528 
Other useful 
strategic 
information 
0.083 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.288 0.051 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.222 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 
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Table 7.3 Mean disclosure scores of strategic information disclosure items in the three testing phases 
 
 
Disclosure category 
 
Disclosure item Phase I Phase II Phase III 
General corporate information Brief history of company 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Organizational structure or chart 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  General description of business activities 0.000 0.500 1.000 
  Principal products 2.000 4.500 7.000 
  Principal market 0.750 7.750 11.75 
Corporate strategy Statement of corporate goals or objectives 1.500 3.750 4.250 
  Current strategy 2.250 31.25 69.75 
  Impact of strategy on current results 1.500 6.000 9.750 
  Future strategy 13.25 84.50 193.8 
  Impact of strategy on future results 1.250 6.250 14.50 
Management discussion and analysis Review of operations 23.25 78.50 135.8 
  Competitive environment 11.25 42.50 71.25 
  Significant events of the year 9.250 29.25 47.25 
  Change in sales/profit 36.25 87.00 107.8 
  Change in expenses 7.500 18.75 26.00 
  Change in inventory 4.000 11.25 17.75 
  Change in market share 25.50 71.50 98.25 
Future prospects New development 27.25 87.50 195.5 
  Forecast of sales/profit 2.000 53.75 117.8 
  Assumptions underlying the forecast 0.750 21.00 40.00 
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7.2.2 Financial information 
7.2.2.1 Number of disclosing firms 
 
Table 7.4 reports the number of firms disclosing financial information in each individual 
reporting year throughout 1995–2006, and during the three phases. It reports a progressive 
increase in the number of firms making voluntary financial information disclosures. During 
Phase I, the number of disclosing firms increased from zero in 1995, to 40 (13%) in 1996 and 
104 (35%) in 1997, but decreased to 88 (30%) in 1998. The average number of disclosing 
firms in this period is 58, representing 20% of total sample firms. During Phase II, the 
reported number of firms disclosing financial information changed from 102 (34%) in 1999, 
to 113 (38%) in 2000, and from 136 (46%) to 145 (49%) in 2002. The average number of 
disclosing firms during this period is 124, representing 42% of the sample firms. In Phase III, 
the number of disclosing firms has slightly increased from 146 (49%) in 2003, to 149 (50%) 
in 2004, and from 154 (52%) in 2005 to 157 (53%) in 2006. The average number of 
disclosing firms in Phase III is 152, representing 51% of the sample firms. These results show 
that over the 1995-2006 period, there has been a gradual increase in the total number of firms 
disclosing financial information. Similar to the number of firms disclosing strategic 
information, Phase II also sees a significant increase. The average number of disclosing firms 
in Phase II is double the number of disclosing firms in the first tests. Phase III sees a slight 
increase, compared to Phase II. 
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7.2.2.2 Descriptive statistics of financial information categories 
 
Table 7.5 reports the descriptive statistics of six disclosure categories under the financial 
information section. A comparison of six disclosure categories shows the Foreign Currency 
Information category has the highest voluntary disclosure, with mean VDS changes from 
0.17 in Phase I, to 0.34 for both Phases II and III. Following the Foreign Currency 
Information category is Projected Information, with mean disclosure score increases from 
0.032 in Phase I, to 0.16 in Phase II and 0.29 in Phase III. This category also has the highest 
maximum score of disclosure (5) under the financial information section. The mean VDS of 
the Financial Review category and Other Useful Financial Information sit in the middle of the 
financial information section. The Performance Indicator category is found to be the second 
lowest voluntary disclosure, with disclosure scores changing slightly from 0.01 in Phase I, to 
0.05 and 0.07 in Phase II and Phase III, respectively. The mean VDS of Stock Price 
Information category shows that sample firms are not willing to disclose information related 
to the stock price trend and market capitalization. 
 
7.2.2.3 Content of financial information disclosure 
 
Table 7.6 reports the mean VDS of each financial information disclosure item during the 
three testing phases. The primary purpose of this analysis is to determine listed firms’ 
preferences when they voluntarily disclose their financial performance and financial position. 
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Performance indicators (not from financial statements) 
 
Several important financial performance ratios and historical figures constitute this disclosure 
category. Very little voluntary disclosure is found describing or comparing firms’ historical 
performance over the past five years or more. Only one firm from the sample is found 
offering the past five years’ comparative information, and three firms from the sample are 
found disclosing the past three years’ financial performance indicators in both Phase II and 
Phase III. The majority of listed firms provide the previous financial year’s comparative 
information. The order of the mean VDS of the four financial performance ratio disclosures, 
from highest to lowest, is: liquidity ratios, cash flow ratios, profitability ratio and gearing 
ratios. 
 
Financial review 
 
There are two items under this category, disclosure of intangible assets and dividend payout 
policy. The mean VDS of Disclosure of Intangible Assets shows that sample firms 
voluntarily disclose information related to firms’ initial recognition and subsequent 
measurements of their goodwill, trademarks and brands across the three testing phases. 
However, the mean VDS increases from 29.75 in Phase I to 34.50 in Phase II, but reduces to 
30.25 in Phase III. In respect of intangible asset impairment, sample firms disclose 
impairment according to the mandatory requirements of the Chinese Accounting Standard, 
and there is no discussion of the indicators of asset impairment and circumstances 
surrounding the impairment decisions. Information which is more relevant to investment 
decision-making, such as fair value of intangible assets, cannot be found in annual reports. 
Although goodwill is recognized in financial statements, there is a lack of explanation of the 
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goodwill associated with business acquisitions. The mean VDS of Dividend Payout Policy 
are 2, 3.75 and 3 for the three testing phases, respectively; showing that voluntary disclosure 
in this area is much lower than firms’ disclosure of intangible asset-related information. 
 
Projected information 
 
This category addresses cash flow forecasts, capital expenditure and/or R&D expenditure 
forecasts and earnings forecasts. Strong voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts is 
consistent with the strong disclosure of forecast sales/profit under the strategic information 
section. The mean VDS of earning forecasts is increased significantly from 3.3 in Phase I and 
18.5 in Phase II, to 55.25 in Phase III. Some sample firms discuss projected three-year 
earnings growth; however, there is no comparison with peers in the same industry. Voluntary 
disclosure of cash flow forecasts involves in-depth discussion of actions taken by sample 
firms to collect outstanding debts, and disclosure of heavy interest payments on loans. One of 
the issues commonly mentioned in annual reports is the difficulty they have experienced in 
collecting outstanding debts. This reflects the cash flow liquidity problem found by listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market. A gradually increasing mean VDS for capital expenditure 
and/or R&D expenditure forecasts reflects the view that capital expenditure and R&D 
expenditure are important factors contributing to firms’ long-term success. 
 
Foreign currency information 
 
This category covers the impact of foreign exchange fluctuations on current results, foreign 
currency exposure management descriptions and major exchange rates used in the accounts. 
Strong voluntary disclosure in this category reflects the interactions between listed firms in 
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China and their overseas counterparts as a result of the Open Door policy implemented by the 
Chinese government. Voluntary disclosure of the impact of foreign exchange fluctuations on 
current results has the highest mean disclosure score in the three phases, followed by the 
major exchange rates used in the accounts. Foreign currency exposure management, however, 
is relatively low, with mean VDS increased from 4 in Phase I, to 8.8 in Phase II and 17.8 in 
Phase III. Low disclosure reflects the lack of risk management associated with foreign 
exchange rate fluctuations among Chinese listed firms. 
 
Stock price information 
 
This category includes market capitalization at year end, market capitalization trends, size of 
shareholdings and type of shareholder. There is no voluntary disclosure for the whole 
disclosure category in Phase I. Voluntary disclosures of the size of shareholdings and type of 
shareholders are only found during Phase III, with the mean VDSs being 0.75 and 1.25, 
respectively. Mean VDS of market capitalization at year end and market capitalization trends 
during Phase II are 0.75 and 0.5, respectively. During Phase III, the mean VDS of market 
capitalization trends remains the same, while the mean VDS of market capitalization at year 
end increases to 2 in Phase III. 
 
Other useful financial information 
 
The Other Useful Financial Information category only includes one item, which is designed 
to capture the information related to the financial performance of sample firms that is not 
included in other disclosure categories. Examples of Other Useful Financial Information 
disclosure are majority shareholders’ occupation of listed firms’ funds, weak earning capacity 
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of low quality assets, contingent liabilities related to lawsuits, related party transactions and 
severe cash flow problems of large customers. The mean disclosure scores (0.14 for Phase I, 
0.06 in Phase II and 0.13 in Phase III) did not reflect any typical trend of this 
category/disclosure item. 
 
In summary, the discussion of the number of firms disclosing financial information, the 
descriptive statistics and the main content of each voluntary disclosure category under the 
financial information section, show that voluntary disclosure of financial information has 
increased gradually over the years. These results also support H1. Firms give preference to 
foreign-currency-related information and forward-looking information disclosures, including 
cash flow forecasts and earnings forecasts. Stock-price-related information has a low mean 
VDS across the three testing phases. 
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Table 7.4 Number of firms voluntarily disclosing financial information 
 
 
Testing 
Phase 
 
Year 
No. of  
disclosing firms 
Percentage (%) 
(=No. of disclosing firm/297 sample firms) 
Average disclosing firms 
per period (%) 
Phase I 
1995     0   0 
58 (20) 
1996   40 13 
1997 104 35 
1998   88 30 
Phase II 
1999 102 34 
124 (42) 
2000 113 38 
2001 136 46 
2002 145 49 
Phase III 
2003 146 49 
152 (51) 
2004 149 50 
2005 154 52 
2006 157 53 
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Table 7.5 Descriptive statistics of financial information disclosure categories in the three testing phases 
 
 
  
Phase I 
 
Phase II Phase III 
 
Category 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Max, 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
Performance 
indicators 0.008 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.087 0.045 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.244 0.071 4.000 0.000 0.000 0.402 
Financial 
review 0.107 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.309 0.129 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.112 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.318 
Projected 
information 0.032 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.189 0.163 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.435 0.299 5.000 1.000 0.000 0.735 
Foreign 
currency 
information 
0.173 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.457 0.338 3.000 1.000 0.000 0.662 0.338 4.000 1.000 0.000 0.730 
Stock 
price 
information 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.087 0.015 4.000 1.000 0.000 0.196 
Other useful 
financial 
information 
0.014 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.119 0.055 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.265 0.126 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.504 
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Table 7.6 Mean disclosure scores of financial information disclosure items in the three testing phases 
 
 
Disclosure category 
 
Disclosure item Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Performance indicators Historical figures for last five years or more 0.000 1.000 1.000 
  Profitability ratios 0.750 2.000 4.000 
  Cash flow ratios 0.750 4.250 6.000 
  Liquidity ratios 0.500 4.500 7.250 
  Gearing ratios 0.250 1.500 2.750 
Financial review Disclosure of intangible assets 29.75 34.50 30.25 
  Dividend payout policy 2.000 3.750 3.000 
Projected information Cash flow forecast 2.250 13.50 21.50 
  Capital expenditure and/or R&D expenditure forecast 4.000 16.50 28.75 
  Earnings forecast 3.250 18.50 55.25 
Foreign currency information Impact of foreign exchange fluctuation on current results 36.75 64.25 55.25 
  Foreign currency exposure management description 4.000 8.750 17.75 
  Major exchange rates used in the accounts 10.50 27.50 27.25 
Stock market information Market capitalization at year end 0.000 0.750 2.000 
  Market capitalization trend 0.000 0.500 0.500 
  Size of shareholdings 0.000 0.000 0.750 
  Type of shareholder 0.000 0.000 1.250 
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7.2.3 Non-financial information 
7.2.3.1 Number of disclosing firms 
 
Table 7.7 reports the number of firms which disclose non-financial information in each 
individual reporting year throughout 1995–2006 and the three testing phases. It reports a 
progressive increase in the number of firms making voluntary non-financial information 
disclosures over 1995-2004, and a slight decrease over the period of 2005-2006. During 
Phase I, the number of disclosing firms has increased from 4 (1%) in 1995, to 55 (19%) in 
1996, and from 61 (21%) to 77 (26%) in 1998. The average number of disclosing firms in 
this period is 49, representing 17% of total sample firms. A significant increase in the number 
of firms disclosing non-financial information can be observed in 1996. During the second 
testing phase, the reported number of firms disclosing non-financial information slightly 
increased from 91 (31%) in 1999, to 99 (33%) in 2000, and from 106 (36%) to 107 (36%) in 
2002. The average number of disclosing firms during this period is 101, representing 34% of 
the sample firms. No significant change in the number of disclosing firms can be observed in 
Phase III. The number of disclosing firms remained at 106 (36%) in both 2003 and 2004, 
reduced to 103 (35%) in 2005, and to 100 (34%) in 2006. The average number of disclosing 
firms for Phase III is 104, representing 35% of sample firms. These results show that over the 
1995-2006 period, there was a gradual increase in the total number of disclosing firms 
disclosing non-financial information. Compared to the average number of disclosing firms in 
Phase I (49), Phase II sees a significant increase. The average number of disclosing firms 
(101) is double the number of disclosing firms in the first phase. The third period sees a slight 
increase in respect of the average number of firms disclosing non-financial information. 
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7.2.3.2 Descriptive statistics of non-financial information disclosure 
 
Table 7.8 details the main descriptive statistics of four voluntary disclosure categories under 
non-financial information over the three testing phases. The Social Policy category achieves 
the highest voluntary disclosure. However, with the mean disclosure score increasing from 
0.25 in Phase I to 0.32 in Phase II, but decreasing to 0.23 in Phase III, there is no established 
general trend of voluntary disclosure in respect of social policy. Following Social Policy is 
Employee Information, with the mean disclosure score changing from 0.06 in Phase I, to 0.09 
in Phase II and 0.22 in Phase III. The second lowest mean disclosure score is observed for 
Information about Directors category, while Other Useful Non-financial Information has the 
lowest mean VDS among the four disclosure categories. 
 
7.2.3.3 Content of non-financial information disclosure 
 
The mean VDSs of each disclosure item under the non-financial information section are 
reported in Table 7.9. The comparison and analysis of these disclosure items allow for 
identification of sample firms’ preference when disclosing non-financial information. 
 
Information about directors 
 
Information about the director category consists of two disclosure items, commercial 
experience of the executive directors and other directorships held by executive directors. The 
mean VDS of CEO duality shows that there is no voluntary disclosure of CEO duality in 
Phase I. In Phase II, the mean VDS are 14 and increases to 16.5 in Phase III. Although there 
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was a gradual increase, these results show voluntary disclosure of CEO duality was relatively 
low throughout the entire testing period. The voluntary disclosure of commercial experience 
of CEOs does not show any consistency. The mean VDS of the commercial experience of 
executive directors increase from 4.75 in Phase I, to 10.5 in Phase II and reduce to only 3 in 
Phase III. 
 
Employee information 
 
The seven disclosure items under this category can be combined into three groups: employee 
training-related, safety-related and redundancy-related. The mean VDSs of the three phases 
show that all three groups experience low voluntary disclosure in Phase I, increased 
disclosure in Phase II and a decline of voluntary disclosure in Phase III. The employee 
training-related group has the strongest increase over Phase I and Phase II. The mean VDS of 
the nature of training increased from 5.5 in Phase I to 10.5 in Phase II. Together with the 
amount spent on training, categories of employees trained and number of employees trained, 
the increased disclosures in this area indicate that listed firms wish to signal to investors the 
skills and knowledge of their employees and, accordingly, the better quality of their 
workforce. Disclosures of redundancy among listed firms reflect the loss of job security in 
Chinese society since the economic reforms. The employee safety-related area has the lowest 
mean VDS under the Employee Information category. 
 
Social policy 
 
This category covers four disclosure items, namely, safety of products, environmental 
protection programs, charitable donations and community programs. Both the safety of 
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products and charitable donations show strong voluntary disclosures over the years, with their 
mean VDS ranging between 25 and 45. Firms list various awards granted by state or local 
government for good quality products or contributions made to the community. Many 
disclosing firms used the ISO certification26  to represent the quality and safety of their 
products. Charitable donations reflect firms’ commitment to Chinese society. Strong 
voluntary disclosure in this area shows listed firms’ interest in developing a good reputation 
in society. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that the voluntary disclosure of environmental protection programs 
achieves a relatively low mean VDS throughout the three phases, with 2.5 in Phase I, and 7 
for both Phase II and Phase III. Only a few firms discuss briefly the actions taken to reduce 
environmental pollution. This result supports the research findings of Guo (2005). Listed 
firms in China have not established the awareness that to be a good “corporate citizen”, 
enterprises should take social responsibility and leadership in environmental protection. 
 
Other useful non-financial information 
 
The Other Useful Non-financial Information category/item is designed to capture relevant 
and useful information which is not covered by other categories in the Non-financial 
Information section. This category demonstrates unstable movements over the years, with the 
mean VDS being 1 in both Phase I and Phase III, and no disclosure in Phase II. A possible 
reason is that other disclosure items and categories have comprehensively covered most of 
the non-financial information disclosures. Examples of other useful non-financial information 
                                                      
26 China is a member of ISO (International Organization for Standardization). The ISO is the world's largest 
developer and publisher of International Standards. 
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include the warnings and sanctions imposed by the CSRC during the year regarding 
misleading information disclosure, and the detailed compensation schemes of CEOs. 
 
In summary, it is difficult to identify a general trend for the level of voluntary disclosure of 
non-financial information because of some unstable movements in the number of firms 
voluntarily disclosing non-financial information, and the extent of voluntary disclosures. The 
result in this section does not support H1. Firms’ preference in voluntary disclosure, however, 
can still be identified. Listed firms prefer to disclose voluntarily to investors, information 
related to the safety of their products and their donations to society. Information related to 
employee, directors and environmental protection all have a relatively low mean VDS. 
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Table 7.7 Number of firms voluntarily disclosing non-financial information 
 
 
Testing 
phase 
 
Year 
No. of  
disclosing firms 
Percentage (%) 
(=No. of disclosing firms/297 sample firms) 
Average disclosing firms 
per period (%) 
Phase I 
1995     4   1 
49 (17) 
1996   55 19 
1997   61 21 
1998   77 26 
Phase II 
1999   91 31 
101 (34) 
2000   99 33 
2001 106 36 
2002 107 36 
Phase III 
2003 106 36 
104 (35) 
2004 106 36 
2005 103 35 
2006 100 34 
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Table 7.8 Descriptive statistics of non-financial information disclosure categories in the three testing phases 
 
 
  
Phase I 
 
Phase II Phase III 
 
Category 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Mean 
 
Max. 
 
Q3 
 
Median
Std. 
Dev. 
Information 
about 
directors 
0.016 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.126 0.083 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.293 0.066 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.282 
Employee 
information 0.058 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.251 0.088 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.315 0.022 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.168 
Social 
policy 0.247 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.462 0.323 3.000 1.000 0.000 0.543 0.227 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.493 
Other 
useful non-
financial 
information 
0.002 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 7.9 Mean disclosure scores of non-financial information disclosure items in the three testing phases 
 
 
Disclosure category 
 
Disclosure item Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Information about directors Commercial experience of CEOs 4.750 10.50 3.000 
  Other directorships held by CEOs 0.000 14.00 16.50 
Employee information  Amount spent on training 2.000 2.500 1.000 
  Nature of training 5.500 10.50 2.000 
  Categories of employees trained 1.250 1.250 1.50 
  Number of employees trained 0.250 0.750 0.000 
  Data on accidents 0.750 2.500 1.250 
  Cost of safety measures 0.250 0.250 0.000 
  Redundancy information 7.250 8.500 0.750 
Social policy Safety of products 33.25 45.00 36.75 
  Environmental protection programs 2.500 7.000 7.000 
  Charitable donations 36.75 44.00 25.25 
  Community program 1.000 0.000 1.000 
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7.2.4 Summary of the three information disclosure sections 
 
This section combines and compares the levels of disclosure of the three information 
sections. Table 7.10 sets out the changes of the three information disclosure sections in the 
three testing phases. It is interesting to note that among the three sections of voluntary 
disclosure, strategic information disclosure achieves the highest mean voluntary disclosure 
score in each individual testing phase, followed by the financial information section, and this 
leaves the non-financial information section having the lowest mean disclosure scores. The 
mean disclosure score achieved by the sample firms in disclosing strategic information is 
increased significantly from 0.65 in Phase I, to 2.44 in Phase II and 3.94 in Phase III. The 
voluntary disclosure score for financial information also increases over the entire testing 
period; however, the increment is not as significant as that seen in the strategic information 
section. The mean disclosure score of the sample firms changed from 0.33 in Phase I, to 0.76 
in Phase II and 0.96 in Phase III. The non-financial information section experienced slow 
growth in voluntary disclosure. The mean disclosure scores for non-financial information 
disclosure achieved by sample firms are 0.07, 0.21 and 0.14, respectively, in the three testing 
phases. The results do not show a general trend of increased voluntary disclosure of non-
financial information in the three testing phases. 
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Table 7.10 Descriptive statistics of the three information sections in the three testing phases 
Testing phase Disclosure section Mean Max. Q3 Median 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Phase I 
Strategic information 
 0.653 6.000 1.000 0.000 0.917 
Financial information 
 0.334 3.000 1.000 0.000 0.659 
Non-financial information 
 0.076 3.000 0.000 0.000 0.292 
Phase II 
Strategic information 
 2.436 10.00 4.000 2.000 1.807 
Financial information 
 0.761 5.000 1.000 0.000 0.991 
Non-financial information 
 0.210 4.000 0.000 0.000 0.583 
Phase III 
Strategic information 
 3.937 14.00 5.000 4.000 2.409 
Financial information 
 0.961 6.000 2.000 0.000 1.256 
Non-financial information 
 0.143 4.000 0.000 0.000 0.544 
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7.3 Characteristics of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock 
market 
 
The description of the results of each of the three voluntary disclosure sections in this 
chapter, and the comparison of the three voluntary disclosure sections, suggest that listed 
firms’ voluntary disclosure behaviors in the Chinese stock market exhibit three 
characteristics. First, there is a significant increase of voluntary disclosure in both the number 
of disclosing firms and the extent of voluntary disclosure during Phase II. Second, listed 
firms are selective with their voluntary disclosure. Third, the level of forward-looking 
information disclosure is significantly higher than for other types of information disclosure. 
 
7.3.1 Significant increase in voluntary disclosure during 1999-2002 
 
Table 7.11 reports the descriptive statistics on the comparison of disclosure categories 
between Phase I and Phase II, and Phase II and Phase III. The comparison of the mean VDS 
of disclosure categories between Phase I and Phase II shows that the p values of corporate 
strategy, management analysis and discussion, future prospects and projected information are 
all significant at 1 percent level, meaning that the mean VDS of these disclosure categories in 
Phase II is increased significantly when compared with Phase I. The p value of the total 
combined disclosure categories is also significant at 1 percent level, meaning that, overall, the 
VDS increased significantly from Phase I to Phase II. Comparing Phase II and Phase III, 
there is no significant increase in Phase III. Therefore, in the three testing phases, it can be 
concluded that there is a significant increase in voluntary disclosure during Phase II which 
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includes the 1999-2002 financial years. Comparing to Phase II, Phase III (2003-2006) 
represents a more established phase of the Chinese stock market. Firms made voluntary 
disclosure in Phase II continued their practices in Phase III. However, the increment of 
voluntary disclosure is not as high as the increment observed in Phase II.  
 
The economic environment of the Chinese stock market during Phase II is marked by further 
globalization of China’s economy, the MOF’s step forward in harmonizing China’s GAAP 
with international accounting standards, several high-profile financial scandals in the Chinese 
stock market, CSRC’s actions in stipulating investor protection regulations, and the 
strengthening of their enforcement. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 signals China’s 
participation in economic globalization at a higher level and with a wider scope. It enables 
the Chinese enterprises to be involved in greater and deeper cooperation and competition in 
the global market. However, as China moved to meet its commitments under the Protocol on 
Accession, systemic reforms and substantial changes to trade-related laws and regulations that 
are inconsistent with WTO rules had been put in place (Shi, 2001). Since 2001, China has 
made remarkable progress in opening its economy, welcoming imports and inviting foreign 
investment. Some of the regulations implemented soon after China’s accession to the WTO 
were driven by “the authorities’” desire to deepen the economic reform and have created an 
even more attractive business environment for foreign investments. 
 
As an emerging economy, China not only made great commitments to opening up its stock 
market upon its entry into the WTO, but also fulfilled those commitments. Since 2002, the 
Chinese government has promulgated a series of regulations, aiming to relax the restrictions 
against foreign trade and investment. As a result, by 2006, foreign institutional investors 
owned equity valued at about 3 billion US dollars in 214 listed firms, becoming the second 
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largest investor group in the Chinese currency-dominated share markets (CSRC, 2007). In 
line with a more open stock market are the higher expectations of quality financial 
information. The accession to the WTO also demanded a significant improvement in business 
transparency in China. The harmonization of the Chinese financial accounting system with 
internationally accepted practices resulted in the issuance of a series of Chinese Accounting 
Standards between 1997 and 2003, and the promulgation of the Accounting System for 
Business Enterprises (The System) in 2001 by the MOF. It is anticipated that effective 
application of the new accounting system and accounting standards, which are based on 
international norms, will serve as a catalyst for better quality accounting information in the 
Chinese stock market (Zhang, 2005). 
 
Phase II also witnesses the changing role of one of the main stakeholders of listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market, namely, the regulatory agency group. The 1998 Securities Law 
empowers the CSRC as the overall regulator of the Chinese stock market. Between 1999 and 
2002, the CSRC accomplished its changing role, from its initial function of undertaking some 
administrative roles, including approving the listing and transferring of non-tradable shares  
among institutional investors, to regulating listed companies’ information disclosure and 
fostering good corporate governance. The CSRC sees itself as a pro-active regulator in 
fostering corporate governance, in enforcing rules, in safeguarding the integrity of the 
Chinese stock market, and in championing the rights of public investors (Tomasic and 
Andrews, 2007). The CSRC also implements some important strategies to promote corporate 
governance among Chinese listed firms. In early 2001, the CSRC declared a “year of market 
supervision”. During the same year, the CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies in China and the Notice of Establishing an Independent Directors System 
250 
 
in Listed Firms. The primary aim of these initiatives was to increase transparency and 
enhance the credibility of financial statements. 
 
The investment community has also started to create a demand for transparency of corporate 
disclosure. As the main stakeholder of listed firms, public shareholders play a role in 
imposing the “norm” of transparent corporate disclosure. By using legal mechanisms, 
investors start to seek compensation from companies for their financial losses due to 
misleading disclosure or non-disclosure of information. The success of the first civil 
compensation case due to fraudulent financial information in China in November 2002, 
signals that public investors have built up a sense of fairness, and know how to use legal 
proceedings to protect their own interest. The case also reflects the change of government 
authority and regulatory agencies’ attitudes in respect of further strengthening the legal 
enforcement of various regulations among listed firms. 
 
Deegan (2006) suggests that as the level of stakeholder power increases, the importance of 
meeting stakeholder demands increases. In the Chinese stock market, especially during Phase 
II, there are significant increases in stakeholders’ power, represented by action on the part of 
the regulatory agencies and the investment community. Both have demanded transparency in 
information disclosure by listed firms. Increased voluntary disclosure during this period of 
time could be regarded as one way that listed firms in the Chinese stock market responded 
positively to the changed disclosure environment and management of stakeholder salience. 
 
7.3.2 Selective information disclosure 
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The comparison between the three information disclosure sections in Table 7.10 indicates 
clearly that, despite the increase in the quantity of information disclosed overall, listed firms 
in the Chinese stock market are selective in choosing the information to disclose. Voluntary 
disclosure of strategic information is much higher than the disclosure of financial information 
and non-financial information. The mean disclosure score of strategic information disclosure 
for the entire testing period reached 7.03, while the average scores of financial information 
and non-financial information are only 2.06 and 0.43, respectively. 
 
Table 7.12 further reports the comparison of sensitive information and non-sensitive 
information by using the T test. Fifty checklist items are divided into two groups: a sensitive 
information group and a non-sensitive information group. There are nine items that can be 
classified in the sensitive information group and they are: dividend payout policy, foreign 
currency exposure management description, market capitalization at year end, market 
capitalization trend, CEO’s commercial experience, CEO duality, data on accidents, cost of 
safety measures, and redundancy information. In the T test, these items are coded as 1 
whereas other items are coded as zero. The results show the F test of equal variances is 
significant; therefore, the unequal variance t value, 2.45, is the appropriate value to use. The 
mean VDS of the non-sensitive information group are 78, while the mean VDS of the 
sensitive information group are only 24. The p value is significant at 1 percent level, meaning 
the mean VDS of the sensitive information group are significantly lower than that for the 
non-sensitive information group. 
 
These results indicate clearly that listed firms in the Chinese stock market feel more 
comfortable disclosing information on their operational areas, such as changes in sales/profit, 
expenses, inventory levels and market share. Firms are also keen to disclose their future 
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strategy, new projects or products under development, and their forecast of earnings for the 
near future. On the other hand, firms choose not to disclose more sensitive information, such 
as CEO duality and data on accidents. Information such as stock price performance, market 
capitalization at year end or market capitalization trends are rarely discussed by the majority 
of listed sample firms, although some firms disclosed their size of shareholdings and type of 
shareholders. It is interesting to note that no information on year end stock price was 
voluntarily disclosed until 2001. A low level of voluntary disclosure is consistent with the 
research finding of Liu (2005) that listed firms do not disclose sensitive information such as 
year-end share price and share price trends. 
 
In respect of corporate governance disclosure, the voluntary disclosure of CEO’s commercial 
experience is only significantly higher in Phase II, with a mean VDS of 10.5, compared to 
4.75 and 3 in Phase I and Phase III, respectively. The disclosure of the commercial 
experience of CEOs is relevant to investors because commercial experience can be used as 
one of the benchmarks to assess the quality of firms’ senior management. In the early stage of 
corporatization of SOEs, the senior managers, the board and supervisory committee members 
were CCP party officials without any commercial experience (Xu and Wang, 1999). The 
appointment of non-commercially experienced CEOs of listed firms was caused by the 
majority holdings by the state. Tam (1995) conducted a survey which confirmed that nearly 
54% of board vice-chairmen in listed firms in the Chinese stock market were members of the 
CCP committee. Tam (1995) also suggests a high percentage of CCP members on boards 
reflect the nature of the continuing bureaucratic power of the administrators and the CCP 
members. The CSRC suggests the selection of management personnel of listed firms should 
be carried out in a fair and transparent manner. The nominated candidates should possess 
relevant professional knowledge and the capacity to make good business decisions. A 
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significant increase in voluntary disclosure in this area during Phase II reflects the listed 
firms’ realization of how value-relevant the commercial experience of CEOs is to investors. 
 
The sample firms start to disclose their CEO duality from Phase II. CEO duality is another 
main corporate governance issue among Chinese listed firms, as Tam (1995) and Firth et al. 
(2007) point out. CEO duality has impacted on the effectiveness of a board in its various 
functions as it undermines the board’s independent ability to oversee the senior managers. 
The board’s role as an effective guardian of stockholders’ interests in the system of corporate 
governance may also be jeopardized. It has been argued that separating the two roles allows 
the development of initiatives, innovation and more effective leadership of the firm (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The survey conducted in China by Tam (1995) revealed 60% of board 
chairmen among listed firms were also the CEOs of firms, and 25% of vice-chairmen were 
either CEOs or Deputy CEOs. This issue is significant enough to attract the regulatory body’s 
attention. In 2001, the CSRC recommended that listed firms separate the roles of CEO and 
chairman. Xiao and Yuan (2007) showed that in 2002, there was only 11% CEO duality 
among the 559 listed firms investigated in their study. The disclosure of CEO duality in 
Phase II and Phase III could be seen as firms’ responses to the CSRC’s pressure during this 
period of time. 
 
Low voluntary disclosure of environmental-protection-related information among the sample 
firms provides further support for the research findings of Guo (2005). As Guo (2005) 
suggested, corporate environmental reporting and disclosure is still in its initial stages in 
China, and is in need of further development in parallel with improvements in corporate 
governance and increasing public awareness about sustainable development. Although 
Chinese society can be thought of as a stakeholder of listed firms, it does not directly control 
254 
 
the financial resources of firms, except as investors and creditors. At this stage, the 
investment community is only profit-oriented. There is not much pressure exerted on listed 
firms to disclose environmental protection-related information. Therefore, the firms’ only 
priorities are operations and performance-related information disclosure. 
 
Selective information disclosure indicates that firms assess the power, legitimacy and 
urgency possessed by powerful stakeholders. To manage the relationship between firms and 
stakeholders effectively, the information demanded from the most powerful stakeholders is 
satisfied first. Investors and creditors have control over the financial resources of listed firms 
and they also have strong support from the regulatory agencies. Firms use financial 
information disclosure as a way of stakeholder salience. 
 
7.3.3 High level of forward-looking information disclosure 
 
As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, disclosure items, including future 
strategy, new developments, forecasts of sales/profit, current strategy and earnings forecasts, 
have all presented strong voluntary disclosures over the years. The results show that listed 
firms in the Chinese stock market give preference to forward-looking information disclosure. 
Hussainey (2004) classifies the information disclosed in annual reports into two categories, 
namely, backward-looking information and forward-looking information. Backward-looking 
disclosure is the class of information that refers to past financial results and their related 
disclosures. Forward-looking disclosure is the class of information that refers to current plans 
and future forecasts that enable investors and other users to assess a company's future 
financial performance. Such forward-looking disclosure involves financial forecasts such as 
next years’ products, strategies, plans, forecasted performance and the anticipated earnings, 
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revenues and cash flows. Forward-looking disclosure also involves risks and uncertainties 
that could significantly affect actual results and cause them to differ from projected results. 
Forward-looking information can normally be found from the Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports (Clarkson et al., 1994; Bryan, 1997). 
 
The result of Table 7.13 further confirms this disclosure characteristic. Table 7.13 compares 
forward-looking information and non-forward-looking information disclosure. Forward-
looking information items are coded as 1, while non-forward-looking information items are 
coded as zero in the T test. The forward-looking information classification in the T test 
follows Clarkson et al. (1994), Bryan (1997) and Kent and Ung (2003). The forward-looking 
information group includes a statement of corporate goals or objectives, current strategy, 
impact of strategy on current results, future strategy, impact of strategy on future results, 
review of operations, competitive environment, significant events of the year, changes in 
sales/profit, changes in expenses, changes in inventory, changes in market share, new 
development, forecasts of sales/profit, assumptions underlying the forecast, cash flow 
forecasts, capital expenditure and/or R&D expenditure forecasts and earnings forecasts. 
 
Given the F value is 6.25 and p value is less than 0.0001, it is appropriate to use the unequal 
variance t value, -4.78. The mean VDS of the forward-looking information group are 117, 
while the mean VDS of the non-forward-looking information are 24. The p value of unequal 
variances is 0.001, indicating the mean VDS of the forward disclosure group is significantly 
higher than the mean VDS of the non-forward-looking information group. The importance of 
forward-looking information for users of corporate financial information has been stressed by 
official pronouncements in the US and Canada. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in America encouraged firms to disclose voluntarily forward-looking information in 
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the early 1970s (Celik et al., 2006). In 1994, the Jenkins Committee Report issued by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) was regarded as a stronger 
impetus for the provision of forward-looking information. In the report called Improving 
Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary Disclosures, issued by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2001, forward-looking information was added as one 
of the business information voluntary disclosure categories. In the Management’s Discussion 
and Analysis: Guidance on Preparation and Disclosure issued in 2002, the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) called for descriptions of not only anticipated 
future events, decisions, circumstances, opportunities and risks that management considers 
likely to materially impact future prospects, but also matters such as management’s vision, 
strategy and key performance drivers. 
Several academic studies have looked at the benefits of forward-looking information and 
factors attributed to the level of forward-looking disclosure. Using 250 US firms as a sample, 
Bryan (1997) finds that indications of future operations and capital expenditures can assist 
users to assess firms’ short-term prospects. Clarkson et al. (1999) used firms listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange to investigate the usefulness of forward-looking information 
disclosed in the MD&A section in annual reports. They found further evidence that changes 
in the level of forward-looking information in the MD&A vary directly with future corporate 
performance. This suggests that forward-looking disclosures in the MD&A provide credible 
and relevant information. Schleicher and Walker (1999) used a sample of UK firms, 
providing evidence that forward-looking information disclosure is associated with a more 
accurate level of share price anticipation. In respect of factors influencing the decision of 
listed firms to disclose forward-looking information, Kent and Ung (2003) suggest that larger 
companies with less volatile earnings in Australia tend to provide more future earnings’ 
information than smaller companies with relatively volatile earnings. Celik et al. (2006) find 
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forward-looking information is positively related to firm size and foreign offers, and is 
negatively related to ownership structure and profitability. O’Sullivan et al. (2006) 
investigate the role played by a firm’s corporate governance framework in the decision to 
voluntarily disclose forward-looking information in published financial reports between 2000 
and 2002. They find corporate governance attributes, such as audit quality, board committees 
and the overall corporate governance system, all contribute to forward-looking information 
disclosure. 
In China, the forward-looking information is addressed by one of the most important 
regulations stipulated by the CSRC - The Standards of Contents and Formats of Information 
Disclosure by Public Issuing Companies. Under the 1999 version of this regulation, the 
CSRC only encouraged listed firms to disclose their operational plan in the next financial 
period, including progress to be made on new projects. Under the 2003 version, Article 39 
expands forward-looking information disclosure by stating that the board of directors of listed 
firms may disclose an annual business plan, including (but not limited to) income, cost and 
expenditure budget, new operational goals such as increasing sales, market share, reducing 
cost and budget for research and development expenditure. Firms that disclose the above 
information should also give information on strategies that need to be implemented and 
actions that will be taken in order to achieve the above goals. If listed firms wish to disclose 
the forecast for the next financial year’s profit, the forecast needs to be verified by their CPA 
firms. 
 
Although forward-looking information is not mandatorily required by the CSRC, the results 
in this study show listed firms actively respond to the CSRC’s calls for forward-looking 
information disclosure. The forward-looking information found from sample firms’ annual 
reports include forecasts of sales for the coming year, discussion of the growth opportunities 
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of major customers, next year’s targets for growth in revenue, projected cash flow, projected 
earnings, percentage growth goals for revenue, earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity 
(ROE). However, a common characteristic of the above disclosure is that listed firms prefer 
to disclose positive and qualitative forward-looking information, rather than negative and 
quantitative information. This result is similar to the findings of Kent and Ung (2003), which 
suggest most Australian companies do not provide quantitative earnings forecasts in annual 
reports. Although more than half of the firms under investigation disclose forward-looking 
information relating to future earnings, they do not specifically disclose point estimates for 
the future, and they mostly supply qualitative information with a positive bias. 
 
Forward-looking information reveals opinions and viewpoints about the operations of firms. 
Voluntarily disclosing forward-looking information in the Chinese stock market helps 
investors to understand managers’ views of a firm’s future and plans. As discussed in Chapter 
5, to legitimate their status in the Chinese stock market, listed firms need to acknowledge that 
investors have the right to get access to relevant information which enables them to make 
efficient decision-making in terms of how to allocate their financial resources. If listed firms 
identify the investment community and regulatory agencies as “powerful” stakeholders, who 
have power, legitimacy and urgency over their capital resources, they will employ 
information disclosure as a major element to manage the stakeholder salience, in order to 
gain the support and approval from powerful stakeholder groups. Disclosing more forward-
looking information among listed firms, therefore, provides further support to Hypothesis 1. 
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Table 7.11 Descriptive statistics on Phase I, Phase II and Phase III - comparisons of disclosure categories 
 
 
  
Comparisons between Phase I and Phase II 
 
 
Comparisons between Phase II and Phase III 
 
Category 
 
t-stat 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
 
t-stat 
p-value  
(two-tailed) 
GI 3.0 0.25 3.0 0.25 
CS 7.5   0.01* 7.5 0.06 
MA 4.0   0.01* 14 0.02 
FP 7.8   0.01* 7.0 0.05 
OUS 4.0 0.15 3.0 0.25 
PI 14 0.01 5.0 0.13 
FR 1.5 0.50 -1.5 0.50 
PRI 12   0.01* 3.0 0.25 
FC 3.0 0.25 -0.5 1.00 
ST 1.5 0.50 3.0 0.25 
OUF 4.0 0.15 4.0 0.15 
DIR 1.5 0.50 -0.5 1.00 
EI 7.5 0.06 -12                   0.05 
SP 4.0 0.25 -2.0 0.50 
OUN 1.5 0.50 -1.5 0.50 
TOTAL DISCLOSURE 39.5   0.01* 28.5 0.07 
 
*Significant at 1 % level 
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Table 7.12 Comparison of sensitive information and non-sensitive information 
 
 
Variable : mean of disclosure 
Sensitive information N Mean Std Dev Std Error Maximum  
0 41 78.28 92.65 16.64 310 
1 9 24.04 32.45 7.443 125 
Variances t-stat DF p-value   
Unequal 2.45 48.00 0.010   
Equal 2.98 40.50 0.005   
For H0: Variances are equal                      F = 8.15                     DF = (30, 18)            Pr> F = <0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.13 Comparison of forward-looking information and non-forward-looking information 
 
 
Variable : mean of disclosure 
Forward looking information N Mean Std Dev Std Error Maximum  
0 32 24.09 39.20 6.930 156 
1 18 117.4 98.01 23.10 310 
Variances t-stat DF p-value   
Unequal -4.78 48.00 0.001   
Equal -3.87 20.10 0.001   
For H0: Variances are equal           F = 6.25                                DF = (17, 31)            Pr> F = <0.0001 
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7.4 Factors affecting voluntary disclosure 
 
 
This section discusses factors influencing firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions. Regression 
models established in Chapter 6 are run to test whether factors developed in Chapter 5 have 
linear relationships with the level of voluntary disclosure. Before regression results are 
reported and discussed, the characteristics of each independent variable are examined and 
correlations between independent variables are discussed, in order to detect any highly 
correlated relationship. 
 
Here is the regression estimated in Chapter 6: 
  
VDS + itSTA1 + itLEG2 + itTRB4 + itBOD5 + itIAC6 + 
          itLEV7 + itPRO8 + itGRO9 + itAUD10 + itSIZE11 + itIND12 + it  
        (Equation 6.1) 
 
 
Where: 
VDS = voluntary disclosure score firm i in time t 
STA = percentage of state ownership for firm i in time t 
LEG = percentage of legal-person ownership for firm i in time t 
TRB = percentage of tradable share B ownership for firm i in time t 
BOD = percentage of independent directors on the board for firm i in time t 
IAC = dummy variable, coded as 1 if there is an internal audit committee for firm i in time t, 
0 otherwise 
LEV = a ratio of total liabilities to total assets for firm i in time t 
PRO = a ratio of return of shareholder’s equity for firm i in time t 
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GRO = a ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity for firm i in time t 
AUD = dummy variable, coded as 1 if the auditor for firm i in time t is an international 
auditor, 0 otherwise 
SIZE = logarithm of total assets for firm i in time t 
IND = dummy variable, coded as 1 if firm belongs to manufacturing industry for firm i in 
time t, 0 otherwise 
 
7.4.1 Independent variables and correlations 
7.4.1.1 Independent variables 
 
Table 7.14 reports descriptive statistics for variables included in the regression models. These 
variables can be classified into four groups. The Ownership Structure group includes state 
ownership, legal-person ownership, domestic public ownership and foreign ownership. The 
corporate governance related group has two variables: the proportion of independent directors 
on the board of directors and the audit committee (dummy variable). Economics-based group 
variables are leverage, profitability and growth opportunity. The external auditor group has 
only one dummy variable, namely, the type of external audit firm. 
 
In the Ownership structure group, the means (medians) of state ownership (STA) present a 
slow decrease over the testing period, changing from 30.47% (32.67%) of total shares issued 
by sample listed firms in 1995, to 27.48% (29.09%) in 2001, and 23.97% (24.13%) in 2006. 
However, the maximum state ownership in 2006 is still 83.75%, meaning that in some listed 
firms, state ownership is still significantly higher than other types of ownership. The same 
trend can be seen from the change of legal-personal ownership (LEG) as well. The mean 
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(median) of legal-person ownership decreased from 29.75% (21.8%) in 1995 to 27.89% 
(22.51%) in 2001 and 22% (15.28%) in 2006. Changes of state ownership and legal person 
ownership reflect ownership reform undertaken among listed firms in 2005. In April 2005, 
the Chinese government initiated an ownership reform program, aiming to eliminate various 
share ownership types and make all shares legally tradable A shares. By mid 2006, this 
conversion process covered 94% of listed firms (Jiang et al., 2008). Although domestic 
public ownership (TRA) is not part of the regression models, the descriptive statistics of this 
variable can also reflect the change of ownership structure among listed firms. Both public 
ownership and foreign ownership (TRB) present a gradual increase over the testing period. 
The mean (median) of public ownership increased from 30.08% (28.81%) in 1995, to 36.19% 
(36.8%) in 2001, and to 44.31% (45.65%) in 2006. Foreign ownership also increases over 
time, but at a slow pace. The mean is changed from 6.68% in 1995 to 8.11% in 2001 and 
8.56% in 2006. Maximum foreign ownership is increased from 49.79% in 1995 to 54.34% in 
2006. The increased tradable A shares and foreign ownership could be the result of the 
opening up of the A share market and B share market in 2001 and 2002. In 2001, domestic 
public investors could have B shares if they had a US dollar account. Since December 2002, 
foreign investors have been allowed to trade in A shares under the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) program. The change of ownership structure among sample 
firms over the testing period mirrors the ownership reform in the Chinese stock market in 
recent years. The direct result is that state ownerships (STA and LEG) experienced a gradual 
decrease, while public ownership (TRA and TRB) increased. 
 
There were no requirements for the composition of the board of directors among listed firms 
until the CSRC released the Notice of Establishing an Independent Directors System in Listed 
Firms in 2001, requiring listed firms’ boards to have at least one-third independent directors 
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by June 2003. Therefore, it is not surprising to see a low proportion of independent directors 
in boards of directors prior to 2003. Although the maximum of the proportion of independent 
directors (BOD) reached 33.33% during the 1995-1999 period, and increased to 40% during 
the 2000 to 2002 period, the mean of the proportion of independent directors is low, with the 
average less than 1% of independent directors in the board before 1999, and 2% independent 
directors in the board between 2000 and 2002. The mean of independent directors becomes 
32.02% in 2003 and increases to 32.09% between 2004 and 2006. It is interesting to note that 
the maximum of independent directors was 60% from 2003, meaning some listed firms have 
had more than half of the board composed of independent directors since the CSRC’s 
regulation was issued. Audit committees did not exist among sample firms until 2000, when 
only two firms were identified with an audit committee. Sixteen sample firms established 
audit committees by 2003, two years after the CSRC’s Code of Corporate Governance 
stipulation. By 2006, there were 34 audit committees in existence among the 297 sample 
firms. 
 
Among the economics-based variables, the average means of the sample firms’ leverage 
(LEV) are 0.46, 0.49 and 0.54 for the three phases, respectively, meaning listed firms in the 
Chinese stock market increased their borrowing relative to their assets to fund business 
operations over the testing period. Although average means of profitability (PRO) increase 
from 0.11 in Phase I, to 0.12 in Phase II and 0.16 in Phase III, the minimum profitability is 
negative across the entire testing period, with average minimum profitability being -6.4, -
10.14 and -10.29 for the three phases, respectively. This result shows that in every reporting 
period there are some firms among the sample with negative reported earnings. Growth 
opportunity (GRO) represents a firm’s future investment opportunities. The mean for this 
independent variable fails to show any stable trend. The average mean of growth opportunity 
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of the sample is 0.004 in Phase I, increasing to 0.008 in Phase II, and then decreasing to 
0.005 in Phase III. The results indicate that the market value of firms’ equity is much lower 
than firms’ book value of equity. Accordingly, the average future investment opportunity of 
sample firms is low. Maximum growth opportunities, however, show some sample firms 
have better investment opportunities by having higher growth opportunities, including 0.13 in 
2001, 0.32 in 2002, and 0.25 in 2003 and 0.45 in 2006. 
 
7.4.1.2 Correlation 
 
Table 7.15 reveals some significant correlations among the dependent and independent 
variables. These suggest that, potentially, some of the hypotheses established in Chapter 5 are 
supported. The total voluntary disclosure score (VDS) is significantly correlated to foreign 
ownership (TRB), the proportion of independent directors (BOD), the existence of an audit 
committee (IAC) and an international audit firm (AUD), size (SIZE) and industry 
classification (IND). Meanwhile, positive and negative correlations are shown between the 
independent variables. Size (SIZE) is positively correlated to the proportion of independent 
directors (BOD), foreign ownership (TRB), and the existence of an audit committee (IAC) 
and an international audit firm (AUD). An audit committee (IAC) is positively correlated to 
the proportion of independent directors (BOD). Growth opportunity (GRO) is positively 
correlated to profitability (PRO). A high correlation is found between State ownership and 
Legal-person ownership.  State ownership (STA) and legal-person ownership (LEG) are 
negatively and highly correlated (β = -0.79). 
 
Xu and Wang (1999) observe that including both state ownership and legal-person ownership 
in the same regression is problematic because these two variables are highly and negatively 
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correlated to each other. This view gains support from Jiang et al.’s (2008), study, which 
suggests state ownership and legal-person ownership have several commonalities, including 
neither is legally tradable and they are usually government owned27. A survey of disclosure 
studies focusing on the Chinese stock market shows research has adopted three different 
approaches in handling state ownership and legal ownership in regressions. Sun et al. (2002) 
include both variables in the same regression model. To avoid a potential multicolinearity 
problem, Xiao et al. (2004) include either state ownership or legal-person ownership in their 
regressions. Jiang et al. (2008) take the aggregation of the state share and legal person share 
proportions as the proxy for the government-owned share proportion. Given the high 
correlation between state ownership and legal-person ownership, this study follows the 
approach used by Xiao et al. (2004). OLS regressions are run with either state ownership or 
legal ownership. 
 
                                                      
27 Although legal-person shares are held by domestic institutions such as other stock firms, state-private mixed 
enterprises and non-bank financial institutions, government-related institutions owned at least 81.5% of total 
legal-person shares between 1991-2001 (Jiang et al., 2008). 
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Table 7.14 Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
 
 
Variable 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
STA                         
Mean 30.47 30.13 29.56 29.58 28.02 27.24 27.48 27.13 26.88 26.64 25.98 23.97 
Std. Dev. 26.61 25.94 25.42 25.17 24.80 24.65 24.49 24.31 24.17 23.95 23.21 21.86 
Max. 88.58 88.58 88.58 88.58 88.58 88.58 88.58 88.58 83.75 83.75 83.75 83.75 
Median 32.67 31.16 29.83 30.00 30.00 28.57 29.09 29.00 28.53 28.57 27.98 24.13 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LEG                         
Mean 29.75 29.57 29.17 28.27 29.48 29.45 27.89 27.91 27.93 27.81 26.81 22.00 
Std. Dev. 27.14 26.44 25.92 25.19 25.14 25.17 24.44 24.37 23.93 23.76 23.40 22.11 
Max. 91.32 91.32 91.32 91.32 91.32 91.32 91.32 91.32 86.37 84.83 84.83 77.77 
Median 21.80 22.20 22.20 22.20 23.99 25.30 22.51 22.51 23.38 23.38 21.86 15.28 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TRA                         
Mean 30.08 30.54 30.81 31.53 32.08 35.28 36.19 36.50 36.71 36.93 38.44 44.31 
Std. Dev. 18.33 18.48 18.62 18.66 18.72 19.32 19.43 19.38 19.45 19.52 20.11 21.66 
Max. 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Median 28.81 28.81 28.99 30.23 31.45 36.31 36.80 37.30 37.74 38.15 39.57 45.65 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Variable 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
TRB                         
Mean 6.68 7.32 7.39 7.63 7.61 7.57 8.11 8.12 8.14 8.23 8.43 8.56 
Std. Dev. 12.78 13.38 13.47 13.69 13.68 13.65 14.47 14.48 14.55 14.75 15.17 15.43 
Max. 49.79 49.79 49.79 49.94 49.94 49.94 51.27 51.27 51.27 54.34 54.34 54.34 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZE                         
Mean 20.48 20.59 20.72 20.82 20.88 20.97 21.01 21.01 21.09 21.14 21.16 21.19 
Std. Dev. 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.10 1.14 1.31 
Max. 23.60 23.61 23.61 23.82 23.82 23.82 23.93 24.00 24.04 24.17 24.38 24.73 
Median 20.39 20.51 20.64 21.00 20.78 20.90 20.99 20.95 21.05 21.10 21.11 21.19 
Min. 18.55 18.54 18.31 19.00 19.00 19.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 17.00 17.00 0.00 
GRO                         
Mean 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.008 
Std. Dev. 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.024 0.019 0.007 0.004 0.03 
Max. 0.009 0.012 0.074 0.040 0.113 0.088 0.134 0.318 0.247 0.119 0.047 0.445 
Median 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 
Min. 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
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Variable 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
LEV                         
Mean 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.54 
Std. Dev. 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.2 0.19 
Max. 0.86 0.93 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98    0.99 0.99 0.99 
Median 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54 
Min. 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 
PRO                         
Mean 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.25 
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.74 0.65 0.17 0.35 0.19 0.52 0.90 0.16 1.87 
Max. 0.54 0.40 0.39 11.2 10.3 1.44 3.75 2.14 6.26 13.52 2.15 2.44 
Median 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.083 0.083 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.064 0.06 0.07 
Min. -0.33 -4.53 -10.4 -10.3 -5.62 -4.32 -10.3 -10.2 -3.60 -8.87 -8.41 -10.2 
BOD                         
Mean 0.22 0.39 0.39 1.73 1.73 2.04 2.04 2.04 32.02 32.09 32.09 32.09 
Std. Dev. 2.40 3.18 3.18 6.63 6.63 7.22 7.22 7.22 5.96 6.09 6.09 6.09 
Max. 33.30 33.30 33.30 33.30 30.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.30 33.30 33.30 33.30 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7.15 Pearson correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. The sample is based on observations of 297 firms over the 1995-2006 period. 
2. Variables are defined in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 VDS STA LEG TRB IAC AUD BOD SIZE GRO LEV PRO IND 
VDS 1            
STA -0.03 1           
LEG -0.07 -0.79 1          
TRB 0.15 -0.07 -0.16 1         
IAC 0.16 0.04 -0.07 0.11 1        
AUD 0.10 0.10 -0.12 0.51 0.11 1       
BOD 0.49 -0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.21 0.03 1      
SIZE 0.20 0.11 -0.20 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.19 1     
GRO -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 1    
LEV 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 1   
PRO -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.50 0.04 1  
IND 0.22 0.19 -0.14 0.25 0.13 0.26 -0.01 0.15 -0.02 0.02 0.01 1 
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7.4.2 Regression results 
 
Tables 7.16 to 7.18 report multivariate test results. Regression models are run for Phase I, 
Phase II and Phase III, respectively. Each table consists of two panels. Panel A shows the 
result of a regression model including independent variable state ownership (STA) but not 
legal-person ownership (LEG). Panel B shows the result of a regression model including 
legal-person ownership (LEG) but not state ownership (STA). 
 
7.4.2.1 Phase I (1995-1998) 
 
Table 7.16 details the results for Phase I. In this period, due to lack of data, the independent 
variable audit committee (IAC) is dropped when running the regression models. It can be 
concluded that during the early development stage of the Chinese stock market, ownership 
structure, especially state ownership, had a significant impact on firms’ information 
disclosure. State ownership (STA) exhibits a negative and significant influence on firms’ 
information disclosure with a p value significant at 1 percent level. Thus, the higher the 
percentage of state ownership, the lower the voluntary disclosure made during Phase I. Legal-
person ownership (LEG) has a negative coefficient, as hypothesized by H3a, meaning that 
during that period, legal-person ownership also had an inverse relationship to firms’ 
disclosure but the impact was not significant. Foreign ownership (TRB) is positively related 
to the total voluntary disclosure score (VDS), as evidenced by a positive coefficient. 
However, this variable does not have any significant influence. These results lend strong 
support to H2a but not to H3a and H4a. 
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For the corporate governance related factor, the proportion of independent directors (BOD) 
shows no relation to firms’ disclosure decisions, although the coefficient is positive, as 
hypothesized. It means independent directors did not play any significant role in improving 
listed firms’ disclosure transparency during the 1995-1998 period. Given the low proportion 
of independent directors on the board of directors among the sample firms during this period 
(average 1% prior to 1999), it is not surprising to see such an insignificant result. Therefore, 
H5a is not supported. 
 
Among the three economics-based variables, leverage (LEV) does not show any significance 
in influencing a firm’s level of voluntary disclosure, although the coefficient is positive, as 
predicted in H7a. This means that listed firms’ borrowing has a positive influence on 
voluntary disclosure but not at a significant level. During the development stage of the 
Chinese stock market the importance of creditors as one of the stakeholder groups of listed 
firms was not recognized. Profitability (PRO), on the other hand, is significantly associated 
with the sample firms’ level of disclosure, with a p value significant at 1 percent level; 
however, it is significant in a negative way. This result shows that during the 1995-1998 
period, the less profit made by listed firms, the more voluntary disclosure they would make to 
the market. The voluntary disclosure made by poorly performing firms can be explained by 
the profitability requirements of the CSRS after the firms’ IPO listing. A listed firm could be 
delisted if it made a loss in three consecutive years. The less profitable firms could, therefore, 
adopt voluntary disclosure in an effort to maintain investors’ confidence. Growth opportunity 
(GRO) is significantly associated with the level of voluntary disclosure in a positive way, 
with a p value significant at 1 percent level, showing that firms with better future investment 
opportunities prefer to disclose more information to investors. These results support H8a and 
H9a but not H7a. 
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Regression results do not support H10a, as an international auditing firm (AUD) does not 
show any significant influence on firms’ voluntary disclosure during the 1995-1998 period, 
although the coefficient is positive, as predicted in H10a. Both control variables, size (SIZE) 
and industry (IND), as predicted, are positively and significantly related to firms’ levels of 
voluntary disclosure, with their p values both significant at 1 percent level. The larger the 
firm, the more information they disclose, and firms engaged in the manufacturing industry 
disclose more information than other categories of firms. 
 
7.4.2.2 Phase II (1999-2002) 
 
The results for Phase II are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7.17. During the 
corporate governance régime phase, state ownership (STA) is still significantly and 
negatively associated with a firm’s level of voluntary disclosure, with a p value significant at 
5 percent level. Legal-person ownership (LEG), however, shows a positive coefficient, 
meaning the relationship between firms’ disclosure and legal-person ownership has changed 
from negative to positive. The impact of legal-person ownership to firms’ voluntary 
disclosure is still not significant though. While foreign ownership (TRB) does not show any 
major impact on firms’ decisions on disclosure during the early stage of the Chinese stock 
market, it becomes one of the positive influential factors during the 1999-2002 period, with a 
p value significant at 1 percent level. The more foreign ownership a firm has the more 
voluntary disclosure the firm makes. These results support H2b and H4b but not H3b. 
 
Although Phase II saw the corporate governance régime as strongly promoted by government 
regulatory agencies in China, especially the CSRC, corporate governance related explanatory 
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variables, the proportion of independent directors (BOD) and an audit committee (IAC), do 
not show any significant influence on improving firms’ voluntary disclosure. The coefficients 
of both corporate governance related variables are positive, and in the direction hypothesized. 
The result could be interpreted that although the CSRC released various regulations in 2001 
to require firms to have a certain proportion of independent directors on the board in listed 
firms by July 2003, the regulations did not have any immediate impact on firms’ board 
composition during the 1999-2002 period. The proportion of independent directors increased 
only slightly, from less than 1% before 1999 to 2% before 2003. Thus, both H5b and H6b are 
not supported by regression results during the 1999-2002 period. 
 
Among the three economics-based variables, during the 1999-2002 period, leverage (LEV) is 
statistically significantly related to voluntary disclosure, with a p value significant at 1 
percent level, showing that the more borrowing the listed firms have, the more information 
disclosure they like to make to the capital market. Profitability (PRO) is still negatively 
associated with information disclosure. However, in contrast to the results in Phase I, the 
association is not statistically significant during this period. Growth opportunity (GRO) 
significantly influenced firms’ voluntary disclosure in a negative way during Phase II, with a 
p value significant at 1 percent level, meaning firms with lower future investment 
opportunities disclose more information to the stock market. Thus, H7b and H9b are 
supported, while H8b is not. An international audit firm (AUD) exhibits a stronger positive 
impact on firms’ disclosure levels, with a p value significant at 5 percent level, showing 
international audit firms play a significant role in improving firms’ disclosure transparency. 
H5 is supported by regression results during the 1999-2002 period. Two control variables, 
size (SIZE) and industry (IND), are all significantly related to information disclosure, with 
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their p values both significant at 1 percent level, and also in the direction predicted in the 
hypotheses. 
7.4.2.3 Phase III (2003-2006) 
 
Table 7.18 details regression results in Phase III. During this period, state ownership (STA) 
has a negative coefficient, as predicted by H2c. However, the impact of this variable on 
firms’ voluntary disclosure becomes insignificant. Legal-person ownership (LEG) still 
presents a positive coefficient but insignificant results. On the contrary, foreign ownership 
(TRB) is statistically significant and positively related to firms’ voluntary disclosure, with a p 
value significant at 1 percent level. Thus, during the 2003-2006 period, H4c is supported but 
not H2c and H3c. It is interesting to note that of the two corporate governance related 
variables, the proportion of independent directors on the board (BOD) significantly and 
positively contributes to an increased level of voluntary disclosure, with a p value significant 
at 1 percent level, while the audit committee (IAC) still fails to show any significance, 
although the coefficient is in the same direction as hypothesized. Thus, regression results of 
Phase III lend support to H5c but not H6c. 
 
Among the three economics-based variables, leverage (LEV) is the only variable showing 
significance positively, with a p value significant at 5 percent level, meaning that during the 
2003-2006 period, the more borrowings firms have, the more information they disclose. Both 
profitability (PRO) and growth opportunity (GRO) fail to show any significant influence on 
firms’ information disclosure decisions. Therefore, in Phase III, H7c is supported, but not 
H8c and H9c. An international audit firm (AUD) still presents a positive and significant 
influence on voluntary disclosure during this period, with a p value significant at 5 percent 
level, and, therefore, H10c is supported. The two control variables, size (SIZE) and industry 
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(IND), are all significantly and positively associated with firms’ voluntary disclosure in 
Phase III, with a p value for size significant at 5 percent level, and a p value for industry 
significant at 1 percent level.  
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Table 7.16 Regression results Phase I (1995-1998) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(Predicted 
Sign) 
 
Total VDS as Dependent Variable Phase I (1995-1998) 
 
Panel A Panel B 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t value 
 
p value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t value 
 
p value 
Intercept -3.8291 1.0191 -3.76    0.0002 -3.4795 1.0256 -3.39    0.0007 
STA (-) -0.5336 0.1529 -3.49 0.0005***     
LEG (+)     -0.0801 0.1489 -0.54    0.5912 
TRB (+) 0.7108 0.4814 1.48    0.1401 0.6767 0.4882 1.39    0.1661 
BOD (+) 1.5189 0.8902 1.71    0.0883* 1.4986 0.8979 1.67    0.0954* 
LEV (+) 0.3527 0.2491 1.42    0.1571 0.2226 0.2498 0.89    0.3729 
PRO (?) -2.1615 0.6146 -3.52 0.0005*** -1.9044 0.6161 -3.09 0.0020*** 
GRO (?) 17.001 21.344 7.97 0.0001*** 167.19 21.47 7.79 0.0001*** 
AUD (+) 0.0638 0.1460 0.44    0.6622 0.0468 0.1474 0.32    0.7512 
SIZE (+) 0.1975 0.0511 3.87 0.0001*** 0.1773 0.0511 3.47 0.0005*** 
IND (+) 0.5719 0.0807 7.09 0.0001*** 0.5172 0.0801 6.46 0.0001*** 
F statistic 17.22    15.70    
Significance <0.0001    <0.0001    
Adj. R² 0.1289    0.1183    
N 987    987    
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test. 
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Table 7.17 Regression results Phase II (1999-2002) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(Predicted 
Sign) 
 
Total VDS as Dependent Variable Phase II (1999-2002) 
 
Panel A Panel B 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t value 
 
p value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t value 
 
p value 
Intercept 1.8667 1.6702 1.12    0.2640 1.8075 1.6940 1.07    0.2863 
STA (-) -0.5135 0.2674 -1.92    0.0500**     
LEG (+)     0.2984 0.2647 1.13    0.2599 
TRB (+) 2.4383 0.8001 3.05 0.0024*** 2.5701 0.8069 3.19 0.0015*** 
IAC (+) 0.0052 0.0810 0.06    0.9492 0.0017 0.0812 0.02    0.9830 
BOD (+) 0.6801 0.8693 0.78    0.4342 0.4988 0.8678 0.57    0.5655 
LEV (+) 1.7311 0.3839 4.51 0.0001*** 1.7178 0.3851 4.46 0.0001*** 
PRO (?) -1.0086 0.6473 -1.56    0.1195 -1.1220 0.6441 -1.74    0.0818* 
GRO (?) -4.8011 12.889 -3.32 0.0009*** -45.247 12.834 -3.52 0.0004*** 
AUD (+) 0.7806 0.3704 2.11    0.0353** 0.7818 0.3709 2.11    0.0353** 
SIZE (+) 0.1946 0.0653 2.98 0.0029*** 0.1916 0.0657 2.91 0.0036*** 
IND (+) 1.0683 0.1359 7.86 0.0001*** 1.0349 0.1344 7.70 0.0001*** 
F statistic 15.20    14.92    
Significance <0.0001    <0.0001    
Adj. R² 0.1284    0.1262    
N 965    965    
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test. 
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Table 7.18 Regression results Phase III (2003-2006) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(Predicted 
Sign) 
 
Total VDS as Dependent Variable Phase III (2003-2006) 
 
Panel A Panel B 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t value 
 
p value 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
t value 
 
p value 
Intercept 2.2146 1.7437 0.12    0.9021 2.6743 1.7892 0.38    0.7064 
STA (-) -0.3498 0.3346 -1.05    0.2960     
LEG (+)     0.3888 0.3389 1.15    0.2515 
TRB (+) 2.9775 0.8951 3.33 0.0009*** 2.9214 0.8981 3.25 0.0012*** 
IAC (+) 2.5142 1.3737 1.83    0.0675 2.5165 1.3735 1.83    0.0672 
BOD (+) 0.6772 0.2556 2.65 0.0082*** 0.7001 0.2555 2.74 0.0063*** 
LEV (+) 0.2642 0.1321 2.00    0.0458** 0.2604 0.1324 1.97    0.0495** 
PRO (?) -0.0789 0.2031 -0.39    0.6977 -0.0729 0.2031 -0.36    0.7197 
GRO (?) -8.7116 8.4747 -1.03    0.3042 -8.0019 8.4743 -0.94    0.3453 
AUD (+) 0.4585 0.2209 2.08    0.0382** 0.4945 0.2212 2.24    0.0256** 
SIZE (+) 0.2021 0.0817 2.47    0.0136** 0.1808 0.0829 2.18    0.0293** 
IND (+) 1.8389 0.1645 11.18 0.0001*** 1.7889 0.1627 10.99 0.0001*** 
F statistic 19.68    19.71    
Significance <0.0001    <0.0001    
Adj. R² 0.1650    0.1652    
N 946    946    
 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level, two-tailed test. 
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7.4.3 Changes in stakeholder power over the years 
A close examination of the results presented in Tables 7.16 to 7.18 finds that factors 
influencing listed firms’ voluntary disclosure changed throughout the 1995–2006 
period. Changed influential factors over the three distinctive phases of the Chinese 
stock market reflect the changes that occurred to various stakeholder groups of listed 
firms. As stakeholders of listed firms, the power possessed by public investors, 
regulatory agents, creditors and professional services over listed firms have gradually 
increased. Table 7.19 summarizes the influential factors regarding firms’ voluntary 
disclosure in the three phases. 
 
Table 7.19 Influential factors in the three phases 
 
Influential 
factor 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Significance Direction Significance Direction Significance Direction
STA √ - √ - х - 
LEG х - х + х + 
TRB х + √ + √ + 
BOD х + х + √ + 
IAC х + х + х + 
LEV х + √ + √ + 
PRO √ - х - х - 
GRO √ + √ - х - 
AUD х + √ + √ + 
SIZE √ + √ + √ + 
IND √ + √ + √ + 
     (√: representing significant influence; х: representing insignificant influence) 
 
State ownership (STA) has a consistent negative association with firms’ voluntary 
disclosure. Although the mean of the state ownership of sample firms decreased from 
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30.47% in 1995 to 23.97% in 2006, the impact of state shareholders on firms’ 
disclosure choice is significant during the developing phase (1995-1998) and the 
corporate governance régime phase (1999-2002) of the Chinese stock market. During 
the 2003-2006 period, the impact of state ownership on firms’ disclosure is not 
significant; however, a negative coefficient shows it still has an inverse relationship 
with the total voluntary disclosure scores (VDS). The higher the proportion of state 
ownership a listed firm has, the lower the number of voluntary disclosures made by a 
firm. State ownership, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, is the result of a unique 
institutional setting when state owned enterprises were transformed into listed firms. 
This ownership structure does not truly represent any stakeholders’ interest in the 
listed firms, except for the “inside controllers”. Pursuing profitability is not a state 
shareholders’ primary concern. State shareholders also have privileged access to 
private information. These factors mean state shareholders lack interest in 
encouraging public disclosure. The result in this study is similar to Xiao et al.’s 
(2004) finding, which concludes there is a negative association between state 
ownership and information disclosure in the Chinese stock market. 
 
No significant impact is found from firms’ legal-person ownership (LEG) on their 
disclosure level in this study. According to Delios and Wu (2005), legal-person 
identity was created by the Chinese policy-makers to aid the transition of China’s 
SOEs to privately-owned status. Although legal-person shareholders are analogous to 
institutional shareholders, legal-person shareholders tend to have strong state-related 
roots in the early stage of the Chinese stock market. The implication is that legal-
person ownership does not represent any stakeholders’ interest in the early stage of 
the Chinese stock market. Non-state related legal-persons increase substantially 
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during the development of the Chinese stock market. Private companies, investment 
funds and securities companies become main shareholders under the legal-person 
ownership category (Delios and Wu, 2005). Several prior studies suggest that legal-
person ownership is motivated to pursue profit maximization and it is better equipped 
with the power and ability to monitor a firms’ management (Tam, 2002; Xiao et al., 
2004; Delios and Wu, 2005). Therefore, legal-person ownership has changed its status 
from state-related ownership to becoming part of the public investment community. 
 
It is worthwhile to notice that, in this study, although regression results throughout the 
entire testing periods fail to show any significant relationship between legal-person 
ownership and levels of voluntary disclosure, the coefficients change from negative in 
the 1995-1998 period to positive during the 1999-2006 period. As has been seen 
before when legal-person ownership changed from strong state-related shareholders to 
private institutions, legal-person ownership is now beginning to represent public 
investors’ economic stakes and financial interests. 
 
Prior studies investigating the association between legal-person ownership and firms’ 
performance provide inconclusive results. Major findings of Xu and Wang (1999), Qi 
et al. (2000), Sun et al. (2002) and Delios and Wu (2005) suggest a positive and 
significant impact of legal-person ownership on firms’ performance measures, while 
Wei and Varela (2003) show a negative and significant relationship between these 
two variables. However, Delios and Wu (2005) indicate that legal-person shareholders 
contribute to profit-oriented governance only if this type of shareholding has a high 
level of ownership concentration and is not in a minority ownership position. Only a 
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high level of ownership provides incentives to effectively monitor a firm’s 
management. 
 
In respect of information disclosure, while Xiao et al. (2004) find a positive 
relationship between legal-person ownership and firms’ disclosure levels, Xiao and 
Yuan (2007) report no relationship between this ownership and voluntary disclosure, 
based on 2002 financial year data. The result of this study is similar to the finding of 
Xiao and Yuan (2007). No relationship is found between legal-person ownership and 
firms’ disclosure levels. 
 
Foreign ownership (TRB), on the other hand, is positively and significantly related to 
firms’ voluntary disclosure during the 1999-2002 and 2003-2006 periods. As 
illustrated in Chapter 4, initially, B shares were exclusively issued to foreign 
investors. Since 2001, domestic individual investors were allowed to invest in B 
shares by using foreign currencies. Therefore, foreign ownership, in fact, represents 
an economic stake of both foreign investors and some domestic investors. As 
experienced investors, foreign ownership shareholders could exert more effective 
external monitoring and pressure on listed firms’ management to disclose more 
information. Following International Accounting Standards when preparing financial 
statements for foreign investors could also contribute to a higher level of voluntary 
disclosure. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 5, listed firms with foreign ownership 
are politically visible in China. Liu and Eddie (2007) suggest listed firms with foreign 
investment participation increase information disclosure voluntarily in their annual 
reports, in order to enhance their reputation and credibility. More extensive voluntary 
disclosures and a widened dissemination of financial information can create an 
  284
impression of greater transparency in the Chinese stock market as a whole. 
Transparent information disclosure will increase an overseas investment community’s 
confidence in investing in China. The result of this study provides strong support for 
the findings of Xiao et al. (2004), Liu and Eddie (2007), and Xiao and Yuan (2007). 
 
The corporate governance related variable, the proportion of independent directors 
(BOD), only shows its significance during the last testing phase, the 2003-2006 
period, while another independent variable, audit committee (IAC), does not show 
any relationship with firms’ voluntary disclosure. Both an independent directors 
system and an audit committee are advocated by the CSRC, aiming to improve 
corporate governance among listed firms. The political objective of regulatory 
agencies in the Chinese stock market is minority investor protection. The protection 
of the minority investor is one of the essential principles to ensure long-term and 
healthy growth of the capital market in China, and development of the capital market 
is part of the sustainable development of the Chinese economy. The viewpoint taken 
by the CSRC is that only a good corporate governance structure can achieve minority 
investor protection in the Chinese stock market. Independent directors can effectively 
monitor management’s performance and represent public shareholders’ interest. In the 
process of establishing an independent director system, the CSRC not only exerted its 
power by stipulating an important regulation, Guide Opinion on Establishing 
Independent Director System by Listed Companies in 2001, but also organized 
training of independent directors and set up an “independent director candidature 
pool” for listed firms. It is reasonable to assume that independent directors started to 
play a positive and significant role in improving firms’ disclosure transparency in the 
Chinese stock market during the 2003-2006 period. This result supports the findings 
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of Xiao et al. (2004) and Xiao and Yuan (2007), whose studies both used data 
collected from annual reports after 2001. Audit committees are supposed to monitor 
firms’ internal controls and review the internal audit system. Establishing an audit 
committee was recommended by one of the CSRC’s regulations stipulated in early 
2001, the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, but setting 
up an audit committee is voluntary for listed firms rather than being compulsory. One 
possible explanation for the insignificant impact of an audit committee on firms’ 
levels of voluntary disclosure is the low proportion of audit committees that existed 
among the sample firms. 
 
The importance of creditors has gradually been recognized by listed firms over the 
years. The creditor group can be identified as one of the powerful stakeholders of 
listed firms. Leverage represents firms’ financial structure and associated risk; the 
higher the leverage, the higher the risk of creditors’ investment. In this study, leverage 
(LEV) is significantly related to levels of voluntary disclosure over the 1999-2006 
period, although no significant association is found between firms’ leverage and 
voluntary disclosure during the 1995-1998 period, the early development stage of the 
Chinese stock market. Gradually declining “Policy Loans” and increasing commercial 
loans to listed firms may explain the relationship between leverage and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The risks associated with commercial loans could also motivate 
creditors to increase their demands for information disclosure from listed firms. 
Similar to public investors, their information demands are supported by the regulatory 
agencies in the Chinese stock market. Results in this study show firms with high 
leverage choose to disclose more information. This is similar to what Liu and Eddie 
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(2007) found, but contrasts with the result of Xiao and Yuan (2007), which shows 
there is no significant relationship between a firm’s leverage and its disclosure level. 
 
An external international audit firm (AUD) is shown by the empirical results in this 
study as one variable that consistently contributes to an increased level of voluntary 
disclosure. Firms issuing B shares are required to prepare two sets of financial 
statements, based on Chinese GAAP and international accounting standards (IAS), 
respectively, and to have their annual reports audited by international auditors. 
Meanwhile, some large domestic listed firms also employ international auditing firms. 
According to signaling theory, employing audit firms with an international reputation 
is a way of obtaining greater potential gains from external monitoring (Xiao et al., 
2004). Under legitimacy theory, reputation is one of the concerns of large/high 
reputation audit firms. As Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) suggest, to maintain or 
enhance their reputation and avoid reputation costs, high audit reputation firms are 
more likely than lower reputation audit firms to persuade or demand their clients to 
adhere to the recommended disclosure régime. The results in this study are consistent 
with the findings in Xiao et al. (2004), Xiao and Yuan (2007) and Liu and Eddie 
(2007). 
 
Profitability (PRO) and growth opportunity (GRO) present mixed results. The 
coefficients across the three tables indicate that the impact of these two variables on 
the level of voluntary disclosure is not unidirectional. These results are not consistent 
with prior studies (Liu and Eddie, 2007; Xiao and Yuan, 2007). Liu and Eddie (2007) 
find profitability in the Chinese stock market has a positive impact on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure, while Xiao and Yuan (2007) find firms with growth 
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opportunities are reluctant to disclose more information. Given the unstable increase 
and decrease of profitability and growth opportunity presented by descriptive 
statistics, it is concluded that profitability and growth opportunity do not have 
explanatory power in explaining firms’ disclosure decisions. 
 
Two control variables, firm size (SIZE) and industry classification (IND), are both in 
the direction hypothesized. Throughout the 1995–2006 period, both of them are 
significantly related to firms’ voluntary disclosure. The results prove that large listed 
firms are politically sensitive and visible in Chinese society, and political factors drive 
them to disclose more information to external investors. Further, firms engaged in the 
manufacturing industry disclose more information than non-manufacturing firms. 
These results are all consistent with the findings of Liu and Eddie (2007). 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the extent and characteristics of listed firms’ voluntary 
disclosure over the three testing phases. It also reports and analyses tests of the 
associations between disclosure and firm characteristics, in order to find out, 
specifically, what factors motivated listed firms to voluntarily disclose information to 
investors. 
 
The voluntary disclosures made by listed firms in the Chinese stock market increased 
over the three testing phases. The number of disclosing firms increased significantly 
from Phase I to Phase II for all three disclosure sections. Consistent with the number 
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of disclosing firms, the voluntary disclosure scores of the three disclosure sections 
also increased dramatically during Phase II. These results show that listed firms 
positively reacted to a changed corporate disclosure environment in China. Among 
the three disclosure sections, strategic information disclosure is found to have the 
highest voluntary disclosure scores, followed by financial information and non-
financial information. Close examination of the three disclosure sections demonstrates 
that listed firms are selective in their information disclosure. Forward-looking 
information, under both the strategic information and financial information sections, 
was found to have a strong connection with voluntary disclosure, meaning that to 
satisfy the information demand of regulatory agencies and the investment community, 
listed firms used voluntary disclosure to manage stakeholder relationships and 
legitimate their social status in the Chinese stock market. 
 
The study also investigates factors affecting listed firms’ voluntary disclosure. It finds 
that state ownership had a significant negative impact on firms’ disclosure decisions 
during the 1995-2003 financial years. Legal ownership does not have any impact on 
firms’ disclosure behavior. Foreign investment, however, has a significant positive 
influence on firms’ voluntary disclosure. The corporate governance related factor, the 
proportion of independent directors, shows its significance only during Phase III, 
reflecting increased pressure from the corporate governance régime in the Chinese 
stock market. International audit firms were found to play a positive and significant 
role in improving disclosure transparency among listed firms. Among the economics-
based variables, leverage became an influential factor from the late 1990s, and firms 
with a high proportion of loans tend to disclose more information. The larger the firm, 
the more voluntary disclosure is found. Firms engaged in the manufacturing industry 
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were found to disclose more information than firms not engaged in the manufacturing 
industry. Finally, profitability and growth opportunity, however, present mixed results 
and their influence on firms’ disclosure decisions are inconclusive.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter reviews the study by revisiting the purpose of the study in Section 8.2, 
and summarizing the main contents of each of the preceding chapters. Section 8.3 
summarizes the findings of the study and discusses the implications of the findings for 
the stakeholders of listed Chinese firms and the regulatory bodies in China. Section 
8.4 addresses the limitations of the study in respect of research design. The 
implications of this study for future research are explored in Section 8.5. Section 8.6 
concludes the thesis by summarizing the contribution made by this study to the 
voluntary disclosure literature. 
 
8.2 Review of the study 
 
8.2.1 Purpose of the study 
 
 
This thesis argues that the political, economic and social changes in China have led to 
the changes in the corporate disclosure environment for listed firms. The economic 
reforms launched by the Chinese government since the late 1970s have allowed China 
to undergo a remarkable transformation, from a centrally-planned economy to a more 
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open and market-oriented economy. The increasing sophistication of the Chinese 
economy and the profound reform of the state-owned enterprises have led to the 
establishment of the Chinese stock market. The rapid development of the Chinese 
stock market over the years has become one of the driving forces behind the 
establishment of the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure in China and its 
harmonization with the international accounting standards. The political and social 
liberalizations in China can be seen both as causes and results of the economic 
development and reforms of the past three decades. New stakeholders of listed 
Chinese firms have emerged and they now demand transparent information 
disclosure. All these changes have created a challenging disclosure environment for 
publicly-listed firms in China. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the changed disclosure environment 
has impacted on the disclosure behavior of Chinese listed firms. In order to address 
this issue, the investigation is empirically conducted by examining the voluntary 
disclosure of the strategic, financial and non-financial information made available by 
listed Chinese firms in their annual reports in the 1995-2006 reporting periods in this 
study. It examines to what extent listed Chinese firms have increased their disclosure 
transparency during this period of time, and what the driving factors behind their 
voluntary disclosures are. 
 
The investigation of voluntary disclosure made by listed Chinese firms during 1995-
2006 is motivated by: (1) the strategic importance of the Chinese stock market to 
China’s economic and social development; (2) the controversial and complex nature 
of the Chinese stock market; and (3) the dramatically changed disclosure environment 
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in China during the past two decades. The significance of the Chinese stock market to 
the Chinese economy is the important role it plays in improving the allocation of 
financial resources to facilitate the growth of the corporate sector, inducing 
fundamental changes in corporate governance, providing new channels to attract 
foreign investment, and facilitating the integration of China into the global economic 
system. In respect of social development in China, the Chinese stock market has 
offered diversified investment opportunities to domestic investors in China, provided 
support to the establishment of a social security system, and nurtured new industries 
and new professionals in Chinese society. Due to its unique historical background and 
institutional setting, the Chinese stock market is characterized by the different types 
of shares, such as tradable and non-tradable shares, domestic A Shares and foreign 
investor owned B Shares, and the conflicting interests between the majority 
shareholders and the minority investors in listed firms. To reduce information 
asymmetry, improve corporate governance of listed firms and improve corporate 
disclosure transparency, the Chinese government and its regulatory agency has made 
remarkable efforts in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
corporate disclosure. The objective of corporate disclosure has shifted from satisfying 
the government’s information needs to satisfying investors and other stakeholders’ 
information needs. The power of stakeholders over the financial resources of listed 
firms has increased dramatically during the past twenty years. In order to make more 
informed economic decisions, stakeholders have gradually increased their demands 
for transparent information disclosure from the listed firms. 
 
To investigate how the changed disclosure environment has impacted on listed firms’ 
voluntary disclosure, this study addresses these two specific research questions: 
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1) To what extent has the level of voluntary disclosure of listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market changed over the 1995-2006 period? 
2) What are the factors that have contributed to the changed level of voluntary 
disclosure in the Chinese stock market? 
In answering these two research questions, the study empirically investigates the 
predictive ability of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. Voluntary corporate 
disclosure has long been researched within the information perspective and 
contracting research paradigm. These economics-based views, however, narrow the 
investigation of firms’ voluntary disclosure down solely to the relationship between 
investors and firms’ management, without considering the broader social impact of 
corporations’ behavior. 
 
Legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory suggest that corporations are operating in a 
social environment. To legitimate their social status and improve their social image, 
corporations need to comply with commonly-accepted social norms and values. 
Corporations’ prospects are affected by various stakeholder groups existing in society 
and corporations need to satisfy powerful stakeholders’ demands. Applying 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to the Chinese context, it is suggested that 
the changed corporate disclosure environment has created a challenging and 
demanding information disclosure régime for listed Chinese firms. To satisfy 
powerful stakeholders’ information demands, listed firms are expected to voluntarily 
disclose information to the Chinese stock market. 
 
The whole testing period, 1995-2006, is further divided into three testing phases 
which reflect the different development stages of the Chinese stock market. Phase I is 
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the developing phase (1995-1998); Phase II is the corporate governance régime phase 
(1999-2002); and Phase III is the convergence phase (2003-2006). The extent of 
voluntary disclosure made by firms continuously listed on the Chinese stock market 
between 1995 and 2006 is examined, and the different factors contributing to firms’ 
disclosure decision-making during different testing phases are explored. 
 
8.2.2 Content of preceding chapters 
 
 
Chapter 2 critically reviews the extant literature of voluntary information disclosure. 
The economic-based views include an information perspective and a contact 
perspective. These two perspectives suggest that the purposes of voluntary disclosure 
are to reduce the information asymmetry existing between the management of firms 
and external investors; to reduce firms’ cost of capital; and to signal a firm’s good 
performance to the stock market. The alternative view employed to explain voluntary 
disclosure is the system-oriented view, which includes legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory and institutional theory. The system-oriented view argues that the motivations 
behind firms’ voluntary disclosure cannot be fully explained without referring to the 
social environment in which firms operate. Legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
institutional theory suggest that firms use voluntary disclosure to legitimate their 
social status and satisfy powerful stakeholders’ information demands. The review of 
the voluntary disclosure literature provides the theoretical underpinnings for the 
study. 
 
Chapter 3 illustrates the political reform, economic reform and social changes that 
have occurred in China over the past three decades. The shift of political emphasis 
from political campaigns to economic construction and development by the Chinese 
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Communist Party (CCP), paved the way for the economic reform and social changes. 
The economic reforms have called for a more accommodating financial system for 
state-owned enterprises. Without funds and capital being centrally-administered and 
allocated to enterprises by the state government, Chinese firms needed to diversify 
their funding channels. Banks and public investors have become the new providers of 
financial resources for Chinese enterprises, and the ownership structure of these 
Chinese enterprises has fundamentally changed from public ownership to full or 
partial private ownership. The emergence of the Chinese stock market is a response to 
the call for new fund-raising channels for Chinese enterprises. Creditors and 
investors, therefore, have become the new stakeholders of listed firms. A revitalized 
Chinese economy has also led to some changes in social values and norms. A more 
open and competitive society has enhanced the individualism of the Chinese people; 
pursuing power and wealth are now commonly accepted by Chinese society. Public 
investors can now exert pressure on listed firms for transparent information disclosure 
using legal mechanisms. 
 
Chapter 4 elaborates on the establishment of the regulatory framework of corporate 
disclosure. Two regulatory agents of the Chinese government, the Ministry of Finance 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission have played essential roles in 
building up the regulatory framework of corporate disclosure. The transformation 
from state-owned enterprises to listed firms has resulted in a large stake of state 
ownership now existing among listed firms. State ownership was not tradable between 
1990 and 2004. However, the co-existence of tradable and non-tradable shares has 
created an agency problem among listed firms. The agency problem is in the form of 
the conflicting interests between majority shareholders, who represent state 
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ownership, and minor investors who own tradable A or B Shares. Poor corporate 
governance practices such as “one dominating state-owned share monopolizes” and 
“insider control” have hampered the sustainable development of the Chinese stock 
market. To maintain investors’ confidence, the Chinese government has implemented 
a series of measures to improve corporate governance and protect minority investors’ 
interests. Chapter 4 provides a chronology of the MOF’s efforts in harmonizing the 
Chinese accounting standards with internationally accepted accounting standards. The 
important regulations and enforcement mechanisms of the CSRC in respect of 
strengthening information disclosure and corporate governance, are also illustrated in 
this chapter. Collectively, Chapters 3 and 4 identify the important stakeholders of the 
listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
 
Chapter 5 justifies the use of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to explain the 
disclosure behavior changes of listed firms in the Chinese context, and assesses 
stakeholders’ attributes in order to identify the powerful stakeholders of listed 
Chinese firms. Propositions established are that listed firms in the Chinese stock 
market: need to legitimate their social status in response to the changed disclosure 
environment and increased voluntary disclosure as a result of stakeholder salience; 
ownership structures reflect shareholders’ financial stake in listed firms and influence 
firms’ disclosure behavior; corporate governance variables reflect the political stakes 
of regulatory agencies and influence firms’ disclosure behavior; firms’ economic 
attributes are closely related to creditors’ and shareholders’ financial stakes and are 
associated with firms’ disclosure behavior; and listed firms use auditing firms with a 
good reputation to legitimate their social status. Chapter 5 divides the entire testing 
period, 1995-2006, into three testing phases: Phase I Developing phase (1995-1998); 
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Phase II Corporate governance régime phase (1999-2002); and Phase III Convergence 
phase (2003-2006). Hypotheses are then developed for each phase based on the 
theoretical underpinnings and institutional environment discussed in preceding 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 6 explains several important aspects of the research design. The justifications 
for employing a longitudinal approach, examination of annual reports and voluntary 
disclosure are provided. To satisfy the minimum requirement of a longitudinal study, 
297 listed firms that were continuously listed on the Chinese stock market between 
1995 and 2006 were selected as the sample. A voluntary disclosure checklist designed 
for this study is based on the preliminary test, the survey extant voluntary disclosure 
literature, as well as reference to the voluntary disclosure framework recommended 
by the FASB in the US. The checklist consists of three information disclosure 
sections: strategic, financial and non-financial information. Each disclosure item is 
assigned with a different score, reflecting the importance of some disclosure items to 
investors’ decision-making. Stability and reproducibility tests were conducted to 
ensure the validity of the checklist. To determine different factors motivating sample 
firms’ voluntary disclosure during different testing phases, OLS regression models 
were run for the three different testing phases. 
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8.3 Findings of the study and the implications 
 
8.3.1 Findings 
 
 
The findings of the study are reported and discussed in Chapter 7. Over the three 
testing phases, listed Chinese firms have gradually increased their voluntary 
disclosures. This is evidenced by the gradually increasing number of disclosing firms 
and the increased voluntary disclosure scores attained by the sample firms. Therefore, 
the findings are consistent with the hypotheses that listed firms positively react to a 
changed corporate disclosure environment in China by increasing their information 
disclosure transparency. Three main characteristics of voluntary disclosures are 
found: a significant increase in voluntary disclosure, selective information disclosure, 
and a high volume of forward-looking information disclosure. These characteristics 
reflect the response of listed firms to the power changes of various stakeholder groups 
in the Chinese stock market over the years under study. 
 
During Phase II (1999-2002), the government regulatory agency of the Chinese stock 
market, the CSRC, changed its role from administrative approval to stock market 
supervisor. It initiated a series of reforms to boost the quality of listed firms, protect 
investors’ interests and rights, and promote the sustained and robust development of 
the Chinese stock market. Regulations stipulated during this period of time, especially 
the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China and the Notice of 
Establishing an independent Directors System in Listed Firms, are aimed at enhancing 
listed firms’ disclosure transparency, corporate governance and the overall quality of 
reporting. Strong enforcement actions and measures implemented during this period 
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make the CSRC a definitive stakeholder of listed firms. It exhibits a strong political 
stake, power, legitimacy and urgency over listed firms’ financial resources. The 
CSRC’s public condemnation, investigation, suspension, imposed financial penalties 
and delisting, could severely damage a firm’s reputation and image in the Chinese 
stock market and, hence, investors’ confidence and perceptions of a firm. Investors 
are the stakeholder group that has an economic stake in listed firms. They have 
gradually increased their demands for transparent information disclosure and have 
realized that they can use legal mechanisms to protect their financial interests. Several 
high-profile legal proceedings between investors and listed firms occurred during the 
1999-2002 period. The investor group has now become a dependent stakeholder of 
listed firms. Commercialized state-owned banks are another new stakeholder group 
for listed firms. From being forced to make “Policy Loans” to the Chinese enterprises, 
to pursuing economic benefits from their investments, these creditors possess the 
stakeholder attributes which enable them to become definitive stakeholders of listed 
firms. The professional association, CICPA, has its political stake in listed firms. 
However, due to weak enforcement of its rules and standards, this stakeholder group 
is only a discretionary stakeholder. Significantly increased voluntary disclosure in 
Phase II is the response of listed firms to the changed role of the CSRC and to the 
increased importance of investors and creditors to firms’ financial resources. A high 
volume of forward-looking information has been disclosed in response to the CSRC’s 
call for information transparency. To satisfy the information demands of regulatory 
agencies and the investment community, listed firms use voluntary disclosure to 
manage stakeholder relationships and legitimate their social status in the Chinese 
stock market. However, selective information disclosure is evidenced by the 
disclosure of more strategic information than the disclosure of financial and non-
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financial information, more qualitative information than quantitative information, and 
more general information than sensitive information. 
 
In respect of the driving forces of voluntary disclosure, this study finds that state 
ownership has had a significant negative impact on firms’ disclosure decisions over 
the years. Legal ownership, however, does not have any significant impact on firms’ 
disclosure decisions. Foreign investment has been a strong influence on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure since the establishment of the Chinese stock market. In addition, 
independent directors and reputable audit firms have played a positive and significant 
role in improving firms’ information disclosure transparency. Among the economics-
based variables, leverage became an influential factor from the late 1990s. The results 
also show that firms with a high proportion of loans tend to disclose more 
information. Profitability and growth opportunities, however, present mixed results 
and their influence on firms’ disclosure decisions are inconclusive. Firm size is found 
to be positively related to voluntary disclosure; the larger the firm, the higher the level 
of voluntary disclosure the firm adopts. This finding is consistent with voluntary 
disclosure literature, which suggests that larger firms are subject to greater public 
scrutiny. Another finding indicates that firms engaged in the manufacturing industry 
disclosed more information than firms not engaged in manufacturing. 
8.3.2 Implications of research findings 
 
 
There are three important implications of the research findings of this study. First, this 
study provides further empirical evidence to support Chinese regulatory bodies’ 
actions in promoting and implementing a good corporate governance régime among 
listed firms in the Chinese stock market. The positive association between corporate 
  301
governance and the level of voluntary disclosure shows that the implementation of 
corporate governance structures in Chinese firms is beneficial to investors. Further, 
the requirements on board composition and roles that should be undertaken by 
independent directors have improved the information disclosure transparency. This 
result may help the regulatory bodies of other emerging capital markets to improve 
their countries’ market transparency by introducing a similar requirement. In addition, 
the establishment of the independent director system in China involves CSRC training 
independent directors and enforcing listed firms to have at least one-third of the 
directors on board independent by a certain date. These measures have effectively 
exerted the pressure from the regulator to implement a good corporate governance 
régime, and have made firms realize the importance of the CSRC’s regulations to 
their firm’s long-term success. They have also sent strong signals to firms that 
corporate governance is essential to protect minority investors’ interests. Therefore, 
an implication of this study is that the regulatory bodies of the Chinese stock market 
should continue to strengthen corporate governance among listed firms by 
maintaining the enforcement of their regulations. 
 
Second, the negative association between state ownership and voluntary disclosure 
found in this study provides strong support for the non-tradable state ownership 
reform which has been implemented by the CSRC since 2005. Due to the lack of a 
“true owner” under the state ownership structure, state ownership cannot truly 
represent the state’s financial stake in listed firms. Rather, “one dominating state-
owned share monopolizes” and “insider control” agency problems are derived from 
the non-tradable state ownership in the Chinese stock market. State ownership has 
become an important factor which hampers the disclosure transparency of listed firms. 
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The existence of state ownership provides evidence that, in the early stage of China’s 
transformation from a planned economy to a market-driven economy, the Chinese 
government was careful with the changes in ownership structure. Fear of losing 
control over listed firms is the primary purpose of having non-tradable state 
ownership. It is plausible that to improve the efficiency of the Chinese capital market, 
the CSRC launched the non-tradable shares reform in 2005. The ultimate goal of the 
reform was to make all shares tradable in the Chinese stock market. The signal sent by 
the Chinese government was that the development of the Chinese stock market should 
follow market principles rather than operate under the shadow of a planned economy. 
 
Third, the significant and positive relationship found between foreign investment and 
voluntary disclosure in this study provides empirical evidence to support the Chinese 
government’s Open Door policy, in general, and the opening-up of the Chinese stock 
market more specifically. As foreign investors from developed countries have more 
experience and skills in monitoring firms’ performance and demanding more 
information, they have played a positive role in improving disclosure transparency. 
By the end of 2006, the CSRC had fulfilled the commitments made for accession to 
the WTO in opening-up the Chinese stock market. Since 2001, foreign enterprises 
have been permitted to apply for listing on the Chinese stock market. In 2002, foreign 
investors were allowed to purchase state shares and legal-person shares. In 2006, 
foreign investors were allowed to make a strategic investment in the A shares of listed 
firms which had completed their non-tradable share reform (CSRC, 2009). The 
opening-up of the Chinese stock market will be beneficial to investors and improve 
the overall efficiency of the market. 
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8.4 Limitations of the study 
 
 
There are two things to be noted when interpreting the results of this study. First, this 
study does not intend to measure the quality of voluntary disclosure made by listed 
firms. The focus of the empirical study is to measure the changes to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure over the years. Second, the empirical investigation of voluntary 
disclosure in this study is based on the assumption of stock market efficiency. In 
addition, this study has some limitations in respect of its research design and data 
collection. This section discusses the imprecision in measuring the dependent 
variable, the limited scope of voluntary disclosure data collection, and the inability to 
differentiate entities that do not disclose any extra information voluntarily and entities 
having no extra information to disclose. It is suggested that the findings of this study 
should be interpreted with care because of these limitations. 
8.4.1 Imprecision in measuring the dependent variable 
 
 
Imprecision in measuring the dependent variable could be caused by two possible 
reasons, voluntary disclosure checklist design and manual data collection. This study 
investigates the disclosure behavior changes of listed firms over the years in the 
Chinese stock market through examining voluntary disclosure. The data needs to be 
collected for the dependent variable; however, the total number of voluntary 
disclosures of the sample firms is not readily available from databases. Although a 
preliminary test was conducted, and the design of the voluntary disclosure checklist 
referred to available statutory requirements and extant literature to ensure the 
comprehensiveness of the checklist, it is not certain that the checklist designed for the 
study has captured all possible voluntary disclosures that the sample of listed firms 
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have made. It is also not certain that compiling the checklist is free from some degrees 
of subjectivity. The data was collected manually from the annual reports, according to 
the checklist, and a score assigned. Although measures were put into place to ensure 
the reliability of the data collection, it is not possible to avoid errors in selecting 
voluntary disclosure items and assigning different scores to each item. 
8.4.2 Scope of data collection 
 
 
The data for the dependent variable is limited to the annual reports of the sample 
firms in this study because of the availability of the data. Extant disclosure literature 
suggests that disclosures made in annual reports can be regarded as an appropriate 
source of a firm’s attitude towards reporting and disclosures (Gray et al., 1995). 
Annual report disclosure is found to be positively related to corporate disclosure in 
other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997). In addition to annual 
reports, listed firms in the Chinese stock market are also required to provide quarterly 
reports, interim reports and press releases. There is a possibility that these disclosure 
channels may contain voluntary disclosures which are not captured by sample firms’ 
annual reports. In addition, the sample selection is narrowed down to the firms 
continuously listed from 1995 to 2006. The rationale of such a sample selection 
method is to satisfy the requirements of a longitudinal research approach, which 
involves repeated observations of the same samples for multiple time periods. It is 
believed that the changes in voluntary disclosures made by firms continuously listed 
from 1995 to 2006 better reflect the trend of listed firms’ disclosure behavior changes 
during the changing disclosure environment. However, the findings based on the 
sample firms may not be generalizable to other firms listed on the Chinese stock 
market during a different period of time, especially since state-ownership reform, as 
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these firms work in a different disclosure environment from the firms listed in the 
early stages of the Chinese stock market. 
8.4.3 Inability to differentiate non-disclosure firms and non-
information firms 
 
 
In the process of extracting voluntary disclosure examples from the sample firms, it is 
impossible to differentiate between the firms that have extra information but choose 
not to disclose it for reasons such as proprietary costs, and the firms that genuinely 
have no extra information to disclose. Nor is it reasonable to make an assumption that 
non-disclosure firms in this study are the firms that have extra information but do not 
want to disclose it to the public. Therefore, there is a possibility that the results of this 
study are affected by the firms that genuinely do not have any extra information to 
disclose. 
 
8.5 Implications for future research 
 
 
 
8.5.1 Value relevance and economic benefits of voluntary disclosure 
 
 
This study focuses on voluntary disclosure made by listed firms to the Chinese stock 
market. It investigates the changes in disclosure behavior of listed firms in response to 
a changed disclosure environment. The increased level of voluntary disclosure over 
the years reflects the viewpoint of preparers of annual reports, or the providers of the 
information, rather than users’ viewpoints. Whether users find the voluntary 
disclosures made by listed firms are useful for their decision-making has not been 
investigated by this study. Therefore, it would seem desirable that future studies 
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address the information usefulness of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock 
market by exploring, first, value relevance of voluntary disclosure and, second, the 
linkage between voluntary disclosure and economic benefits. Value relevance studies 
are able to determine users’ reaction to the voluntary disclosures, which could be 
represented by movements of share prices and trading volumes. The studies 
examining the linkage between voluntary disclosure and economic benefits are able to 
find out whether voluntary disclosures could contribute to a reduced cost of capital for 
listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
8.5.2 Accuracy and predictability of forward-looking information 
disclosure 
 
One of the findings of this study is that listed firms are in favor of forward-looking 
information disclosure. Listed firms disclose their earnings forecasts, targeted sales, 
and projected cash flow, although the information is not compulsorily required in an 
annual report. Future research could examine whether the forward-looking 
information voluntarily disclosed by listed firms possesses accuracy and predictability 
in the Chinese stock market. The accuracy and predictability can be examined by 
comparing forward-looking information disclosed with firms’ future measures, such 
as future sales, future operating cash flow, future capital expenditure and future 
earnings. 
8.5.3 Voluntary disclosure post-2007 
 
 
The testing period covered by this study is 1995 to 2006. For the Chinese stock 
market, the 2007 financial year was a milestone for two specific reasons. First, the 
Chinese government initiated non-tradable share reform from April 2005. The 
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objective of the non-tradable share reform was intended to lift trading restrictions 
imposed on state ownership and make the shares publicly tradable. By the end of 
2007, 1298 listed firms had either initiated or completed the process of non-tradable 
share reform, accounting for 98% of the total listed firms in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Only 33 listed firms had not completed the reform. 
Therefore, the non-tradable share reform was mostly completed by the end of 2007. 
Given the negative association between state ownership and voluntary disclosure, as 
the findings of this study have shown, future research could examine the voluntary 
disclosure made by listed firms in post-state ownership periods. The second milestone 
occurred on 16th February 2006, when the MOF announced a revised Accounting 
Standard for Business Enterprises (revised ASBE), which is effective from 1 January 
2007. The revised ASBE consists of the ASBE and 38 specific ASBEs that are 
substantially in line with international standards. The release of the new ASBE marks 
the full harmonization of the Chinese accounting standards with IFRS, and the new 
ASBE is expected to provide more decision-useful information (MOF Press Release, 
February 2006). Given the significance of this event, it is worthwhile for future 
research to investigate voluntary disclosure made by listed firms, and the factors 
which are motivating firms to voluntarily disclose information post-2007. 
8.5.4 Another possible explanatory variable – managerial ownership 
 
 
Reviewed in Chapter 2, managerial ownership has been suggested as one of the 
important factors motivating firms to voluntarily disclose information. However, due 
to a low proportion of managerial ownership in the sample firms, this study does not 
include managerial ownership as one of the independent variables in the regression 
model. With the implementation of non-tradable share reform, the legal foundations 
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and market environment for providing incentive structures steadily improved among 
listed firms (CSRC, 2009). In late 2005, the CSRC released Opinions on Regulations 
of Stock Incentives by Listed Companies, enabling listed firms that had completed 
non-tradable share reform to implement a stock incentive mechanism. In 2006, the 
CSRC announced the Administrative Measures on Stock Incentives by Listed Firms 
(Provisional), aiming to promote the establishment and improvement of a sound 
incentive and supervision mechanism for listed firms. The new regulation prescribed 
that stock incentives should be mainly in the form of restricted shares and share 
options. As the proportion of managerial ownership increases gradually, especially 
during the post state ownership period, future research could explore whether 
managerial ownership becomes another possible factor motivating listed firms to 
voluntarily disclose information in the Chinese stock market. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the changed disclosure 
environment on the disclosure behavior of listed firms in the Chinese stock market. 
More specifically, this study investigates the impact of the changed corporate 
disclosure environment during the past twenty years on the level of voluntary 
corporate disclosure in the Chinese stock market. It aims to make several 
contributions to the literature and to business practice. First, this study extends the 
literature of voluntary disclosure by providing empirical evidence in an emerging 
capital market. The study investigates voluntary disclosures for a relatively large 
sample of firms listed on the Chinese stock market and operating across most 
industries. The use of longer time data (1995-2006) enables shifts in voluntary 
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disclosure strategies to be identified and to incorporate the time periods during which 
several important regulations on external reporting were promulgated. It contributes 
to the understanding of firms’ responses to the changes in the corporate disclosure 
environment since the beginning of the 1990s. Second, this study applies and 
operationalizes legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory in the Chinese context. 
Previously, corporate disclosure in the Chinese stock market has been researched 
within a contracting research paradigm and firm characteristics. There has not been a 
study particularly focused on the behavioral changes of Chinese listed firms by the 
application of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. This study, therefore, extends 
the literature by using a system-oriented theoretical framework to explain corporate 
disclosure behavior in the Chinese setting. Third, this study provides empirical 
evidence, for the Chinese regulatory bodies and investors in the Chinese stock market, 
of the changes in disclosure decisions over the years, along with the dramatic changes 
in the corporate disclosure environment. It shows the effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework relating to disclosure and of the introduction of a corporate governance 
régime in the Chinese stock market. 
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